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PRO and CON:

BEING

AN IMPARTIAL ABSTRACT

OF THE

PRINCIPAL PUBLICATIONS

ON THE SUBJECT OF A

LEGISLATIVE UNION,

BETWEEN

GREAT BRITAIN AND *IRELAND*;

IN WHICH THE

ARGUMENTS *FOR* AND *AGAINST* THAT MEASURE,
BY THE FOLLOWING WRITERS,

ARE FAIRLY CONTRASTED;

VIZ.

EARL OF CLARE,
LORD AUCKLAND,
LORD MINTO,
RT. HON. MR. ADDINGTON,
RT. HON. MR. PITT,
RT. HON. MR. DUNDAS,
RT. HON. MR. DOUGLAS,
DEAN TUCKER,
MR. WM. SMITH,
DR. CLARKE,
MR. PEELE,
DR. M'KENNA,

EARL OF FARNHAM,
RT. HON. MR. FOSTER,
SIR J. W. JERVIS, BT.
MR. SPENCER,
MR. BOUSFIELD,
MR. EDGEWORTH,
MR. RUDD,
MR. GOOLD,
MR. TAAFFE,
MR. WELD,
MR. SHEEHY,
DR. DRENNAN:

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

ALSO,

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST, &c.—CEASE YOUR FUNNING,—
IMPARTIAL VIEW OF THE CAUSES LEADING TO, &c.—
TIT FOR TAT,—AND MANY OTHER ANONYMOUS
WRITERS ON THIS SUBJECT.

BY A SEARCHER AFTER TRUTH.

DUBLIN:
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1800.

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INTRODUCTION.

AMONG the boaſted and valuable privileges of a Britiſh ſubject, one of the moſt important, and moſt eſſential to real liberty, is the Freedom of the Preſs. Before the invention of the Art of Printing, liberty may have been enjoyed at certain times, and at certain places; but it could not have been either permanent, or ſecure, for want of an eaſy circulation of ſentiment, and a free communication of idea. This a free preſs ſecures to the ſubject; it impoſes a check upon the conduct of the moſt exalted and powerful, and protects the order of ſociety, from the danger of any violent infraction. It is productive of another and more poſitive advantage, though perhaps of leſs immediate and univerſal value to ſociety: it furniſhes the eaſieſt vehicle, and the ſureſt criterion of the real ſentiments of a people; it ſupplies, from a multitude of counſellors, opinions upon public matters, which have no other means of communication; it provides the ſtateſman with aſſiſtance to effect his deſigns, or to correct his errors, from talents that would otherwiſe lie buried in obſcurity, and that would ſhrink from a direct application, or from a more conſpicuous exertion.

Thus, ever ſince Freedom has been regularly eſtabliſhed in the Britiſh empire, the Preſs, upon every important point in agitation, has teemed with declarations, of the opinions, or of the fancies of men, on each ſide of every great queſtion. The preſent ſubject of public debate, a Legiſlative Union between Great Britain and Ireland, has rouſed the attention of all ranks of men, from the capital to the remoteſt extremities of the iſland: and as it is the moſt momentous topic, that has ever yet come under the diſcuſſion of the Iriſh Parliament, it has produced a greater number of publications, than, probably, any other matter of ſtate policy has ever given riſe to.

On this, as on all ſimilar occaſions, ſome of the pamphlets offered to the public, are the children of paſſion, and devoid of all argument: ſome are mere declamation; and among

among thoſe that are argumentative, different authors have viewed the ſubject under different lights; and in ſupport of the ſame opinion, arguments are ſometimes urged, diſſimilar to each other, and even contradictory. It is of moment to the welfare of the people, that the Public, as well as thoſe whoſe province it is to decide, ſhould entertain juſt conceptions of ſo important an object: but there are few, whoſe leiſure, or whoſe inclination will permit them, to take the trouble of wading through the prodigious number of pages, that have been written on this ſubject; and fewer ſtill, who are capable, in the rapid view that a pamphlet uſually obtains, of reaping much information, from a looſe and deſultory collection of arguments, ſcattered wide, without order, or connexion.

It occurred therefore that ſome ſervice might be rendered to the Public, by collecting into one point of view, all that has been urged in print; and by oppoſing to each other, the arguments on either ſide, ſo as that the ſolidity of each might become apparent at a glance, and that a few moments might ſuffice to go through the condenſed ſubſtance of what, in a more dilated form, would require weeks, or months to peruſe.

Having read all the principal pamphlets and ſpeeches, that have been publiſhed on the ſubject, whether in ſupport of the expediency of an Union, or in oppoſition to that meaſure, the compiler has extracted every argument, that offered itſelf to his obſervation, and, in methodizing them here, has endeavoured to preſerve to each, the full force which its reſpective authors ſeemed to attribute to it. Impartiality and perſpicuity have been his chief aim; and, as he has ſought with equal aſſiduity to procure for himſelf ſatisfactory information, as to contribute to public convenience, he is not conſcious of having, in any caſe, either over-rated, or under-valued any argument, which has preſented itſelf in the writings, either of the advocates, or the opponents of an Union.

For the ſake of clear arrangement, the various arguments are diſpoſed under three diſtinct heads, viz.

1ſt. *Political*, as reſpecting the *external relations* of Ireland in connexion and intercourſe with Great Britain.

2dly. *Political*, as reſpecting the *internal peace and proſperity* of Ireland. And,

3dly. *Commercial*.

In

In the margin, oppoſite to each argument, ſtand the names of the principal authors, by whom it has been urged: when any argument, or any part of an argument, has been repeated by more than one writer, the names annexed are connected by the conjunction, *and*: when a name ſtands without that conjunction, it deſignates the ſole author, of the argument, to which it is affixed.

In like manner, the name and number printed at the bottom of the page, preſent a reference to the author, by whom, on the other ſide of the queſtion, reſpectively, the adjoining argument has been oppoſed, and to the page in which his anſwer may be found.

It ſeems to be the natural order, that thoſe arguments ſhould be placed firſt, which have been urged in ſupport of a propoſed meaſure; and that, thoſe, by which its opponents have combated, ſhould follow. For the ſake of a more eaſy compariſon, each head contains immediately contraſted the arguments on each ſide.

PRO

PRO AND CON,

&c. &c.

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IN *FAVOUR* OF A LEGISLATIVE UNION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND;

ARGUMENTS *POLITICAL, RESPECTING THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF IRELAND,* IN CONNEXION AND INTERCOURSE WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

A PERPETUAL and intimate connexion between Great Britain and Ireland, is eſſential to the intereſts of both :* the geographical ſituation of the two iſlands render any medium impoſſible, between the moſt intimate connexion, and rivalſhip or enmity: the connexion between them is regarded, by the enemies of the empire, as its moſt vulnerable point; and, as the diſjunction of the two great limbs would annihilate the power of the empire, their chief object, and almoſt only remaining hope, is to effect a ſeparation; this connexion has, in conſequence, been expoſed to the repeated attacks both of foreign enemies and domeſtic traitors; it ought, therefore, to be ſufficiently ſtrengthened, to be capable of withſtanding theſe efforts of the enemy.

Weakneſs of preſent connexion. Pitt, & Lord Minto. Lord Minto. Pitt, & Addington, & Douglas, & Lord Minto.

The ſettlement of 1782, which is called *final*, conſiſted merely in the demolition of the injurious ſyſtem, by which the two countries were before held together, § without ſubſtituting any other in its place: and, though ſuch a ſtate of things as was then eſtabliſhed, might have ſubſiſted for a while, during a period of tranquillity, it was ill ſuited to bear the agitation of the tempeſt that has ſince convulſed the greater part of Europe, and has imparted its malignant principles to Ireland. Such was the opinion, with regard to that ſettlement, of the Britiſh Parliament at the time, of the miniſtry by whom it was propoſed and conducted, and of thoſe very perſons who now call it a *final* adjuſtment: it was the declared opinion of the gentleman who now takes the lead in its ſupport, that it could not laſt: the Iriſh Parliament, in their anſwer to the meſſage from the throne recommending the adoption of

Settlement of 1782 inadequate. Pitt, & Addington, & Dundas. Addington. Pitt,

ſome

* Foſter, 27. § Ibid. 26.

& Addington. Pitt. some plan of *final adjuſtment between the two countries*, are totally ſilent with regard to that part of it contained in the word *final*. So far was that ſettlement from being then looked on as final and complete, that the then miniſter thought it neceſſary to move, that a further ſettlement was neceſſary for the maintenance of connexion; and an addreſs was voted to the King,* praying him to take ſuch *further* meaſures as he ſhould think fit to ſtrengthen the connexion: his Majeſty's anſwer ſtated his compliance with the requeſt of the Houſe, and was Douglas. delivered by Mr. Fox. In objection to this ſtatement, it is urged, that the addreſs contains not the word *further*, and that it, therefore, alluded only to the meaſures then about to be embraced: but Mr. Fox, in his ſpeech on the occaſion, ſaid expreſsly, that *ſomething more than what he had ſtated to be his intention, was fit and proper to be done, &c. but it was not to be propoſed by him, it was the duty of the Crown to look to that.* In 1785, the ſame gentleman declared, that no idea of commercial regulation had been entertained by the adminiſtration of 1782, in the reſolution propoſed.

But, however intereſting to aſcertain, the opinions of men at that time cannot be binding on them now, nor upon the parliament of either country; nor even, if by either parliament a formal and expreſs declaration had been made againſt any further adjuſtment, or againſt a legiſlative union, would it by any means prevent that ſubject from being now entertained.

Smith, & Addington, & Douglas. But it is a mere diſpute about words to dwell upon the term *final* adjuſtment, as applied to that of 1782; for, admitting that adjuſtment to be *final*, as it undoubtedly was, ſo far as the limits of thoſe doubts and controverſies, to which it was the object of that arrangement to put an end, ſtill it was not *preclufive*; it did not deprive the King of the right to recommend, nor the parliament of the power to receive any propoſal for deliberation. The object of that ſettlement was to remove thoſe grievances of which Ireland then complained; viz. the claim of Great Britain to bind Ireland by her laws; the appellant juriſdiction of the Britiſh Houſe of Lords; Poynings' law; and the frame and perpetuity of the mutiny-bill. Theſe, it did finally remove, by a compact which cannot be violated without a groſs breach of faith; Douglas. and no more than this was meant in the expreſſion, *final*; together with a *hope* that *no conſtitutional queſtion* would exiſt afterwards, to diſturb the harmony of the two kingdoms—that is, no cauſe of diſpute or contention; it could not have been intended to exclude all amicable propoſals from one to the other, or from the Sovereign to both: and, being Smith. only an abolition of abuſe, and a reſtitution of the original principles

* Foſter, 26.

principles of the conſtitution, it left Ireland as free to receive any propoſal of treaty or compact as before ſuch abuſe took place; therefore this propoſal is no violation of the compact of 1782.

It appears, then, from the expreſſions uſed by miniſters,* as above, that the ſyſtem of connexion was at that time deemed imperfect; it ſtill remains the ſame: and, while it declares the moſt ſtrict and intimate connexion to be eſſential to the individual intereſts, and general welfare of both countries, it leaves them connected by no other tie, than the community of the executive government, with the privilege of aſſenting to Iriſh acts of parliament under the great ſeal of Great Britain, and directing Iriſh affairs by the advice of Britiſh miniſters:—a bond of connexion which is inſufficient to conſolidate the ſtrength of the two countries in time of war; to unite them in time of peace; to guard againſt local jealouſies and doubts, which muſt exiſt between countries ſo connected; to give to Ireland all the commercial and political advantages, which ſhe might derive from a cloſer connexion with Great Britain; or to improve both nations to that degree of ſtrength and proſperity of which they are capable.— Pitt.

A *connexion of affection* is mere ſentiment and nonſenſe; it cannot exiſt between nations, for they can be guided by intereſt alone, and are incapable of affection; and reaſon is required in ſober argument, not ſentiment. Lord Minto.

The preſent imperfect ſyſtem of connexion has this fundamental vice, that by the very law of its conſtitution and nature, it muſt tend gradually, though not always with rapidity, yet certainly and inevitably to diſſolution. Such a connexion, between two unequal countries, is the means of aſcendancy in one, and the cauſe of ſubordination in the other.— But the natural love of independency will ſet a ſpirit of jealouſy at work in the weaker, which will continually ſtrive to improve and enlarge that independency, by the only poſſible means; that is by ſtriking off link after link of the connexion, which impoſes ſome reſtraint, till the laſt thread ſhall be broken: this ſtatement is ſupported by the uniform teſtimony of all hiſtory. ‡ Ditto.

There are but two poſſible methods, by which the imperfection of this ſyſtem can be remedied;—by a compact between the two kingdoms, or by the blending and indentification of their legiſlatures. The former has been already tried, and found to be impracticable (commercial propoſitions of Pitt.

* Foſter, 27, and Taafe, &c. 28.

‡ In Lord Minto's ſpeech the reader will find an analyſis of the various poſſible modes of connexion between two countries, ſtated in order to prove that no other can be ſecure or permanent but entire conſolidation.

of 1785): the alternative, therefore, is to remain in the present ſituation, ſubject to endleſs jealouſies and diſſenſions, expoſed to the malignity of the enemy in a point of the higheſt importance, where weakneſs invites attack; or, to adopt the meaſure propoſed.

Pitt, & Addington. Experience proves the imperfection of the preſent ſyſtem; for the ill effects of jarring legiſlatures have been felt, in the only inſtance, which has yet occurred, where they could have been felt, in the affair of the regency:* there the two legiſlatures acted upon different principles; and though they happened to coincide in the choice of the perſon, yet the regent would have held his authority upon different tenures in the two countries. It is poſſible for many other queſtions to ariſe, which may occaſion diſſenſion; as, for inſtance, that of peace or war. Supplies might be granted by the one, and Addington. withheld by the other. And this danger of diſſenſion muſt very greatly increaſe, if the Roman Catholics ſhould obtain admiſſion into the legiſlature, and influence its deciſions; for many cauſes of difference might ariſe between them and the Britiſh Parliament, on points leſs capable of reconciliation.

Union will ſtrengthen the empire. It is the opinion of every ſtateſman of abilities, acquainted with the intereſts of the Britiſh empire,§ and of every well-informed writer who may have touched upon the ſubject, that Pitt, & Ld. Minto. the general power of the empire would be very greatly extended by ſuch a conſolidation of the ſtrength of the two Ditto. kingdoms, in a far greater proportion than the ſimple addition of their reſpective amounts.

Pitt. The commercial reſources of the empire, in which its ſtrength conſiſts, would evidently be much increaſed by any meaſure that ſhould communicate to Ireland the commercial advantages of England, open the market of one country to the other, and give them the common uſe of Britiſh capital. And ſince, in caſe of attack, Ireland now depends for protection upon the power, naval and military, of Great Britain, the beſt method of guarding her againſt danger is to enable Ireland to defend herſelf, and to ſtrengthen her by a participation of the wealth and power of Britain.

Douglas, & Anon. The ſtrength of any people is beſt increaſed and ſecured by an identity of government, and identity of intereſt. One general ſuperintending legiſlature is beſt fitted for the ſteady conſiſtent government of all the parts of which it is compoſed. Anon. France well knows the principle and the force of incorporations, and has practiſed it with ſucceſs in her own caſe, while, on the contrary, ſhe maintains with regard to the politics of the Britiſh empire the principle of ſeparation, as eſſential to freedom,

* Foſter, Bouſfield, 30. § Foſter, 31.

freedom, and, with as ſound policy, aims at forming into independent republics its two members, Scotland and Ireland. In whatever part of an united people wealth may be accumulated, its benefits will pervade and fructify the whole. London feels no detriment to its intereſts in the proſperity of Briſtol or Liverpool; for one country, under a common legiſlature, has a common intereſt. In the preſent precarious ſtate of connexion, the idea of *diſtinctneſs of intereſt*, which is but a convertible term for ſeparation, is ever preſent; and, with the increaſing ſtrength and wealth of the inferior country, that of a *poſſible* future ſeparation becomes more practicable, and more formidable. While there is a *poſſibility* of ſuch an event, it is the intereſt of the wealthier country to reſtrain, to a certain degree, this riſing proſperity; and before England will promote the intereſts of Ireland to the extent of which they are capable, ſhe muſt be well aſſured that they are identified with her own.

Is not derogatory to Ireland.

The meaſure propoſed is not, in the leaſt, derogatory to the honor and dignity of Ireland, nor does it imply any inferiority on her part. This jealouſy for the independence of Ireland is a natural feeling or paſſion, but it is ill directed; for true patriotiſm is guided by utility, and embraces thoſe meaſures which contribute to the welfare and proſperity of the country. It is an union, by treaty, of two independent nations, upon equal terms, by which no part of the united country is more ſubjugated or dependent than the reſt; it is a confederacy, which in the very act recogniſes the independence of both; and, without this acknowledged independence, a treaty of union could not take place, becauſe both parties could not treat fairly and equally. It was never objected, by the moſt captious opponent of the Scotch union, that the independence of the Scotch parliament was attacked by the propoſal, and yet its independence was to the full as complete as that of the Iriſh parliament. In the preſent caſe it is manifeſtly for the advantage of a country incapable of defending or providing for herſelf, to unite, upon terms of equality, with that country whence ſhe has derived every thing valuable or important in her poſſeſſion. Diſtinctneſs is not to be confounded with independence, nor union with ſubordination.

Pitt, & Dundas, & Lord Minto, & Addington. Dundas. Pitt, & Smith.

The independence of the Britiſh parliament was not infringed by the addreſſes of the Iriſh houſes to the Queen in 1703 and 1707, aſking for an union: neither can that of the Iriſh parliament, equally free and independent, be violated by ſuch a *propoſal* coming from England; but, as before ſtated, the very propoſal is a ſolemn recognition of its independence, and its excluſive competence to decide upon the queſtion.—The compact of 1782 cannot have done more, than make Ireland as independent of Britain as that country is of Ireland;

Smith.

but

but the *adoption of an union* would not encroach on the independence of England; neither can it on that of Ireland, which is not greater.

The number of Iriſh repreſentatives may be diminiſhed, but a repreſentation proportioned to the territory, population, reſources, and contribution of Ireland, in an union identifying the intereſts of the two countries, is ſufficient to ſecure to her an independence equal to that enjoyed by any part or diſtrict of Great Britain; which may yet bear but a ſmall proportion in the ſum of Britiſh repreſentation. It is therefore an idle objection to ſay, that the Iriſh members may be outvoted by the ſuperior number of the Britiſh members. An union would neither annihilate the Iriſh legiſlature, nor transfer its authority into other hands; but would combine it, upon equal terms, with another independent legiſlature, where having its due proportion of weight and influence, it might much better ſupport the independence and dignity of the country, than in its preſent ſituation: for never, but at a moment of general terror and alarm, has it been known to have a will of its own, except on the one queſtion of the regency: and there it ſerved only to ſhew, how looſe the connexion is, and how near folly or wickedneſs might go to diſſolve the only bond.

Anon.

Douglas.

Ireland, by an union, no more becomes a *province* in any offenſive ſenſe of the word, than Great Britain: they both become provinces, or component parts, of one whole; one integral empire.

Proſperity of Ireland not to be attributed to the ſettlement of 1782.

Douglas.

Neither is it to the tranſaction of 1782 that the progreſſive improvement in the trade, manufactures, and proſperity of Ireland, is to be attributed. Its proſperity* is not ſecured by that ſettlement, but is in a great degree dependent on the policy and wiſdom of Great Britain; and the only ſafeguard of its permanence is that very meaſure which it is pretended would produce a contrary effect.

The great points gained by Ireland in the way of commerce, were the fruits of ſeveral Britiſh acts of parliament† of 1779 and 1780, which firſt opened her trade with America and the Weſt India colonies, as well as with the reſt of the world.—And it was not till 1793§ that permiſſion was granted her to trade to the colonies on the ſame footing with Great Britain. This act will hardly be ſaid to be an effect of the arrangement of 1782, and the others were antecedent to it. But Ireland was growing faſt in induſtry, enterpriſe, manufactures, trade, and

* Foſter, 27.

† 19 George III. c. 35. 20 George III. c. 6.
- - - - - - c. 37. - - - - - c. 10.
- - - - - - - - - - - - c. 18.

§ 33 George III. c. 63.

and agriculture, before either the acknowledgment of her independence, or the grant of her free trade; and all the three kingdoms have flouriſhed with an accelerated rapidity for about fifty years, ſince the general pacification of Europe by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. In 1776 it was the opinion of Lord Chief Baron Foſter, (a man of great acuteneſs and accurate enquiry) as recorded by Mr. Arthur Young,* that "Ireland had improved more within the laſt twenty years than in a century before; that the great ſpirit of improvement had begun in 1749 and 1750; and that, in the ſpace of about thirty years, the exportation of linen and yarn had ariſen from 500,000*l.* to between 1,200,000*l.* and 1,500,000*l.*;" nearly treble.—And yet, ſince that time, notwithſtanding the tranſaction of 1782, improvement has not continued to advance in the ſame ratio; ſo that it ſeems much more reaſonable to aſcribe the growing improvement of Ireland to the ſpirit which began about 1750.

That the ſettlement of 1782 is no ſecurity for the permanence of the advantages enjoyed by Ireland, is plain. For, however Great Britain may have renounced the power of binding Ireland by Britiſh laws, ſhe cannot have reſtrained herſelf from repealing her own acts; and the encouragements which have promoted the proſperity of the linen manufacture of Ireland, as well as her trade with the colonies, are derived merely from Britiſh laws, which are of courſe liable to be repealed by the Britiſh legiſlature.

It is ſometimes *admitted* that theſe advantages are derived from Britiſh laws, and are therefore dependent on Great Britain; but, in anſwer it is urged, that, though by a war of duties and prohibitions Britain might injure Ireland, ſhe herſelf muſt alſo inevitably ſuffer in the conteſt, and therefore wiſdom and policy, as well as liberality, muſt ever prevent her from engaging in ſuch hoſtilities. This is certainly true, but wiſdom is not a poſſeſſion in perpetuity; the principles now held with regard to commerce, it is poſſible, may change hereafter; ſucceeding adminiſtrations may entertain different opinions from thoſe of the preſent day, with regard to policy and expediency; diſputes and animoſities may ariſe, and, in ſuch a caſe, there is no treaty, no ſecurity that Ireland can have recourſe to.

The conduct of England towards Scotland,† before the union, is a caſe exactly in point: and yet it ſeems to have been as much the intereſt of England to promote the welfare of that country, as to further the proſperity of Ireland.

In

* It is from the ſame period nearly that Dr. Adam Smith dates the rapid progreſs of improvement in Scotland, and the eſtabliſhment of country banks. Douglas.

† Foſter, Spencer, Rudd, Goold, Bousfield, 33.

Propoſitions of 1785.

In 1785 it was thought that the commercial connexion was not ſufficiently ſecure under ſuch protection, and thoſe who were beſt acquainted with the intereſts of Ireland, wiſhed for the "ſecurity of a legiſlative compact;" yet the warmeſt advocates of that imperfect meaſure are now the foremoſt to reject a legiſlative ſecurity of a more binding nature, which cannot be diſſolved.

Smith.

The modification of Poynings' law in 1782 (by which it is required that the royal aſſent be affixed to Iriſh ſtatutes under the great ſeal of England) is ſaid to have ſufficiently *ſecured* the connexion between Great Britain and Ireland: but, on the contrary, that very circumſtance is a proof of its frailty, by the application, to an *admitted evil*, of a weak and inadequate remedy; viz. the reſponſibility of an individual to the Britiſh parliament; and that law, inſtead of aſſerting the independence of Ireland, places her in a ſtate of abſolute dependence upon the Britiſh miniſter; and thus ſubjected to the poſſible wickedneſs or caprice of an individual, or a cabinet.

It was admitted in 1785, when the commercial propoſitions were rejected, that things could not remain as they were; that commercial jealouſy might ariſe, and ſeparation of intereſt lead to ſeparation of connexion. No change has ſince taken place in the arrangement, therefore the danger muſt ſtill remain the ſame; for, though partial evils have been remedied by ſeparate laws, that mode is inadequate to remove the danger, becauſe there is no ſecurity for the permanence of thoſe laws; and becauſe the exerciſe of diſtinct rights is liable to produce diſſenſion between the two legiſlatures. The good ſenſe, which has hitherto obviated the evil, has not annihilated the riſk.

Ld. Auckland, & Addington, & Dean Tucker.

If the independence of Ireland be real, it preſents a field for endleſs diſſenſions; and, if ſhe chuſes to exerciſe the power of diſſent, the conſequences muſt be conteſt, and, either ſeparation, or the conqueſt of the weaker, with all its attendant misfortunes.

Smith.

If it be merely nominal, it will produce diſtruſt, abhorrence, and ſuſpicion; and will probably render the very connexion odious, and reduce Ireland to the neceſſity of ſubmitting to the control of a Britiſh miniſter, no way accountable to her, but amenable only to the parliament of Great Britain.

Ld. Auckland, & Addington, & Dean Tucker, & Dundas. Smith.

If it be between both, it combines the evils of both ſyſtems; ſo that, in any caſe, the preſent *diſtinctneſs* furniſhes a ſtore of weapons to wound and ſever a connexion ſo frail: a danger, which is now redoubled by the efforts of foreign and domeſtic enemies to effect a ſeparation.

Iriſh parliament not independent. Douglas, & Dundas.

But, in fact, the parliament of Ireland is not independent; it is in a ſtate, not of ſhadowy, but of real and ſubſtantial ſubordination on the parliament of Great Britain. For, by that very act (21 and 22 George III.) which is boaſted of by the adverſaries of an union, as ſecuring the connexion between the two kingdoms; it is ordained that no act of the Iriſh parliament,

liament, whether it affect the empire at large, or regard only the moſt minute local concern, can paſs into a law, till it be returned under the great ſeal of England. The affixing of that ſeal is an executive, not a legiſlative act; and the miniſter who does ſo, does it at his peril, and liable to impeachment in the Britiſh parliament, if done amiſs. Thus is the Iriſh parliament under the abſolute control of the Britiſh, whilſt it claims a perfect equality of independence. That topic, then, ſo much inſiſted on, and ſo well ſuited to rouze a paſſionate oppoſition,—the loſs of independence--has no weight, for Ireland has no independence to loſe; and though the ſeparate parliaments loſe, each of them, their reſpective identity and diſtinctneſs, that of Ireland no more becomes dependent than the Britiſh; but both equally become proportionate parts of one whole.

Arguments for and againſt, &c.

The preſent ſituation is, what is called *Imperium in imperio*, a ſuppoſed independent government within an independent government, and this, all writers have agreed in condemning. Such was the firſt conſtitution of the American ſtates, when each ſtate was ſupreme and independent; but as ſoon as peace allowed time for reflection, the abſolute neceſſity appeared of remedying by conſolidation a conſtitution incapable of ſtanding. Such alſo is the conſtitution of the Swiſs Cantons, which incapacitated that nation from oppoſing with effect the intrigues or the violence of the French.

Douglas.

The ſubordination of the Iriſh executive to Great Britain is more obvious ſtill, than that of the legiſlative body: the Lord Lieutenant acts in obedience to the King's commands, ſignified either in his commiſſion under the great ſeal of England, or by the King's letter, counterſigned by a ſecretary of ſtate, or, in revenue matters, by the lord treaſurer, or three lords of the treaſury.

But the jealouſy of Ireland revolts at the practical exerciſe of theſe legal and conſtitutional powers; and, partly from this, partly from other cauſes, the government of England is ſuppoſed, in general caſes, to leave matters to the Iriſh parliament, and miniſters. From time to time, however, occaſions occur, where it is neceſſary for the Britiſh miniſters to act contrary perhaps to the ſentiments of the ſervants of the crown in Ireland. And, though in ſuch caſes the difficulty may often be ſurmounted by confidential intercourſe, or by the adoption of a middle way, ſo as not to alarm the dignity of Ireland, or commit the imperial authority reſident in England; yet ſituations have ariſen more than once, when the miniſtry have thought it their duty, without ſuch temperature, to exerciſe an immediate controling authority in Ireland; even under the hazard of rouzing the jealouſy, or affronting the high ſpirits of the leading perſons there. This dilemma, which has already occaſioned many difficulties, and will be the ſource of growing embarraſſments, is capable but of two remedies;

either the King muſt remove his reſidence to Ireland, which would only take off the difficulty from that country to throw it on Great Britain; or Ireland, by her repreſentatives, muſt come to England, and thus place both countries, in theory as well as in effect, under the direction of the ſame miniſters.—But while the preſent ſyſtem remains, no alteration can work a remedy. By indentification with Great Britain, Ireland will become truly independent, in ſharing her independence, and will no longer be bound to follow, tamely and ſubſerviently, a will that is not her own. This can be no otherwiſe effected than by an union, unleſs it be by ſeparation; ſuppoſing even that ſhe had means and ſtrength in that ſituation to preſerve herſelf independent, which is not poſſible. Were the Britiſh

Lord Minto. iſlands ſeparated, neither of them could ſubſiſt againſt any enemy combined with the other, nor ſupply ſufficient means of defence againſt his inroads. It is evident that, in caſe of war, the weaker of the two would be more expoſed to danger; and, though for a while, ſhe might perhaps maintain herſelf by the mean arts of intrigue, ſhe would be a conſtant bone of contention to ſurrounding nations, and at laſt would be forced to fly for refuge to her more powerful neighbour, either England or France; and either actually ſubmit to her authority, or at leaſt, by virtually yielding to her influence, loſe her own independency.

Douglas. There is another ſtriking inſtance, in proof of the ſubordinate condition of Ireland; ſhe is *obliged* to take part in all the wars of Great Britain, for the King's declaration of war involves all his dominions; ſhe is expoſed to all the riſks and dangers of war; ſhe may loſe one of her provinces, or herſelf become a province to an enemy; and yet ſhe cannot acquire an acre of territory; every conqueſt made, though perhaps at the expence of Iriſh blood, and Iriſh treaſure, belongs ſolely to Great Britain. Ireland cannot either plant a colony, or eſtabliſh a foreign ſettlement.

Smith. It is a miſtaken expreſſion, to ſay that by an union the Iriſh parliament would merge in that of Great Britain; it merges in the imperial legiſlature, and an union merely changes the reſidence of the legiſlature of Ireland, leaving to it ſtill, in partnerſhip with that of Great Britain, the direction of Iriſh affairs.

Two legiſlatures not ſimilar to two houſes of parliament.

The ſeparate deliberation of the two independent parliaments, is very erroneouſly compared to that of the two houſes of the ſame parliament. Theſe latter are connected together

Smith. and conſolidated into one body,* by having, for a middle term, the third eſtate, and, in caſe of diſagreement, the meaſure merely falls to the ground, and no miſchief enſues; but there is no bond of union between two bodies each complete and independent;

* Foſter, 31.

independent; there is no middle term to connect them, and ſhould a diſagreement occur between them, and ſhould each parliament, having a right to purſue its own meaſures, think proper to adhere with tenacity to its own deſigns, a conteſt muſt be the conſequence; and, in ſuch a caſe, the great ſeal would be but a pitiful guardian to the connexion. That diſagreement is poſſible, the tranſactions of 1785 and 1789 evince; at the latter period the coincidence, in the *perſon* of the regent, was accidental; for the precipitation of Ireland waited not for his appointment in England; nor was any perſon, in fact, actually named in that kingdom, the King's fortunate recovery having happened juſt in time to prevent it. But, though the perſon had been the ſame, the diſparity in the limitation of his prerogative would have given the two countries an executive government, with different conſtitutional powers in each: an evil, which is admitted by the late regency-bill, to have exiſted.

Beſides, if a difference of opinion ſhould ariſe between the two houſes of parliament, they have not only much greater facility of diſcuſſion, and mutual explanation, but identity of intereſt between them is much more direct and ſenſible, than that between two ſeparate kingdoms, though they be connected in, and form parts of the ſame empire. It is true, that to a certain degree, the ſeparate legiſlatures may afford a check upon each other, ſimilar to thoſe of the three branches of parliament upon each other; yet, it muſt be of a very imperfect nature, having no formal or legal conſtitution; and can have no more force or efficacy than thoſe checks upon each other, which prevail in the relation of different ſtates, having a common intereſt, but without any link of connexion, and which ſerve to maintain what is called the balance of power. Douglas.

A local parliament has been compared alſo, for the local knowledge, of which it is ſuppoſed to be poſſeſſed, to a jury, which, on the ſame account was formerly obliged to be ſelected from that ſpot, which was thought to furniſh local knowledge of the circumſtances to be tried; but the wiſdom of legiſlators, finding the neighbourhood of a culprit too much expoſed to prejudice, paſſion and party ſpirit to allow of juſtice, have thought it expedient in latter and more liberal times, to enlarge his vicinage to the whole county, and ſo to give a greater field for the ſelection of a jury; or, if it be ſuſpected that a fair trial cannot there be had, they have allowed to *change the venue* to another place, where equal local knowledge may be exerted with leſs danger or prejudice. In like manner, to carry on the compariſon, the Iriſh parliament, combined in the imperial, may poſſeſs all the local knowledge that they could obtain in their own country, and be at the ſame time exempt from local danger and local prejudice. Smith.

In

Diſtance no impediment.

Douglas.

In ſome caſes, diſtance may preſent an inſuperable impediment to the union of legiſlatures, as in that of America, where the experiment was ſtrongly recommended by Adam Smith; and in many others: but this objection will not apply to Ireland, for that country, though ſeparated by a ſea, is in the neighbourhood of Great Britain alone, and is ſeparated from all other countries by an immenſe ſpace. Its capital is nearer to that of England than Edinburgh, and notwithſtanding the intervention of a ſea, the journey thither from London uſually occupies a ſhorter ſpace of time; the moſt diſtant towns of Ireland, that are of any note, as Cork, Limerick, Londonderry, &c. are not ſo far from the metropolis of the empire as many towns in Scotland.

To theſe conſiderations ſhould be added, the many important inducements to intercourſe and incorporation, between Great Britain and Ireland, which did not exiſt in the caſe of Scotland: the ſame ſyſtem of laws, civil and commercial; the ſame rules of property; ſimilar tribunals; extenſive conſanguinity and intermarriages; the great and increaſing number of thoſe, who, by ſucceſſion or acquiſition, have become owners of land in both countries; the ſame eſtabliſhed religion; the ſame courſe of education; and ſeveral others, which infinitely outweigh any conſideration of territorial contiguity.

The purſe of Ireland not the object ſought in an Union.

Smith.

It is an abſurd ſuppoſition, that the object of an union is to place the purſe of Ireland in the hands of the Britiſh miniſter: it is already open to him, to the extent of its abilities, and the efforts of the miniſter have ever been directed to lighten the burthens of the people, not to increaſe them beyond the power to bear. But if ſuch were his deſign, even that would afford a certain proof of the ſincerity of his opinion, that the proſperity of Ireland will be increaſed by an union, for he would ſcarcely graſp at a purſe, and take meaſures at the ſame time to prevent its being filled: an empty purſe is ſeldom an object of deſire.

Parliament cannot reſcind the treaty afterwards.

Douglas.

That the *omnipotence of parliament* has power to reſcind hereafter any of the articles of compact, is a falſe aſſertion, as it ſhall preſently be proved;* but, were it true, it would equally furniſh an argument againſt the ſtability of any law, or treaty, or compact, and would overturn the principles of civil ſociety; and, beſides, ſuch a violation of the compact being a ſubverſion of the conſtitution, is one of thoſe extreme caſes, which would abſolve the ſubject from his allegiance, and juſtify an appeal to the ſword. Nor is there any foundation for imagining that, on account of the great majority of the Britiſh members of the legiſlature, the repreſentatives of Ireland would be outvoted on all occaſions of competition, and Ireland oppreſſed at the pleaſure of the ſtronger

rty.

* Foſter, Goold, 32, 33.

party. This would, at leaſt, amount to an infraction of the treaty, and therefore to a diſſolution of the union; but alſo, ſuch a conſpiracy is impracticable, becauſe when the two countries are identified, there cannot exiſt any claſhing of ſeparate intereſts to occaſion competition for power or profit. Both theſe ſuppoſitions are refuted too, by experience, in the caſe of Scotland; for, as to thoſe inſtances produced, as breaches of the compact of union with Scotland, they have no exiſtence in fact. The impoſition of an income tax, in the proportion of one eighth to that of South Britain, in lieu of a land-tax, which, it was covenanted, ſhould not exceed a fortieth, was certainly no infringement of the *letter*, and it was the exact accompliſhment of the *ſpirit* and end of the treaty, which was to proportion the taxes of Scotland to her means. The objections to the malt-tax were merely, like other attempts of the violence of faction,* to ſerve the purpoſe of the day, no matter at what riſk. When party ran extremely high in 1713, the Scotch repreſentatives were perſuaded to lay hold of one of the ſecondary clauſes in the treaty of union, one of doubtful conſtruction, and which at beſt was to be but of a temporary and ſhort duration,‡ then virtually expired; and to raiſe a cry, that the articles of union, in favour of Scotland, were infringed, and even to bring forward a motion for the diſſolution of the treaty.

Treaty with Scotland religiouſly obſerved.

Douglas.

In fact, that treaty, as will be confeſſed by every candid man, verſed in the hiſtory of his country, has, in all its clear and important parts, all its fundamental and eſſential conditions, been adhered to, with ſacred and ſcrupulous inviolability.

The example of Scotland is rejected by the adverſaries of an union, upon the grounds of a difference in the ſituation of Scotland from that of Ireland,‡ which renders that unneceſſary to the latter, which was abſolutely requiſite to the other; and of the great improvement of Scotland ſince the period of union being aſcribable to other cauſes, rather than to the effects of that meaſure.

Caſe of Scotland not diſſimilar.

Smith.

Scotland, they ſay, was driven by a ſeries of repeated injuries the moſt intolerable, and by the conſtant jealouſies of England, to ſuch a ſtate of hoſtility, as left no alternative, but union or ſeparation. But the ſame reaſoning applies, equally, to Ireland; the partial and oppreſſive conduct of Britain for a long ſeries of years; the repeated injuries offered to the victualling trade of Ireland, which ſhe haraſſed with her embargoes; the jealous tenor of almoſt all her tranſactions, and almoſt an equal danger of ſeparation, render an union in this caſe equally neceſſary, as the only remedy that can be found. The union of the crowns of England and Scotland in the ſame

* Spencer, 34. ‡ Anon. 37.
‡ Foſter, Spencer, Rudd, Bousfield, Goold, 33.

ſame perſon, (which, but for the change made in the royal line of ſucceſſion, by the abdication of James II. would have continued unalterable in the houſe of Stuart) was, at leaſt, as durable a bond of connexion as that which keeps united the crowns of Great Britain and Ireland, viz. the annexation act, and the great ſeal. There was, in fact, no ſuch difference between the conſtitutions of England and Scotland, as is ſaid to have exiſted, and to have rendered an union neceſſary on account of the viciouſneſs of the latter; there was, indeed, but one houſe of parliament in Scotland, but that was compoſed of three eſtates; (1. *Nobles.* 2. *Barons*, i. e. repreſentatives for ſhires, and 3. *Burrows*, or members for boroughs †;) and, as the votes of each eſtate were taken ſeparately, and a majority was required of each, it thus became impoſſible for the Crown to create a forced majority, by the privilege of adding at pleaſure to the number of the peers. As to the lords of articles, that inſtitution had been aboliſhed many years before the union, by an act of the Scotch parliament; and was no more a part of the conſtitution of Scotland in 1707 than the ſtar-chamber was at that time of the Engliſh conſtitution.

Douglas.

Douglas. Scotland made much greater ſacrifices, for the purpoſe of obtaining an union, than any that are expected from Ireland, or that are in her power to make. Ireland has not been, for many centuries, free and independent of England; Scotland never had been ſubdued to her, nor under her control: Scotland gave up, what Ireland *cannot* give up, an independent parliament of King, Lords and Commons, and an *independent ſeparate crown.* Theſe ſacrifices were made, at the time, indeed with great reluctance; and ſo ſtrong was the hoſtility of the Scotch to the meaſure, that many violent inſurrections took place. An army, even, of 7000 men was levied in the weſt, and was ready to march againſt the parliament; and the Duke of Queenſbury, with other miniſters, who took an active part in carrying the union into effect, were ſo attacked by the populace as to eſcape narrowly with their lives; while the Duke of Hamilton, Lord Belhaven, and others of the moſt inveterate opponents to it, became the idols of the people, and were carried in triumph through the ſtreets of Edinburgh. Yet ſo quickly were the ſentiments of the Scotch nation changed, with regard to that meaſure, when experience had made them acquainted with its happy effects, that only eight years after it had been concluded, in the midſt of ſuch violent clamour, the union had obtained the moſt univerſal popularity; inſomuch that the pretender, having pledged himſelf, in a public manifeſto, to repeal the act of union, was obliged, in 1715, to expunge that promiſe, in order to preſerve the favour of his adherents. The

Douglas, & Dundas.

Scotch Union ſoon became popular.

† Spencer, Goold, Bousfield, 34.

The event of an union would, probably, be similar in Ireland; and how great soever the unpopularity which attends it now, a few years would remove the delusion of the nation, and make clear its good consequences.

Scotch Union long prevented by France.

It is remarkable that the many attempts made towards an union, first of the crowns, and afterwards of the parliaments of England and Scotland, from the time of Henry VIII. down to the second year of Queen Anne, have been constantly frustrated through the means of French influence and intrigue; and England was first induced to become zealous for its accomplishment, by the ill effects that she experienced from French intrigue in Scotland; in order to remove entirely the influence of the French party. Ireland, by various accidents, is fallen into a situation exactly similar. France labours, by every means, to form a connexion in that country, and has, in a great measure succeeded. But French influence was by no means as mischievous in 1707 as it is in 1800; France was not then the advocate of sedition in the abstract, and the general ally of all rebellious subjects. As the surest method of putting an end to this dangerous conspiracy, by a consolidation of the powers of the whole empire, a legislative union with Great Britain is proposed.

Dundas. Smith, & Dundas, &c. &c.

Improvement of Scotland due to the Union.

The great improvement of Scotland since the period of the union, it is said, should not be attributed to that measure, because society has been every where, during that time, in a state of rapid improvement; and because the progress of Ireland in prosperity, without an union, has in the same period been still greater. It is not possible to determine,* exactly, how far the prosperity of Scotland may be attributable to the union; but it is fair to conclude, that, if she has improved during that period, in a proportion relatively greater than the improvement of England,† the cause of this excess may be ascribed to the effects of the union, and, if the advancement of England have surpassed that of North Britain, her superior opulence is owing to the superiority of her natural advantages, which were too great to be overbalanced by the benefits derived to Scotland from an union. But without an union Scotland could not have made such progress in improvement, as to have kept pace with the general advances of society; because the circumstances attending her local situation, and internal policy, prevented her from having any part in the growing prosperity of other countries, as long as she continued separate; so it was ably argued in the Scotch parliament by Mr. Seton, one of the commissioners of the union. To this may

Smith. Douglas. Dundas.

* Foster, 86.

† The customs and excise of Scotland have increased between 1707 and 1797, upwards of *twenty fold*; while those of England have not been multiplied quite *eight* times. For the particulars of this detail, see the speeches of the Right Hon. Henry Dundas, and the Right Hon. Sylvester Douglas.

may be added the following well known fact, that the proſperity of Scotland took riſe in the weſtern parts, and near the ports, beſt ſuited to the colonial trade, which was firſt opened to Scotland by the union.

Douglas. Again it is objected, that, whatever may have been the improvement of Scotland in the laſt ninety years, Ireland,* on the other hand, has made ſtill more rapid progreſs. This aſſertion has been much inſiſted on, but a cloſer inſpection will ſhew that it is not founded in fact. No compariſon can well be drawn between any particular branches of improvement, in thoſe two countries, but a fair eſtimate may be made from the ſtate of the public revenue in each. It will be found that Scotland with a ſmaller population, a leſs fertile ſoil, a climate leſs temperate, and ports for foreign trade much inferior, pays a ſhare of public contribution equal in amount to the revenue of Ireland, and which is, at the leaſt, not a greater burthen to her people than the taxes of Ireland are to her ſubjects; from thence it is a fair inference that the wealth of Scotland is not inferior to that of Ireland.

Population no teſt of improvement. As to the population of Ireland, which is alſo urged as a teſt of her flouriſhing condition, its ſuperiority is admitted: but it affords no proof of ſuperior proſperity, and tends only to give additional ſtrength to the above argument, from the greater difficulty under which Scotland labors in that particular alſo. The accuracy of thoſe calculations, however, appears very queſtionable; they ſeem in general to exaggerate the population of Ireland, and to underrate conſiderably that of Scotland. †

Adam Smith's opinion, Smith. It was the opinion of the learned and ſagacious Dr. Adam Smith, that an union would procure for Ireland, beſide commercial, many other important advantages;§ and that without ſuch a meaſure the inhabitants of the two countries were not likely for ages to coaleſce as one people.

Addington. To his opinion may be added, the authority of ſome of the moſt diſtinguiſhed and enlightened men of the laſt century, by whom that meaſure was approved and recommended; of *and thoſe of others.* Sir Matthew Decker, Sir William Petty, Sir Joſiah Child; and Molineux, who incurred the diſpleaſure of the Engliſh Houſe of Commons, for his bold aſſertion of the independence of his native country, thought the proſpect of Iriſh repreſentatives being admitted to the Parliament of England, "*too* "*great a happineſs to be hoped for by Ireland,*" however it might be wiſhed.

Anon. In the preſent century, it has been recommended by many able writers and ſtateſmen, of various political attachments: Addington, & Douglas. Doctor Campbell, Dean Tucker, Lord Egmont, Lord Hillſborough, Lord Sackville, Lord North, &c. The opinion held by

* Foſter, Spencer, 85, 86.

† For the diſcuſſion of this ſubject, ſee Mr. Sylveſter Douglas's Speech, p. 18.

§ Anon. 35.

by theſe great politicians with regard to the value of an union, is corroborated by the teſtimony of M'Nevin, and his aſſociates in rebellion,* whoſe fears have expreſſed *their* conviction of its tendency to ſtrengthen the empire, and to prevent that ſeparation being effected, which has been the uniform object of their endeavours.

Ireland's proſperity Britain's intereſt.

But why, it is aſked, does Britain make an *offer* of ſuch great advantages to Ireland, and of a participation in ſuch mighty benefits?

Dean Tucker,

Becauſe ſhe perceives her own intereſt equally concerned in the proſperity and the *ſecurity* of Ireland: becauſe her intereſts are inſeparable from thoſe of Ireland, and Ireland's ſtrength is Britain's ſtrength, Ireland's greatneſs is Britain's glory; and becauſe ſhe has found, that a cloſer union is made now more requiſite than ever, by the repeated attempts of enemies, to diſſolve the connexion. Precautionary wiſdom ſeldom has much influence on the conduct either of individuals, or nations; an evil, in general, muſt have been painfully felt, before meaſures are taken to remove it, or to guard againſt its recurrence.

& Addington, & Douglas, & Peel.

Addington.

Conceſſions dangerous, when ſeparation is poſſible.

When the commercial propoſitions were brought forward in 1785, they were oppoſed by all the commercial intereſts of Great Britain, becauſe, while Ireland had ſeparate intereſts, (as, with a ſeparate legiſlature, ſhe muſt have, ſince there is then a *poſſibility* of actual ſeparation) ſuch an arrangement might have been highly prejudicial to the manufactures of Great Britain: but the preſent plan, while it affords the higheſt advantages, political and commercial, prevents, by uniting the two countries into one, the poſſibility of ſeparate intereſts exiſting; and therefore meets the approbation of the trading body of Britain. The ſame opinions were prevalent, ſo long ſince as the reign of Charles II. as is apparent in the anſwer to certain complaints made by the Scotch, of more favour being ſhewn to Ireland, than to their country: the commiſſioners ſtated in reply, "that Ireland was an appendage of the crown of England, was bound by the laws, and under the abſolute control of England, and that, *therefore*, any favour might ſafely be granted to her, but that the ſeparate ſtate and independence of Scotland would not allow of the ſame treatment."

Peel.

Dundas.

The caſe is now reverſed, and the altered relation in which Ireland ſtands, makes it dangerous to grant the advantages, which would accrue to her from an Union, without the accompanying ſecurity of that meaſure. It admits, however, of a doubt, whether in a ſeparate ſtate Ireland be capable of profiting by ſuch conceſſions, if made, without a communication of the capital of Great Britain.—But, in caſe of an union, though Great Britain will communicate her capital and induſtry to Ireland, they cannot be expected to flow in

Communication of capital cannot hurt Britain.

Douglas.

* Meeting at Francis-ſtreet chapel, April 9, 1795. See Report of Secret Committee.

with ſuch rapidity, as to effect any inſtant benefit to the one, or to occaſion any loſs or detriment to the other; becauſe capital and induſtry, ſo localized, are not eaſily influenced, at once to change their ſituation. Gradually, however, much wealth, capital and credit, will be attracted to Ireland, when uniformity of laws and legiſlature, give an increaſe of confidence to ſpeculatiſts and moneyed men; and this gradual benefit reaped by Ireland, inſtead of injuring the intereſts of individuals in England, will tend according to the known principles of public wealth, by multiplying the returns of profit, in and between both countries, to increaſe the riches of each.

Engliſh capital to ſpare. Douglas.

Some men have advanced an opinion, that the capital of England, is already ſo fully employed, that there is none to ſpare: but this cannot be reconciled with the eagerneſs conſtantly diſplayed, in purſuit of every new ſpeculation;—with the ſmall return of profit,* that many men are content to receive, in adventures ſubject to hazard and riſk;—with the immenſe ſums conſtantly inveſted in the funds, even when the dividends fall below 5 per cent.—or with the known fact, that a large proportion of foreign trade is carried on with Britiſh capital, excluſive of that portion, which, even under the preſent forbidding circumſtances, is engaged in the commerce of Ireland.

No danger from the increaſe of the parliament. Douglas.

Neither is there any more foundation for the imaginary evil, that is apprehended for Great Britain, from the increaſed number of the members of the legiſlature. ‡ It is notorious, that the parliament poſſeſſes, and has ever been uſed to exerciſe the power of adding to, or diminiſhing the number of its members; and that no inconvenience has reſulted from it. And the Scotch union is a remarkable inſtance in point, when an addition of *forty-five* members was made to the Houſe of Commons, without any inconvenient conſequences ariſing from it. In addition to this, it may be obſerved, how very ſmall a difference is occaſioned to the convenience of gentlemen, (and none to the buſineſs of the Houſe) by the moſt extreme fluctuation of the number of attending members, between 50 and 500.

The apprehenſion of the Britiſh Legiſlature being debaſed and corrupted by the intermixture of ſo many Iriſhmen in its body, is an argument that cannot be ſeriouſly urged by any one, who has any knowledge of the higher ranks of the Iriſh nation, or who has witneſſed the many inſtances in which the natives of Ireland have become members of the Britiſh Parliament, and by their ſplendid talents, have ſhed a luſtre upon that body, of which they have formed ſo diſtinguiſhed a part.

Edgeworth.

But beſides it muſt be recollected that as the Iriſh members to be added to the Britiſh Houſe of Commons will be thoſe, who repreſent

* Even ſo low as 5 per cent. though the fair returns in mercantile concerns are calculated on the LOWEST eſtimate at 10 PER CENT.

‡ Spencer, Goold, Taaffe, Bousfield, Weld, 36.

repreſent the counties of Ireland, with ſome others of the moſt independent in the Iriſh Legiſlature, there can be no grounds to apprehend from them any dangerous increaſe of miniſterial influence, for men of that deſcription are in general the leaſt liable to corruption. But inſtead of adding to the corruption, an union will ſerve to effect a ſalutary reform of the Britiſh Houſe of Commons. It may be ſuppoſed that of the 300 Members, there are in the Iriſh Houſe 80 or 90 county and city Members, and in the Britiſh parliament 180 county and city members out of the 558. In the one Houſe there is not nearly a third, in the other not more than a third of county and city members; but in the united Parliament the proportion would be materially altered: inſtead of one-third (or three-ninths) compoſed of county and city members, there would be four-ninths, which is nearer to one-half than to one-third. This of itſelf would ſerve to puriſy the Engliſh Commons; but it would alſo afford an excellent opportunity of cutting off from that Houſe 100 of the borough members without any inconvenience; thus leaving a conſiderable majority of county and city members in the united Parliament, without diminiſhing the influence of the crown, to any dangerous degree, for influence is far preferable to prerogative. It will be a further advantage to ſupply their place by 100 new members from Ireland, rather than from Engliſh counties, where eſtabliſhed families would thus acquire too great an increaſe of influence. Nor can it be imagined that the intereſt of Ireland ſhould be neglected by her repreſentatives at one ſide of the channel, more than at the other. The name of abſentee will not prevent a man from attending to the intereſt of his own property, though it be divided from him by ten or twenty leagues of ſea.—Beſides it is probable that the younger branches of noble and opulent abſentees, will come over to Ireland after an union, to manage the affairs, and to repreſent the families of their Engliſh relatives.

Another objection is drawn from the neceſſary imperfection of the union that would be enacted; ſince it is not poſſible, entirely to aſſimilate the two countries, with regard to revenue, taxes, &c. But to this, the caſe of Scotland affords a direct reply; for there a union, was to all intents and purpoſes, effected, notwithſtanding the difference of taxation, and what ſeems of much greater moment, and was objected to by all the judges under James I. with the exception of Sir Francis Bacon, as an inſurmountable impediment,—the difference of laws, and of the modes of adminiſtering juſtice. But it never was ſuppoſed, that the union of England with Wales, or with Lancaſhire, was imperfect, becauſe Wales and Lancaſhire have each rules of property, forms of judicature, cuſtoms and uſages, appropriate; which of courſe, form a difference, between their ſituation and that of England. The town of Calais was ſeparated by a ſea, and diſtinguiſhed by the preſervation of all its local Douglas.

local cuſtoms; yet the union of Calais with England was not objected to as imperfect, when it was admitted, by the charter of Henry VIII. to ſend two Burgeſſes to ſit in the Parliament of England.

Preſent time not improper.

Many, even of thoſe who expreſs a wiſh that an union may, at ſome future period, take place, * object to the preſent, as an improper time for the introduction of the meaſure, and deſire rather to wait for the moment of general tranquillity: but the preſent time is ſuch as to render this, which at any other ſeaſon might be a wiſe meaſure, now a *neceſſary* one. This is evidently demonſtrated by the *avowed fears* of an union being effected, which are entertained by thoſe, who have openly profeſſed themſelves the advocates of ſeparation; by Tone, Emmet, M'Nevin, &c. The apprehenſions ſtill felt on this ſubject, by their aſſociates, whoſe deſperate attempts are too recent to be forgotten, proclaim a *ſpeedy union*, or a *ſeparation* to be the only alternative.

A moment of general tranquillity may be expected for ever; it is not likely to be obtained by any other means than this meaſure, which muſt, therefore, firſt take place before the effect can follow. The Scotch union was completed during a foreign war of great magnitude, and at a ſeaſon of as much political difficulty and internal diſſenſion as the preſent.

And it cannot, with any colour of truth, be objected, that Ireland is taken by ſurpriſe, or that a novel meſaure is ſuddenly introduced; for, not to ſpeak of the actual incorporation under the uſurpation of Cromwell, an union was recommended by the Council of Trade in Ireland, ſo early as the year 1676, in the reign of Charles II. It was long a very favourite object of Ireland under Queen Anne, and the Iriſh Parliament failed, in repeated endeavours, to obtain it. After that period, it became a ſubject of general diſcuſſion, and gave riſe to numerous publications; and it has ever ſince been familiar to the ears of the Iriſh, and has been the ſubject of various works, publiſhed at different periods of time. Never till now, was a ſuſpicion entertained by any writer, ſpeaker, or ſtateſman, of the incompetency of Parliament to carry it into effect.

Parliament is competent.

Pitt, & Douglas, & Smith.

The competence of Parliament to debate, or to adopt the ſcheme of a legiſlative union, cannot be diſputed without calling in queſtion the conſtitutional exiſtence of the united kingdom of Great Britain † and the legality of its legiſlature ſince the period of the Scotch Union, for the plea of incompetence muſt be equally applicable to the Parliaments of that day, as to the preſent. But ſuch a doctrine would ſhake the title of the royal family to the throne (the act of ſettlement) and is a republican principle, degradatory to the Parliament, and ſubverſive of the conſtitution. The power of Parliament has no limits, but in the uſefulneſs of the meaſure; all queſtions, therefore,

* Spencer, Bousfield, Weld, Sheehy, &c. 63.
† Spencer, Taaffe, Bousfield, Goold, 36.

therefore, are open to *diſcuſſion* and *inveſtigation*, becauſe the demonſtration of utility brings any meaſure within the ſphere of parliamentary competence to achieve.

But the boaſted and valuable ſettlement of 1782, was made by Parliament. How then can a doubt be entertained of the competency of Parliament to make changes in the legiſlature of the kingdom, when the whole conſtitution of Parliament was changed by that very ſettlement? If Parliament was authorized in 1782, to make ſuch an agreement for the benefit of Ireland, ſo muſt the preſent Parliament. But, it is aſſumed that an Union is a dereliction of the rights and liberties of the people; and then it is argued, juſtly upon that aſſumption, that Parliament is not competent to enact it, becauſe, though capable of negociating for what is advantageous, Parliament cannot ſurrender the rights or liberties of the people. If the premiſes were true, the concluſion muſt follow; but the premiſes are not true; they are indeed aſſumed but not proved, and it is abſurd to ſay that any deviation however advantageous from the ſettlement of 1782 is impoſſible: the Iriſh legiſlature has not ſurely loſt the power of doing good, or of diſtinguiſhing good from evil. Edgeworth.

But, if not in Parliament, where can the power to effect any meaſure be imagined to reſide? Not in the conſtituent body, for they cannot be ſuppoſed to have delegated a truſt, with a tacit reſervation in particular caſes; nor does the conſtitution of Great Britain and Ireland acknowledge, in that body, any power or right of deliberation whatever; their entire function conſiſts in the act of election of their repreſentative, and with that act it ends; though it be always the duty of the latter, without doubt, to pay a certain attention to the wiſhes of his conſtituents, and the opinions of the people. It is from the incompetency of the people at large, to decide upon acts of government, and from the phyſical impoſſibility of their deliberation, that has ariſen the inſtitution of Parliament, or the nomination of perſons authorized by the people *to act in all caſes for them:* if therefore, in any inſtance, the power were to revert to the people, it would occaſion what is called *the vicious circle*; for, from the ſame cauſe as at the firſt, it muſt again return to the repreſentatives, and ſo, it might for ever perform the ſame courſe from the one body to the other, and back again: but the greater the magnitude and importance of the ſubject, the greater is the abſurdity of ſuppoſing it to revert to the deciſion of thoſe, who had deputed the power to decide in matters of inferior moment, becauſe they were judged, by the conſtitution, to be incompetent themſelves. The Houſe of Commons, in all legiſlative matters, is equivalent to the people at large; and therefore, as the Parliament conſiſts of three branches, King, Lords and Commons, if it were neceſſary on *any* occaſion to recur to the conſent of the people, who are equivalent to *one* only of theſe branches, that act would deſtroy the equilibrium, extinguiſh the legiſlative capacity Addington, & Douglas. Douglas. Lord Minto. Smith.

pacity of the King and the Peerage, and annihilate the conſtitution.

Addington, & Douglas. The power then cannot reſt in the people at large, for ſuch a ſuppoſition would imply a diſſolution of the government. It is an eſtabliſhed truth, that while the conſtitution exiſts, the *only legitimate* ſanction of public opinion, and its *only* efficient authority muſt be derived from the Parliament. The extent and abſolute ſupremacy of parliamentary power are aſſerted by the higheſt legal authorities, Sir Edward Coke, Sir Matthew Hale, Sir William Blackſtone, Lord Somers and others, who, to ſay the leaſt, have never been ſuſpected of any bias againſt the conſtitution and liberties of their country.

Douglas, To aſſert that there are acts, which, however beneficial, the conſtitutional legiſlature has not the right to perform, without a previous ſpecial commiſſion from the maſs of the nation, leads directly to the falſe and miſchievous principle of the ſovereignty of the people: a principle, which is proved, by all attempts to put it in practice, either by the ancient Jacquerie in France, by the Wat Tylers and Jack Straws of England, or by the Jacobins of modern France, to be as pernicious and as impoſſible in fact, as in theory the ſuppoſition is abſurd.

There are no caſes where the powers of the people at large begin, though there may exiſt ſome extraordinary caſes, which the legiſlature cannot reach; but ſuch a circumſtance, inſtead of conveying a rightful power to the people, would occaſion a diſſolution of the conſtitution and government, and give riſe to anarchy.

There are caſes of another deſcription, to which the ſupreme power of the legiſlature, in our conſtitution, cannot reach; but this ariſes not from any ſuppoſed compact, but from the moral impoſſibility of the act, or an implied contradiction of terms: for inſtance, no law of any Parliament can bind a ſubſequent Parliament, for ſuch an act muſt ſuppoſe the next Parliament leſs abſolute and ſupreme than the preſent, but the conſtitution gives them equal powers.

Again, in the caſe of an Union or incorporation of diſtinct parts, enacted by the legiſlature, by treaty or otherwiſe, Parliament is there incompetent to decompoſe and ſeparate them again: becauſe, the eſſential condition of ſuch Union being the combination of each of the conſtituent parts into a new whole, the identical characters and qualities of thoſe parts are ſo loſt, that they can no more afterwards be found, or reſtored; the contracting parties ceaſe to exiſt, and therefore become incapable of being reinſtated.

And this affords a ſufficient anſwer to the apprehenſions of Britain's aſſuming to herſelf, hereafter, the right of ſetting aſide at her pleaſure any incorporation of the two kingdoms. Ireland may, by civil convulſion or foreign force, be torn aſunder from her; ſo may Scotland, or Wales; but it never

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can be disjoined by any regular act of the united legiſlature. It is in the power of the common Parliament to alter or repeal any act of either Parliament, made previous to the Union, but it cannot alter or reſcind any fundamental article of the treaty by which they are united, becauſe the parties, by whom it was concluded, no longer exiſt; nor is it poſſible for either to return, at ſuch diſſolution, to the ſame ſituation, as they were in before their Union took place.

But, ſay the advocates of parliamentary incompetence, the members of the Iriſh Houſe of Commons were delegated to exerciſe, but not to alienate the powers committed to them; —to ſupport the independence, and excluſive authority of Ireland; and therefore, they have no power to make ſurrender of that independence and authority, into the hands of the Britiſh legiſlature, which on account of the great majority of the Britiſh above the Iriſh members, would, in effect, poſſeſs alone, ſupreme power. Both this alleged fact, and the inference of incompetency, are controverted by the example of Scotland. It is well known, with regard to the former, that, though Scotland has but forty-five repreſentatives, yet, on all local queſtions where the intereſts of their country have been particularly concerned, they have always been able to influence the deciſion of the houſe. Reſpecting the ſuppoſed incompetency of the repreſentative body, it is further argued, in order to obviate the inſtance of Scotland, that the act of Union paſſed by the Scotch Parliament either is become valid now by the length of time which has ſince elapſed and has ſanctioned it, as it were, by preſcription, from long acquieſcence;—or that it was made ſo at firſt by an expreſs power or commiſſion being given to the Scotch repreſentatives for the purpoſe.

& Dundas. Dundas, & Douglas,

But no preſcription can render that valid, which was at the firſt a mere nullity; and if that argument be admitted, every law ſince enacted, depending for its validity, on the validity of that tranſaction, is equally null and void; and, as a neceſſary conſequence, it will follow that the preſent legiſlature of Great Britain has no legitimate authority:—a dangerous abſurdity!

& Smith.

The obvious weakneſs of this argument has obliged gentlemen to reſort to a ſuppoſed ſpecial delegation from the conſtituent body to their repreſentatives. But, as before ſaid, the incompatibility of ſuch a tranſaction with the conſtitution, is ſuch that no validity or force could thence be derived to any act that was not valid without it, nor could that body grant to the elected any powers, beyond thoſe incident to the character of repreſentative.

Douglas.

No ſpecial delegation to the Scotch deputies, for an Union.

Beſides, it is eaſy to ſhew that no ſuch thing was attempted in Scotland in 1707; nor was the neceſſity, or poſſibility of it conceived to exiſt, with regard to any treaty ſince the acceſſion of James VI. to the crown of England; though it does ſeem as if ſuch a thing were intimated in an obſcure paſſage of

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De Foe, by whom alone it is even hinted. The fact was thus. The convention of eſtates in Scotland, which met on the abdication of James II, continued undiſſolved through the whole reign of William, and were ſummoned by Queen Anne, a few months after her acceſſion. At the time when this anomalous aſſembly was nominated, no meaſure of Union was in agitation; but, as ſoon as it met after King William's demiſe, it paſſed an act, in conſequence of a ſimilar act paſſed by the Engliſh Parliament, empowering the Queen to appoint commiſſioners for Scotland, to treat of an Union. Commiſſioners, on the part of each kingdom, met at Weſtminſter in October, 1702. Mean while the Scotch convention was diſſolved, but the commiſſion ſtill continued in full force, and no want of competency was urged againſt it. Soon after, a proclamation was iſſued in Scotland calling a new Parliament, in which it was curſorily mentioned that "commiſſioners *had been nominated* to treat of an Union, &c." as it was alſo in the ſame way, that "the Queen was engaged in a juſt and neceſſary war." This ſlight paſſage is the only one that affords the leaſt grounds for the aſſertion of a ſpecial delegation; and the ſimilar paſſage relative to the war, then carried on, may furniſh as good a proof of the neceſſity of a ſpecial notice to electors and a ſpecial delegation on that head alſo, which will ſcarcely be alleged: and no notice was taken, in any way, of ſo unuſual a circumſtance as that would have been, if the proclamation had intended to require particular inſtructions to be given to the repreſentatives. But the proclamation gives no particular directions; neither do the ſummonſes of election, the returns, (or as they are called in Scotland the commiſſions) —the minutes of election, or the corporation books bear the ſlighteſt marks of any thing ſpecial. Hiſtory, memoirs, tradition, and the act of the Scotch Parliament are all ſilent on that head. In 1703 this Parliament voted the commiſſion, then exiſting, to be terminate and extinct; and in 1705 the Queen, being again empowered by *that* Parliament, as well as by the Engliſh Parliament, appointed new commiſſioners, and by them, without any further communication with the people, the treaty was executed in 1706: the articles were ratified in 1707, and took effect on the firſt of May in that year, and there was no other election or delegation of power whatever.*

Ireland will be proportionably repreſented.

But the inequality in the numbers of the Iriſh and Britiſh members of the common Parliament does not evince any dereliction or ſurrender of her authority on the part of Ireland,† becauſe each country being ſtill repreſented preſerves its own power

* For a more particular detail, ſee the Speech of the Rt. Hon. Sylveſter Douglas, April 22, 1799, Page 18, et ſeq.

† Foſter, 33.

power of legiſlation, though at the ſame time either gives and mutually receives a power of legiſlation over the other; and this power is exactly equal, provided the repreſentatives be in exact proportion to the relative conſequence of each country reſpectively. Were a perfect arithmetical equality of numbers requiſite, the incorporation of the whole legiſlature of Ireland, as it now ſtands, would be inſufficient to effect a legal Union: but ſuch an incorporation would be highly unjuſt, becauſe it would give Ireland much more than her due propottion of influence.

The eſſential principles of the conſtitution, are, in both countries the ſame; and the legiſlature of the empire may be conſidered as one great machine conſiſting of a ſupreme head, and two branches, each ſimilarly divided into two parts: one of theſe branches regulates the affairs of Great Britain and the general concerns of the empire at large; the other legiſlates only, but excluſively for Ireland. This machine, it appears, might be greatly ſimplified, and therefore materially improved, by blending, in due proportion, theſe two ſeparate members into one, which, by one act, could adjuſt the concern of the whole ſtate; thus lending to each other additional ſtrength, and removing the poſſibility of weakneſs and diſtraction of councils.

AGAINST A LEGISLATIVE UNION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND;

ARGUMENTS *POLITICAL, RESPECTING THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF IRELAND,* IN CONNEXION AND INTERCOURSE WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

Settlement of 1782 final and adequate.

Foſter,

THE expreſſions * made uſe of, in the reſolutions of both Houſes of the Iriſh Parliament, on the occaſion of the ſettlement of 1782 † in their addreſs to the King and the Lord Lieutenant, and in both the anſwers to theſe addreſſes, are ſuch as afford ample proofs, that that adjuſtment was regarded as *final*, and was deemed ſufficient; for it is repeatedly termed *a full and perfect eſtabliſhment of the conſtitution of Ireland; an indiſſoluble connexion in unity of intereſts, and unity of conſtitution;—from which, no conſtitutional queſtion can ever avail to diſturb the harmony of the two kingdoms, &c &c.*

When Mr. Flood moved for leave to introduce a bill declaratory of *the ſole and excluſive right of Ireland to make laws, &c.* leave was refuſed, and a reſolution was paſſed, that it was refuſed, " *becauſe* the ſole, ſeparate, and excluſive right of legiſlation in the Iriſh Parliament, in all caſes, whether internal or external, had already been aſſerted by Ireland, and fully and *finally* and *irrevocably*, acknowledged by the Britiſh Parliament." And ſo great was the general joy and ſatisfaction, at this concluſive event, that in their laſt addreſs upon the ſubject, the Iriſh Parliament deſire a day of public and ſolemn thankſgiving to God, for ſo great a bleſſing. That ſettlement removed from Ireland, all thoſe evils of ſubjection, which an Union would again heap upon her.

The ſentiments of the Britiſh Parliament on that ſubject, ſeem to have been exactly ſimilar; and the arrangement of the points then in queſtion was the *ultimate* object of the then miniſters, Lord Shelburne and Mr. Fox; for, though it has been ſaid, that, after the paſſing of the bill repealing 6 Geo. I. ‡ an addreſs to the King was voted praying him *to take ſuch further meaſures as, &c.* no ſuch addreſs was ever voted; but when the firſt reſolution had been paſſed in the Britiſh Commons, declaring " the connexion indiſpenſable," &c. and leave " had been given to bring in a bill, an addreſs was voted con- " taining the ſubſtance of the reſolution, viz. " that the King " would be graciouſly pleaſed to take ſuch meaſures as his " Majeſty, in his royal wiſdom, ſhould think moſt conducive " to

* For full quotations, ſee the Speech of the Rt. Hon. John Foſter, April 11th, 1799, in the Iriſh Commons.

† Pitt, Addington, Dundas, 1. ‡ Pitt, 1.

" to the eſtabliſhing by mutual conſent, the connexion between " this kingdom and Ireland, upon a ſolid and *permanent* baſis." The addreſs contains not the word " further," and was *not* voted after the paſſing of the bill (repealing 6 Geo. I.) which was not preſented till June 11th: the addreſs was voted on the 17th of May.

The reſolution, in reſpect to future meaſures, ſeems to have had only commerce in view; and ſo it was aſſerted in 1785, by Mr. Pitt, and by the Earl of Liverpool (then Mr. Jenkinſon) and on that it was that miniſters relied, as the grounds for the neceſſity of the commercial ſyſtem of 1785; and though, it is true, that in reply, Mr. Fox, ſaid it was to extend to political objects only,* yet he explains thoſe political objects to be what really are commercial, by ſaying that they were to " comprehend the whole ſyſtem of navigation of the empire." Bousfield.

The connexion between the two kingdoms was rendered ſufficiently permanent and ſecure, by the act paſſed in 1782, which modifying Poynings' law,† enacts, that " no bill ſhall paſs into a law in Ireland, till it be returned under the *Great Seal of Great Britain:*" not leaving the connexion a *bare junction of two kingdoms under one Sovereign*, as it is ſaid; but, making the Britiſh miniſter anſwerable to the Parliament of Britain for any law paſſed in Ireland injurious to the empire, or tending towards the ſeparation of Ireland. This act does indeed certainly create a theoretic difference in the conſtitutions of the two kingdoms, which renders that of Ireland inferior to the other: yet it is a difference not injurious, but neceſſary from the ſituation of Ireland in the empire. And though Ireland be not therefore abſolutely independent, and cannot be ſo conſiſtently with her connexion with Great Britain, yet ſhe is independent with regard to the right of making laws for her own internal regulation and taxation, which ſhe ſolely and excluſively poſſeſſes. For though Ireland has not *abſolutely* the power of enacting any ſuch law, as it muſt be ratified by Great Britain, yet there is a moral certainty that ſuch ratification never will be withheld, unleſs in caſes where it is really injurious, becauſe the intereſt of Great Britain neceſſarily obliges her to conſult the intereſt of Ireland. *Connexion ſufficient.* Foſter. Lord Farnham.

This power of the Britiſh Parliament to control the third eſtate of the Iriſh Parliament, (in the King's power of aſſent) is an effectual pledge to Great Britain, that no Iriſh act can paſs to weaken, or impair the connexion: Ireland alſo, at the ſame time, is, on her part, ſecured as well in her connexion with Britain, as in her independence, becauſe, as ſhe cannot be bound by Britiſh law, ſo neither can any act of Britain alter, or reſcind the connexion, unleſs confirmed, by the act of Ireland herſelf. An act ſimply of the Britiſh Parliament is inadequate to throw off the connexion of Ireland, for no Britiſh act is capable of reſcinding the Iriſh annexation act of Henry VIII. as

* Douglas, 2. † Pitt, Addington, Lord Minto, Douglas, 1, 4.

as it was directly ſtated by Mr. Eden, (now Lord Auckland) when he moved the repeal of 6 Geo 1.

Taaffe, & Anon. The connexion was further ſtrengthened by Yelverton's act, which was paſſed the ſame day as the former, adopting *all* the Britiſh laws, reſpecting commerce, and making them the uniform law of the empire. An Union is the only poſſible event, that can endanger the connexion between the two kingdoms; for then the diſcontent of the people, magnifying every trifle, and conſtruing every act of the legiſlature into an injury, would render martial law, or rebellion, the only alternative for the unhappy country. But, it is ſaid, that the *preſent connexion* has been tried in various ſhapes, and in all, has failed of the expected effects: if ſo, there cannot be derived from thence any inducement to Ireland, to put herſelf implicitly in the hands of a country, from which, in mere partnerſhip, ſhe has derived ſo little benefit; it is rather an argument for complete ſeparation and entire independence.

Foſter. The conſtitution of 1782,* has obtained for Ireland greater bleſſings, than at any former period, ſhe had ever enjoyed; —an increaſed and increaſing affluence;—a flouriſhing trade; —an extended commerce. Her progreſs in improvement, which, in the twenty years that ſucceeded that eſtabliſhment, was greater, than in a century before, can be attributed to no other cauſe, than the reſtoration of her independence. But the eſtabliſhment of 1782, which effected this, is incompatible with an Union; they are in direct oppoſition to each other, and by an Union the adjuſtment of 1782, which is ſufficient for every purpoſe of happineſs, muſt be annihilated.

The introduction of the propoſitions of 1785, is no argument againſt the permanency, or ſufficiency of the adjuſtment of 1782: thoſe propoſitions were entirely commercial, and did not in any way, touch upon the conſtitution; they were ſtated by Mr. Pitt, as being a ſupplement to the meaſures of 1779 and 1780 and 1782; and, as *all* that was neceſſary to ſecure the connexion inviolate, and form a *complete* arrangement: ſo was it expreſſed by him in the addreſs to the King moved by him, in the Commons, and accompanied by a ſimilar addreſs from the Lords, expreſſive of the ſame thing.

It was ſaid, at the time, when the commercial propoſitions were debated in 1785, that "things could not remain as they "were,"—that "commercial jealouſy was rouſed, and would "increaſe with two independent legiſlatures;" and it is now argued from thence, that becauſe no compact has ſince taken place, matters are ſtill in the ſame dangerous ſituation, and require a remedy to be applied to the exiſting evil, by one of the only two meaſures, which, as is aſſerted, are capable of producing that effect, viz. a Legiſlative Union, or a Commercial

* Douglas, 6.

mercial Compact. The ſituation of things, however, is now materially different from that of 1785; the grounds of commercial jealouſy, that then exiſted, have been removed; and all the eſſential parts of the propoſitions then debated, have been adopted in ſubſequent laws, which have been paſſed ſeparately, as occaſion required: for inſtance;—Lord Hobart's act of 1793, to permit the importation into Great Britain from Ireland, of all goods the produce of the Britiſh colonies, or of Aſia, Africa, or America:—The Iriſh act, reſtraining the *acknowledged* right of Ireland, to trade within the Eaſt India Company's limits:—the adoption in *toto* of the navigation acts; the acts for the regiſtry of ſhipping; the increaſe of ſhipping; the regulation of Greenwich Hoſpital, &c. &c.

Thus, a third method of accommodation has been found, and has been practiſed, equally effectual with the others, and more permanent, becauſe it is founded on mutual intereſt and good will.

The connexion of Ireland with Great Britain very much reſembles that of the Britiſh Houſe of Commons with the crown. In former times that houſe had no concern whatever with matters of ſtate, and acted merely as a check to control the legiſlative prerogative of the crown: this prerogative, in courſe of time, has dwindled into nothing; and, as the commons now enter into all the detail of buſineſs, prerogative has given way, to the milder, but equally efficacious organ, influence. The effects are nearly ſimilar, but caſes have ſometimes ariſen, when the propoſed meaſure appeared ſo hoſtile to the intereſts of the country, that it was beyond the power of the crown to effect it, and no influence was able to obtain conſent to it. Anon.

So, in all common caſes, Ireland is in the habit of thinking with Great Britain, and acquieſcing in her plans, but ſtill ſhe retains the *power* of diſſenting, whenever the welfare of her country may ſeem to be menaced. It is not probable that the Iriſh Parliament would take ſo bold a ſtep, as to diſſent from any imperial meaſure propoſed in the Britiſh legiſlature, without a ſufficient conviction, that in ſo doing, they were expreſſing the will of the people: and there is much leſs danger to be apprehended, from ſuch a legal expreſſion of public diſapprobation, through the conſtituted anthorities, than from any other, that might irregularly burſt forth, when there were no public organ to ſpeak the ſentiments of the nation.

The falſehood of the aſſertion, that the two legiſlatures cannot exiſt, without a virtual ſubordination of the inferior to the deciſions of the other, is proved by the fate of the very queſtion under diſcuſſion, when it was agitated in the Iriſh Parliament. Anon.

Rudd. Parliament. The government of Ireland, compoſed of the King, Lords an Commons of Ireland,* is perfectly independent, and ſubject to the control of no power under Heaven; nor is the crown of Ireland any way ſubordinate to the crown of Britain, but equal and free.

Spencer. It would be abſurd of Ireland, with a greatly increaſed population, with a flouriſhing agriculture, extenſive, and ſtill extending commerce, to reſign into the hands of another country that diſtinct, and independent legiſlature, which ſhe enjoyed while inconſiderable in point of agriculture, commerce, and population. A temporary ſtate of diſturbances can afford no grounds for adopting a meaſure of ſo great magnitude, and in its nature *irrevocable:* nor is there any connexion between the evil, and the remedy propoſed.

Foſter, & Bousfield, But great fears are entertained of the conſequences that may ariſe from diſſenſion between the two legiſlatures; and many queſtions, it is ſaid, may be hereafter productive of ſuch fatal diſagreement. Of all theſe poſſible queſtions, however, none are pointed out, except thoſe of peace and war, including treaties, and that of regency.

The declaration of war is the King's prerogative, and in him, ſolely, the power is veſted, independent of either legiſlature. The only means poſſeſſed by Parliament of controling that power, is by withholding ſupplies. But if, in that point the two legiſlatures ſhould diſagree, and the one ſhould ſupport the crown in a war, while the other ſhould refuſe to concur, the only inconvenience that could reſult from thence, would be, that one country would withhold its aſſiſtance, till its good ſenſe ſhould induce it to acquieſce; while it would ſtill be expoſed, equally with the other to all the loſſes, and calamities of war, becauſe the King's declaration of war involves equally all his ſubjects: So that there is little probability of reſiſtance, in ſuch a caſe, on the part of the weaker, and more expoſed.

Lord Farnham, But hiſtory does not furniſh one inſtance, where the Iriſh Parliament has withheld its ſupport. The motive which has produced this uniform concurrence, is one which muſt *ever* produce the ſame effect, ſelf-intereſt, and ſelf-preſervation. The ſame motive ever has, and ever will occaſion the ſame concurrence of the Britiſh Parliament with the crown in ſuch caſes, but it muſt operate with greater force upon Ireland than Great Britain in proportion as the former ſtands in a more defenceleſs condition than the latter.

In making peace, the executive is not ſubject to embarraſſment of the ſame ſort, by the denial of ſupply; and it is very unlikely that any nation, eſpecially the weaker, ſhould decline

* Douglas, Dundas, &c.

decline accepting the bleſſings of peace, when offered. And, on the ſubject of treaties, not concerning peace or war, which may therefore require the confirmation of a legiſlative act, there is leſs reaſon for apprehending a diſagreement between the Iriſh Parliament, and that of Great Britain, than between the latter and the executive; both, therefore, may reſt upon the ſame footing. There are many things hazardous and alarming in theory, which yet in practice are ſafe and eaſy.

The only queſtion upon which a difference of opinion can be ſaid to have ever actually exiſted, between the two legiſlatures, is that of the regency in 1789. But, in that caſe, it was the diſagreement of *two eſtates* of each Parliament only, deprived of the third which was common to both legiſlatures; and it is an inſtance of a caſe, where the controul of the Britiſh council over the third eſtate, in its power of aſſent to the acts of the Iriſh Parliament, was neceſſarily extinguiſhed. It affords ſtrong preſumptive evidence of the efficacy of the connexion eſtabliſhed in 1782, that the only inſtance of diſagreement, happened during the ſuſpenſion of the bond of Union then eſtabliſhed.

In the caſe of Regency, however, no difficulty, in fact, exiſts, becauſe, not only the identity of perſon in the Regent is, by the annexation Act of Hen. VIII. equally ſecured with that of the Sovereign; but by the law of 1782, concerning the Great Seal, the matter is put beyond all doubt, for the Great Seal muſt be in the hands of the Regent of Great Britain, and without the uſe of that Seal, and conſequently without the concurrence of that Regent, all the functions of the Iriſh Legiſlature muſt be ſuſpended. If any & Bousfield.
difference of ſituation ſhould require any local difference of power to be put into the Regent's hands, the Iriſh Parliament would be as fully competent to eſtabliſh it, as it now is with regard to the Sovereign. But it would be ſilly from any apprehenſion of theoretic inconvenience, in a caſualty that may never happen, to ſurrender the independence and honor of the country.

The true principle, to which is to be aſcribed the preſer- Foſter.
vation and ſtability of the Britiſh Conſtitution, is the balancing check of the three eſtates of Parliament upon each other,* which maintains a juſt equilibrium and proportion between them all. The ſame principle may be applied to the two ſeparate Parliaments, which, by a ſimilar operation, may ſerve to ſecure each other in their juſt relations; ſo that their mixed powers, like thoſe of the mixed government, ſhall by their ſeparate exertions, ſo checked, preſerve the ſymmetry of the whole.

If

* Smith, 10.

Union will not ſtrengthen the Empire, Foſter, & Spencer.

If the effects of an Union* were to be ſuch as are promiſed, the ſtrengthening the Empire, and increaſing its reſources, ſuch an object would certainly juſtify very important ſacrifices made to obtain it. But the conſolidation of the kingdoms is already as ſtrong, as human policy, or individual intereſt can make it; and an Union could have no other effect, but to deprive Ireland of the reſidence of her Parliament: in all other reſpects ſhe would remain preciſely as ſhe is; ſo that no addition would be made through her means, to the power of the Empire by an Union. On the contrary, it would be leſſened, by debilitating Ireland: her ſpirit would be debaſed, and her reſources weakened, by being reduced to a ſtate of ſubjection, by the increaſe of Abſentees, and by the check that her trade and manufactures would ſuffer.

Lord Farnham.

It has been argued by the advocates of Union, that the *only* mode of connexion, which is ſufficient to guard againſt the danger of ſeparation, is the *perfect identity* and *incorporation* of the governments. But admitting this to be juſt, it affords an argument againſt the propoſed Union, between Great Britain and Ireland: For, according to the ſcheme propoſed, there is not any ſubſtantial diſtinctneſs between thoſe countries, which will not continue to exiſt, except the very material one of the Parliaments. The executive governments will be diſtinct, the revenues, the appropriation of the funds in each, the treaſury will remain diſtinct, and from thence muſt ever ariſe, more or leſs, a diſtinctneſs of intereſt. Theſe circumſtances render a *perfect identification* impoſſible, and according to the ſame juſt reaſoning, ſerve only to increaſe the tendency to ſeparation. The ſituation of Scotland and Wales with regard to England, was totally different upon theſe points; they admitted of a complete incorporation and identity. In order to *conſolidate* the Scotch Union, it is ſaid, that it was found neceſſary to remove, by the abolition of the Privy Council of Scotland, that remaining *nucleus of local government, and ſeparate intereſt*. And yet Union with Ireland, accompanied with the diſtinctneſſes of Viceroy, Privy Council, Revenues and expences, is expected to produce a perfect identity and incorporation.

Lord Minto.

and is irrevocable. Foſter, & Spencer.

But whatever may be the poſſible, or probable advantages to be derived from an Union, it ſhould always be recollected, that the meaſure once adopted, is *irrevocable*; that no means will exiſt on obtaining the redreſs of any inconveniencies that may be found to reſult from it; whereas that if a change of circumſtances ſhould ever hereafter make it neceſſary to have recourſe to an Union, it will always be within the power of the Parliament to do ſo when occaſion may require.

No

* Pitt, 4.

No very brilliant proſpect can offer itſelf to Ireland, of the advantages to be derived, from putting herſelf again into the hands of a Parliament, whoſe partial and oppreſſive conduct towards her, till 1782, was ſo truly and forcibly deſcribed by Mr. Pitt. It is a mere play upon words, to ſay that Ireland will be ſecured from a ſimilar ſituation, by ſuch a mockery of repreſentation as 100 Members among 558.* The ſmall proportion of Iriſh Members would annihilate the ſalutary control of the conſtituents over the repreſentatives; and would anſwer no other purpoſe, than to ſanction as the voluntary act of Ireland, an uſurpation, which was before ſuffered only by compulſion, and from which ſhe was reſerved by the energy of her own Parliament: No *articles*† of Union can ſerve as a ſecurity, becauſe it equally lies within the omnipotence of Parliament, that eſtabliſhed them, to alter, or reſcind them altogether, at its pleaſure. And even if there ſhould hereafter ariſe ſome liberal-minded Miniſter in England, who ſhould be inclined to treat Ireland, with a juſtice that ſhe has not experienced theſe 500 years; ſtill the narrow ſelfiſhneſs of the Britiſh character, would tie up his hands, and oppoſe ſuch an attempt. Nor is any reliance to be placed upon its being the duty of the legiſlature to provide equally, for the benefit of the whole Empire. For public virtue is not to be depended on; and therefore it is, that government is made to conſiſt of a ſyſtem of checks. The argument of *duty* may as well be adduced in ſupport of a ſyſtem of abſolute power. If the Britiſh legiſlature be entitled to ſuch implicit confidence, it were as wiſe to ſend no repreſentatives from Ireland, but let that country give to Britain, *formally*, the ſway, which really ſhe will have.

Imprudent to confide in Great Britain. Foſter, & Goold, & Anon. Spencer. Foſter, & Goold, & Anon. Anon.

At the Union of Scotland, it was ſtipulated, that the Land-tax upon Scotland, ſhould never exceed *one fortieth* of that which was laid upon England; but now, by the contrivance of ſubſtituting a tax on income for a land-tax, Scotland is made to pay *one eighth* of the Engliſh tax. This is not quoted as a breach, or even an evaſion of any of the articles of Union, but it ſerved to ſhew how futile any language, in which ſuch articles can be expreſſed, may, by the accidents of time and unforeſeen circumſtances, be rendered. And Ireland would have the leſs ſecurity in Parliament, becauſe the great diſtance would place her repreſentatives beyond the reach of public opinion or cenſure.

Spencer, & Goold, & Bousfield, & Anon.

The example of Scotland is conſtantly urged, in favour of the neceſſity and good conſequences of an Union:‡ but there is no ſimilarity between the ſituations of Scotland and of Ireland. Scotland was connected with England, by no other tie, than the accidental circumſtance of the crown of

Caſe of Scotland not ſimilar. Foſter, & Spencer, & Rudd, & Goold, & Bousfield.

* Douglas, 24. † Ibid. 13. ‡ Douglas, 8. Smith, 13.

England having deſcended to the Scottiſh King; in all other reſpects, it was perfectly foreign. Scotland had no conſtitution, the two houſes of Parliament ſat together, and the Commons had no control over the purſe of the Nation,* for the King, by exerting his prerogative in the creation of Peers, could at pleaſure outnumber the votes of the Commons: nor were they poſſeſſed of the power of deliberation, for no ſubject could come before them, without being firſt propoſed by the *Lords of Articles*. Depreſſed in trade, ſubject on all occaſions to miſchievous foreign influences, led by a train of groſs injuries to the very brink of hoſtilities, (ſo far as even to *have paſſed* an act diſjoining the realm from the crown of England, at the demiſe of the then reigning Sovereign,) Scotland was fortunate, in her declining ſtate, and under ſuch diſadvantages, to obtain, by incorporation with a rich and inimical nation, all the benefits of a great and increaſing commerce, not otherwiſe attainable to her, the ceſſation of a vexatious ſyſtem of enmity and oppreſſion, and the certainty of a powerful and friendly alliance, together with ſecurity from the impending dangers of total ſeparation: Not one of theſe circumſtances is applicable to the ſtate of Ireland.

Spencer. But even in Scotland, ſo ill-reliſhed was the Union, that only ſix years after the concluſion of the treaty, its diſſolution was moved in the Upper Houſe; and was ſupported by *all* the Scotch Peers;† upon the plea of one of the articles of the treaty having been violated, in the impoſition of a Malt tax; of there no longer being a council in Scotland; and of their laws being altered in matters of the higheſt importance.

Anon. There is no inconſiſtency in arguing, from the ſame grounds; the oppreſſion exerciſed by England over each country, that great benefits were derivable to Scotland from an Union, but that the meaſure would be injurious to Ireland. Becauſe the misfortunes of Scotland were in exiſtence and ſenſibly felt at the time, and not to be remedied by any other means than an Union: Ireland *has already freed herſelf* from the oppreſſion, that ſhe ſuffered; and to her an Union would anſwer no end, but to expoſe her to a repetition of the ſame calamities.

It may be obſerved alſo that the efficacy of an Union, is not proved to be ſo complete and univerſal, as its advocates aſſert, by the condition of Scotland; for it has not had power ſufficient to prevent two rebellions from taking place in that country in the courſe of forty years: Nor was it able to counteract the introduction of French principles and

* Douglas, 14. † Ibid. 13.

and republicaniſm, very lately, which made conſiderable progreſs in Scotland, as the fate of Muir, Palmer, &c. ſufficiently teſtify.

But it appears from the ſecret correſpondence between the Duke of Portland and Lord Shelburne in 1782, which has been lately diſcloſed, that the Duke had then in contemplation certain acts of Parliament, which were calculated to produce all the good effects that are now expected from an Union, ſo that Miniſters *then* thought that ſuch acts were ſufficient, without depriving Ireland of her conſtitution. Ld. Farnham.

Adam Smith's opinion not relevant.

The authority of the juſtly-celebrated political œconomiſt, Dr. A. Smith, has been quoted in ſupport of an Union: but it ſhould be obſerved that that gentleman's works were publiſhed previous to the material alteration which was produced in the condition of Ireland, by the recovery of Free trade in 1779. He wrote in 1776, and that very acquiſition, which was likely to have flowed from an Union, is the principal point upon which he dwells, as an argument of the benefits to be derived from an Union. His opinion alſo embraced equally the caſe of North America, and recommended an incorporative Union with Britain to thoſe States; but the American colonies ſpurned his remonſtrance, and vindicated their own independence. Anon.

Union will injure Britain.

The injuries that will reſult from an Union between Great Britain and Ireland, are not confined to the latter; Britain will alſo feel its ill effects.* Ireland, reduced to the miſerable condition of a Weſt-India colony, will, like St. Domingo, furniſh an eternal ſink to the blood and treaſure of Britain, which muſt be expended in order to maintain it. Anon.

Inſtead of purifying the corrupt condition of Parliament, by mixture with another corrupt body, it will ſerve only to deteriorate ſtill further the Britiſh Parliament, by the admiſſion of the Iriſh Members; and of men ſo peculiarly expoſed to temptation. Spencer.

It will be a dangerous innovation in the conſtitution of Great Britain, by the admiſſion of foreigners into the Legiſlature, for at the moment that a ſingle Member, over whom the country has no control, contributes to enact any law to bind that country, its conſtitution is at an end. Goold.

It will commit England, in a breach of faith with Scotland, by infringing on the ſtipulated proportion of the Scotch Members, to thoſe of the Engliſh houſes of Parliament. Taaffe.

And in the wound, which Ireland will receive in her conſtitution, Britain ought to feel herſelf equally attacked; for ſo cloſe and intimate is the connexion between the two countries, that there can be no invaſion of the rights of the one, without enfolding in its mantle the liberties of the Bousfield.

* Douglas, 18.

Goold, & Weld, & Anon.

the other. But in this meaſure the grand object of the Miniſter ſeems to be the overthrow of the Britiſh conſtitution, by means of the additional ſtrength which he will derive from the body of Iriſh repreſentatives.

Parliament not competent. Spencer, & Taaffe, & Sheehy, & Bousfield, & Goold, &c.

But, further though all the ſuppoſed advantages of an Union were juſtly to be expected from it, yet Parliament is not competent to effect ſuch a meaſure, without the directly expreſſed approbation of the people.* The power of the Britiſh Parliament has been held in doubt by ſome very able men, with regard to the ſeptennial bill, by which it only prolongs its own duration for a few years: Much more then may the extent of Parliamentary power be called in queſtion, as to a meaſure, which goes to aboliſh the Parliament itſelf, and transfers the right of legiſlation into the hands of another country.

A Member of Parliament has no right to delegate that, which was only a delegated truſt to himſelf, or to ſubſtitute another Parliament for that choſen by the people. Some years ſince, when a bill was introduced in the Iriſh Houſe of Commons, to incapacitate revenue officers, from voting at elections of Members of Parliament, it was contended on the part of Adminiſtration, and ſucceſsfully too, that Parliament had not a right to disfranchiſe men not convicted of any crime.

If then Parliament was not impowered to disfranchiſe ſome obſcure individuals, ſurely it cannot be competent to adopt a meaſure, which will render the franchiſes of the whole Kingdom a mere nullity.

Anon.

But, it is argued, the Septennial Bill was paſſed, and the *fact* is a proof of the competence of Parliament; ſo alſo the various limitations of the Crown. But neither the Septennial Bill of Geo. I. nor the limitations of the crown, at all trench upon the conſtitution; they relate only to the *regulation* of diſtinct branches of the conſtitution, but that in itſelf remains unaltered. The queſtion of an Union affects immediately the conſtitution; for it is an *eſſential* part of it, to have an Houſe of Commons choſen *ſolely* by the people, and any Act, which ſubſtitutes for that aſſembly an Houſe of Commons of which five-ſixths, are choſen by a foreign Nation, alters materially, and impairs the conſtitution. The introduction of a ſingle member not choſen by the people is a breach of the conſtitution.

At a period of the world, when conſtitutional rights were ſo little known or underſtood, as in the twelfth century, king John's reſignation of his crown and kingdom to the Pope was oppoſed with violence, by the Barons, becauſe he was

* Douglas, Addington, Lord Minto, &c. 20.

was not competent, to hand over his people, without their conſent, to any other maſter. The inſtance of competence in the Scotch Parliament to a ſimilar meaſure proves nothing, becauſe the Scotch Union was treated of and concluded, by deputies from the Nation, expreſsly choſen for that purpoſe; and Lord Somers, who was a conſtitutional lawyer, and was well aware of the incompetency of Parliament,† took care to authorize their proceedings by an *appeal to the people*, and by ſtating expreſsly in the ſummons, which called together the Scotch Parliament, that an Union between the two kingdoms was one of the ſubjects to be laid before them.

The power of Parliament, though not abſolute and unlimited, is competent to every act, which is not a violation of the conſtitution. No more than this, is aſſerted either by Coke or Blackſtone, and both thoſe Lawyers give inſtances of acts, to which Parliament is not competent. So it ſtands recorded upon the authority of the Parliament and people of England—an endeavour to ſubvert the conſtitution, or violate the fundamental laws, was declared to amount, on the part of the King, to an abdication of his Crown: it will not, ſurely, be contended that the King is the *only* branch of the Legiſlation that may not with impunity ſubvert the conſtitution, or that has an original compact with the people.

Lord Coke,* and Sir William Blackſtone,† however high Anon.
their authority, are not the only writers on this ſubject, who have aſſerted the incompetence of any Sovereign, whether an abſolute monarch or a delegated Parliament, to alienate or tranſfer into other hands the right of legiſlation: it is equally the opinion of Grotius,‡ Puffendorf,§ and Locke.‖ Lord Coke¶ goes ſo far as to deny the power of Parliament to depute its authority, even for a ſingle ſeſſion, and even to men ſelected from itſelf, and members of its own body.

But in caſe an Union be enacted, Parliament will be &Ld. Farnham.
competent hereafter to reſcind it,—or it will not. If not, the whole doctrine of the omnipotence of parliament vaniſhes. If it be competent, then that power of diſſolving the Union will reſt in the Britiſh Parliament; and if it ſhould happen that an Union prove injurious to Britain, then the Britiſh Legiſlature will make uſe of that power, and Ireland will be caſt off. But, on the other hand, if the unfortunate conſequences of an Union ſhould fall upon Ireland, however heavy

† Douglas, 23. * Inſtit. p. 43. † Com. B. 1. c. 1.
‡ De jure belli et pacis, L. 1. c 4. § 10.
§ De leg: naturæ et gen. L. 8. c. 12. § 6.
‖ On Government. Part 2d. c. 11. § 141.
Ib. ——— c. 19. § 212.
¶ 4 Inſtit. p. 42.

heavy the calamities that ſhe may ſuffer, ſhe may cry in vain for relief, ſhe will have no power over the United Parliament, and conſequently no power, on her part, to procure the reviſion of the compact of Union. Thus, when Scotland, a few years after the concluſion of the Union, thought herſelf aggrieved by the impoſition of a malt tax, in violation, at leaſt of the letter of the treaty, and wiſhed for a diſſolution of the Union, ſhe failed of ſucceſs in the attempt, notwithſtanding the unanimous ſupport of the Scotch Peers, in the Upper-houſe, where the motion was made.

Taaffe. Britain, at the leaſt, would have it in her power always, to make ſuch alteration in the terms of the treaty, as might ſuit her intereſt, or caprice: and numberleſs inſtances exiſt in proof of the little reliance that is to be placed on the good faith of England; as the breach of the treaty of Limerick, &c. &c.

Dr. Drennan. It is argued by another gentleman, who ſeems to ſtand alone, in his opinion, that the preſent connexion between Great Britain and Ireland, cannot be permanent, that it is already haſtening towards diſſolution, but that inſtead of adding ſtrength to it, an Union will lead *immediately* to *ſeparation, hoſtile and republican;* and that the only method of guarding againſt this, and conſolidating the connexion by firmly uniting the intereſts of the two kingdoms, is a *complete, friendly,* ſeparation, and the eſtabliſhment of total independence; conſtituting, in each iſland, a *ſeparate and independent monarchy,* and ſecuring the *alliance,* by placing the Crown of Ireland on the head of ſome of the younger branches of the reigning family, on the Britiſh throne.

IN

IN *FAVOUR* OF A LEGISLATIVE UNION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND,

ARGUMENTS *POLITICAL*, AS RESPECTING THE *INTERNAL* INTERESTS, PEACE, AND PROSPERITY OF IRELAND.

Small ſtates expoſed to danger.

SMALL ſtates are always, expoſed to the dangers of internal convulſion, and of external fraud and oppreſſion. It is large ſtates only, and extenſive communities, which can poſſeſs power ſufficient, for protection againſt foreign encroachments, and internal diſſenſions. Hiſtory affords a confirmation of this remark, in the conduct of the ancient ſtates of Greece and Italy, of the ſmall kingdoms of the Saxon Heptarchy, of the ancient divided territories of Ireland itſelf, of the ſeparate governments of England and Scotland in the courſe of ſeveral centuries, &c. At the preſent æra the inſecurity of ſmall ſtates is evinced, in the misfortunes, to which the diſcordant powers of Italy, and the imperfect confederacy of Switzerland, have been expoſed.

Iriſh Patriot. Anon.

It was by a firm Union of her ſeparate Members, that Great Britain was enabled, to overcome the difficulties which embarraſſed her, to put an end to internal quarrels, and raiſe her power and influence among nations to that exalted rank in which ſhe now ſtands. Ireland, too ſmall to be capable of maintaining herſelf independent, is the only part of the Britiſh Empire, that, at this day, is not united to the reſt, by a firm and undivided Government. The ſecurity of ſuch an Union is equally neceſſary for the removal of his own internal commotions, as for the ſtrengthening the reſources and powers of the Empire at large.

Internal condition of Ireland wants remedy.

The leaſt reflection upon the internal condition of Ireland; the dreadful cruelties exerciſed by the ferocious enemy; the lamentable ſeverities that in conſequence became neceſſary; the hoſtile diviſions of ſects; the animoſities exiſting between the original inhabitants, and the more recent ſettlers; the unfortunate want of civilization, more remarkable in that country, than any other almoſt in Europe; the unhappy prevalence of Jacobin principles, ariſing out of the foregoing cauſes, and augmenting their malignity.—The leaſt reflection on theſe melancholy and too evident circumſtances,

Pitt, & Addington, & Anon.

ſtances, will point out the abſolute neceſſity of ſome change of ſyſtem. No meaſure ſeems ſo likely to effect a remedy, as the formation of a legiſlature removed from danger, and uninflamed by the prejudices and paſſions, that diſtract the country.* Theſe qualities a general Imperial Parliament would eminently poſſeſs, combined, at the ſame time, with all the requiſite local information and attachment.

& Douglas. The intereſts of the two Iſlands are ſo united, that it is not poſſible, to ſpeak to that of either, without including, in the conſideration, the concerns of the other; but, though Ireland were alone implicated in the preſent diſcuſſion, the adoption of another ſyſtem is of the higheſt importance, and the diſtracted ſtate of that country ſeems to point out the eſtabliſhment of an Imperial legiſlature, as the only means of healing its bleeding wounds, and reſtoring its long-loſt tranquillity.

Smith. Ireland is as well calculated, by nature, as any country upon earth, to enjoy every poſſible bleſſing, and yet, its ſtate has never, at any period, been ſuch as to afford ſatisfaction, on account of the feuds, and animoſities that have ever prevailed, and have alternately injured and irritated both Roman Catholic, and Proteſtant, and prejudiced them againſt each other. The form of Government, though ſimilar to that of Great Britain, was not competent to remove theſe calamities, becauſe it did not beſtow and receive *general* confidence and protection; for it was not connected by an indiſſoluble tie, with the obvious intereſts, the feelings, and the opinions of the great body of the people: No remedy can be effectual, but ſuch as will ſtrike at the root of the evil, by putting an end to the ſtruggles for power between different bodies of the people, and rendering the Proteſtants and Catholics of the two countries one Nation, under the authority and protection of one Parliament;† which ſhall be free from the prejudices, the fears and the hatreds of either of the contending parties in that kingdom.

Preſent Government of Ireland, not able to procure it.

Addington.

Ireland the moſt vulnerable part of the Empire. Smith. That Ireland is regarded by the enemy, as the moſt vulnerable part of the Empire, and that her condition is, by them, attributed to her domeſtic convulſions and diſtractions, we have too ample teſtimony in the declarations and conduct of Hoche, Humbert, Tone, &c.‡ in the Reports of the Secret Committees, &c. &c. But the ſtate of Scotland has been urged, in this reſpect, in oppoſition to the benefits of an Union, becauſe treaſon has, notwithſtanding, found its way into that country alſo: If, however, the Scotch have been

* Foſter, 54. † Ibid. 56. ‡ Foſter, Bousfield, 58.

been tainted with diſaffection, and ſedition did appear among them, it ſhould be remembered that the diſeaſe was derived from the contagion of Ireland; and this circumſtance ſerves only to afford a more convincing proof, of the neceſſity to the whole empire, of ſome meaſure, that will purify that ſource of ſedition.

Some of the principal defects of Ireland, and an abundant fountain of calamities, are well known to be the want of capital and induſtry; theſe wants, no method is ſo likely to remedy, as mixing with a people, that can amply ſupply her with both. Smith,

Religious Diſtinction the misfortune of Ireland.

But the great misfortune of Ireland is the diviſion of its people, by the diſtinction of religions: this more particularly requires the interference of ſome regulating power, that is placed, beyond the ſphere of danger, or prejudice.* In the preſent ſtate of things, the Proteſtant ſees the aſcendancy, and even the exiſtence of his religion, expoſed to danger, from any further extenſion of the privileges, and powers of the Roman Catholics: and on the other hand the Romaniſts, increaſing every day in power and influence, equally feel the eſtabliſhment of the National Church to be a grievance; ſo that it is equally perilous to comply with the fears of one party, or to grant the claims of the other. This difficulty would be obviated by an united legiſlature, which might be able, in time, to remove all the grievances of the Roman Catholic, without ſubjecting the Proteſtant to any poſſible riſk. & Douglas, & Addington, & Lord Minto, & Dundas.

Remedied by an Union.

In that caſe, if the Roman Catholics were to be admitted into the united Parliament, their weight, in the general repreſentation, would be but as feathers in the ſcale;† all poſſibility of encroachment on the Proteſtant eſtabliſhment, through the means of an Imperial Parliament, would be done away; and the favourite argument of preponderating numbers, would be diſſipated in a moment. On the other hand, ſhould the Romaniſts continue to be excluded; a barrier of tenfold ſtrength, would be placed between their wiſhes and the accompliſhment of them: Inſtead of a minority of fellow citizens, they would have to contend with the united legiſlature, and a majority of Proteſtants in the empire, greater than their own boaſted majority at home. Smith, & Addington, & Lord Minto, & Anon.

It has been ſaid that the conceſſions, made to the adherents of that religion in 1793, are ſuch as to "threaten the overthrow of the Proteſtant eſtabliſhment in Ireland, and hazard both the connexion with Great Britain and the ſucceſſion of the Houſe of Hanover." There are but two modes, in which the effects of that meaſure can be remedied; either by an Incorporative Union, or by the re-enaction of the repealed code of popery laws. To the latter, it is univerſally Addington,

* Taaffe, Sheehy, 57. † Foſter, 57.

verſally allowed, there are radical and inſuperable objections: And it is worthy of remark, that it was not till after the repeated efforts of the Iriſh Parliament had proved abortive, and the object was abandoned, that, as the only remaining reſource, in the diſtreſſed ſtate of the kingdom, the penal code of popery laws was enacted

& Earl of Clare, (Speech 1793.)

It would, beſides, be a ſatisfactory reflection to thoſe Romaniſts, who are poſſeſſed of the elective franchiſe, that, in the exerciſe of that power, they were no longer about to delegate a body of men, whom they are too apt to regard as hereditary enemies, adverſe to their intereſts and religion; but that thoſe, whom they ſhould elect, would be mixed among a great majority of men, uninfluenced by the prejudices, which are by them imputed, whether juſtly, or not, to the Proteſtants, and Parliament of Ireland.

Addington, & Dundas.

Parliamentary ſyſtem of Ireland vicious.

A review of the origin and progreſs of the parliamentary ſyſtem of Ireland, will clearly ſhew that, as well as the ſyſtem of government, it is alſo in itſelf radically vicious; that it cannot ſubſiſt in its preſent ſtate, and can only be remedied by, either a reform, or an Union with Great Britain. At a time like the preſent, when the pruning knife of reform, has been changed for the axe of demolition, ſo that the ſmalleſt inlet to innovation admits a torrent ſufficient to deſtroy the fabric, which it was the deſign to ſecure, no thinking man will wiſh to have recourſe to the former means. An Union then remains, as the ſole remedy.

Anon. Impartial view of the cauſes leading to, &c.

The rebellion, under Queen Elizabeth, had occaſioned forfeitures to a great extent, in point both of number and value. In order to occupy thoſe lands and contribute to their improvement, James I. ſent over a colony of Proteſtants. But theſe ſettlers were expoſed to all the animoſities of the barbarous natives, who differed from them in religion, in language, in laws, and in all the habits of ſocial intercourſe. It became neceſſary, therefore, to provide for their ſecurity by ſome extraordinary means; and for that purpoſe the King erected *ſixty-ſeven* Proteſtant corporations, which were allowed the privilege of ſending, each, two repreſentatives to ſit in Parliament; and in this circumſtance, it was, that the inſtitution of an Iriſh Parliament commenced; for previouſly, there had exiſted only the *Aſſembly of the Pale*, which was no Parliament.

Thus aroſe a hoſtile Parliament, in a hoſtile country, a government, whoſe views were oppoſite to thoſe of the people governed; and conſequently whatever benefited the one muſt have been the injury of the other: and the degradation of either muſt have, reciprocally, ſerved to exalt the other. No ſyſtem could be more formidable; it induced a neceſſary reciprocity of coercion and reſiſtance. The hands of the

Proteſtants

Proteſtants were further ſtrengthened by Cromwell; he erected new boroughs, and made new diſtributions of the property of the papiſts. It ſeems to have been the deſign of James II. to oppoſe this ſyſtem of corporations, and to reſtore the Roman Catholic proprietors, to their due weight, in the ſcale of power. But his abdication, at once, put an end to theſe ſchemes, and made way for the Revolution; which while it provided England with ſecurity for life, liberty and property, ſerved, in Ireland, only to throw additional chains upon the people, to exclude the Romaniſts from the legiſlature, to deprive them of all means of education, and to place new power in the hands of the Proteſtant ariſtocracy.

Too public notoriety and too ſad experience render it unneceſſary, to record the melancholy effects of this policy, both, upon the face of the country, and upon the manners of its inhabitants. Induſtry and emulation were baniſhed; the Iriſh people was reduced to a nation of herdſmen, and the only art that remained to be cultivated, was that of making the rents for the oppreſſive landlords.

At the acceſſion of the preſent Royal Family, the attention of Great Britain was in a great meaſure turned away from Ireland, by the agitation, which had ſucceeded the ſettlement of the Houſe of Hanover upon the throne, together with the multiplied foreign concerns with which ſhe was then occupied: and Ireland was left in the hands of her own ariſtocracy, which conſequently increaſed in power; and, aſſuming to themſelves the complete control over the Lords Lieutenant who were ſent there, incapacitated them totally from paying attention to the complaints and ſufferings of the people, when any of them ſhould by chance penetrate to the viceroy's ear. In order to break this overbearing ariſtocracy, Lord Townſhend was ſent to Ireland, as Lord Lieutenant. That nobleman put down effectually the reigning faction, but it was only by elevating upon its ruins an oppoſite faction, whoſe conduct, and principles, and views were preciſely ſimilar.

The ſcheme, ſince then purſued, in order to carry on the buſineſs of government, has conſiſted in temporizing between the adverſe parties; but ſtill the ſame barrier remains between the crown and the people, and muſt remain without a poſſibility of being overcome, as long as the preſent ſyſtem of repreſentation continues, becauſe the preponderance of the borough intereſt in the Iriſh Commons, puts it always in the power of the ariſtocracy, by the coalition of five or ſix principal poſſeſſors of boroughs, to take into their own hands, the power of government; and to oppoſe an inſurmountable obſtacle to the beſt intentions of the Sovereign towards the people. This ſyſtem cannot be ſupported, unleſs the coer-

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cion exercised by the aristocracy be increased, proportionably to the numerical increase of population: but, such a train of reciprocal exertion and coercion must necessarily tend to dissolution; the wisest ministers of Great Britain, therefore, from that period to the present time, have been of opinion, that an Union was the only measure capable of saving Ireland from the horrors of civil hostilities.

Advantages of 1782, not obtained by Parliament.

It is in vain, that the advocates of the settlement of 1782, offer that adjustment, with the constitutional and commercial advantages obtained about that time, as a proof of the excellence of the parliamentary system, or, as they say, of a dormant patriotic energy in the constitution of Ireland, because those were not the measures of Parliament, but were wrung from a sulky aristocracy, by an armed people: the volunteer army was arrayed *against* the Irish Parliament.

The parliamentary constitution of 1782 had the same radical vice with that of James I. it did not embrace the body of the people; and its effects were to render the government of the country, impracticable to the executive minister, unless carried on by a system of corruption, commensurate to the extent and power of the aristocracy; because the interests of the aristocracy, and those of the people are at variance.

At this period it was, that the French principles of sedition and democracy were introduced into Ireland: but government was so clogged by the weight of that aristocratical faction, that the executive ministers had no power to oppose an effectual resistance; and thus, were these destructive principles allowed to extend, and fortify themselves.

At length the Sovereign, and the British cabinet thought proper, to attend to the claims of the Roman Catholics of Ireland. It was then, that the aristocracy, alarmed at the indulgence granted and afraid of further concessions, laid the foundation of the *Orange Society*, and formed themselves into an army of Orangemen. The oppressions exercised by this society upon the Romanists were very grievous, and served, in a great degree, to force the great body of the peasantry into the views of the opposite society of *United Irishmen*, and into rebellion.

At the same time, the power of that faction became so great as to oppose the inclinations and efforts of the Lord Lieutenant, and force out of the kingdom, the only officer, whose skill and experience were capable of saving the country, from the miseries of a rebellion on the eve of breaking out, and the dangers of an expected invasion. At last even the Lord Lieutenant himself was forced, by the violence of this faction, to leave Ireland.

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The vigour and ſteadineſs of his ſucceſſor, Marquis Cornwallis, has ſince in a great meaſure ſubdued them; but that Nobleman's adminiſtration muſt, at laſt, have an end; and at his departure, the flames of civil diſcord will revive, with increaſed fury, unleſs they be extinguiſhed either by an Union, or by a Reform; which in the preſent temper of the world, is too dangerous to be practicable. Indeed, as long as the preſent ſtate of things continues, the two factions, who contend for power, muſt be tolerated, or even, in ſome degree encouraged by the ſupreme Government; and conſequently the country muſt ever be kept in a ſtate of diſtraction. Till all the inhabitants be placed upon an equal footing, ſo that all jealouſies ſhall be removed, and equal ſcope, and encouragement given to the induſtry of all, Ireland can never enjoy proſperity, or tranquillity: this an Union would ſerve to effect, by removing the cauſe and objects of contention. M'Kenna.

And as, out of the very frame and conſtitution of the Parliament of Ireland, ariſes the want of that confidence between the governors and the governed, which is eſſential to good government, the interference of the Britiſh Parliament is admirably calculated to reſtore peace and confidence, by removing thoſe conſtitutional vices, which are the ſource of the evils ſuffered, and by granting to the people of Ireland, what is beyond the reach of their local Parliament, a free participation of all the privileges, enjoyed by their fellow-ſubjects of Great Britain. Dundas.

At preſent, Ireland has no ſhare in the legiſlation of Great Britain, nor of the Empire; ſhe can take no part in the regulations reſpecting the foreign poſſeſſions of Britain; nor even thoſe in St. George's channel, or on the oppoſite coaſt of France, though, it is obvious, how much the commercial and political intereſts of Ireland may be affected, by ſuch regulations. By the admiſſion of her repreſentatives to be incorporated with thoſe of Great Britain, Ireland becomes a part of that body, whoſe voice is heard,—not in Europe only, but in the four quarters of the world; and immediately acquires her proportionate ſhare in all theſe great concerns: and Ireland will ſpeak, as well through the influence and ſuffrage of every Member choſen in Great Britain, as by the mouth of her own immediate repreſentatives; for the intereſts of that iſland will be as much the object of the duty and intereſt of the *whole body*, to attend to, as thoſe of any part of the Britiſh Empire. The deciſion, however, of all caſes merely local, will probably be left to the Iriſh Members, as it uſually happens, in ſimilar caſes, with regard to the Scotch repreſentatives, when the ſubject of debate relates merely to Scotland. Dundas & Douglas.

Ireland

Ireland has no control over the executive.

Dundas. Ireland is not now poſſeſſed of any control over her own executive government; for the third eſtate, or executive of Ireland is neceſſarily and inevitably the ſame as that of Great Britain; and it, therefore acts, with regard to the whole Empire, by the advice of *Britiſh Miniſters*, amenable to the *Britiſh Parliament* alone, and not, in any manner, to Ireland; not even as to the affairs of Ireland, which paſs through the King's hands. From this important privilege, Ireland, as a ſeparate ſtate, muſt ever be debarred; but, becoming by an incorporate Union, a part of the Britiſh legiſlature, ſhe obtains, equally with Great Britain, the privilege of control over the Miniſters of the Crown.

Union will remedy the ignorance of Miniſters.

It has been argued by many, (even of thoſe, who have not borrowed, from their predeceſſors in Scotland, the abſurd phraſeology, of *foreign* Government, *foreign* Miniſters, *foreign* Parliament, as applied to thoſe of Great Britain,) that Miniſters in London have neither opportunity, nor means of acquiring ſuch detailed knowledge of the characters, circumſtances, and intereſts of Ireland, as may be neceſſary, in order to form a true judgment of the juſtice or policy of their meaſures: and that *therefore*, they ought not to interfere in the government of that iſland. This concluſion is abſurd, becauſe the adminiſtrators of the ſupreme government muſt neceſſarily reſide near the perſon of the Sovereign, who holds the executive authority equally over both; but the premiſes may in ſome inſtances have been true. This evil however, ariſing from the want of information of Britiſh Miniſters, with regard to Ireland, will meet a perfect remedy in the incorporation of the two legiſlatures: for that meaſure will neceſſarily draw to the ſeat of government men from Ireland, who are acquainted with all parts of the kingdom and all its affairs, with the various circumſtances of its trade and manufactures, with its characters and its property; who will be near the Miniſter, or the Sovereign, when the affairs of their country are under conſideration; or will be ready, with their talents, their influence, and their ſuffrages, to ſupport in the Imperial legiſlature, whatever their duty may require.

Douglas. But, ſay they,* a Parliament, ſitting in London, cannot be competent to tranquillize Ireland and eſtabliſh ſubmiſſion to the Laws, or to promote its proſperity; becauſe, "it will "be at too great a diſtance to adminiſter, in time, to the "wants and wiſhes of the people, or to guard againſt exceſſes "and diſcontents." But theſe cares fall into the department of the executive; it is the province of the executive government, and by no means of the Legiſlative body, to diſpenſe inſtant

* Foſter, Spencer, 55.

inſtant favours, or apply inſtant coercion, on emergencies; ſubject afterwards to the inveſtigation of the Legiſlature.

Much ſtreſs has been laid upon the effects produced in Dublin by the proceſſion of the Houſe of Commons through the ſtreets; it is, however, but an ill compliment to the Parliament, or the people of Ireland, to aſcribe to ſuch a circumſtance as that, the diſtinguiſhed part, which the Iriſh Legiſlature had in ſuppreſſing the rebellion.

Civil advantages of an Union.

Beſide commercial advantages, and thoſe of general and relative policy, and legiſlation, Ireland would gain, by an Union with Great Britain, others much more important,—general civilization; habits of morality and true religion, inſtead of blind ſuperſtition and fanatical rage;* uniform ſubmiſſion to law, together with a gradual extinction of the ſpirit of diſturbance, inſurrection, plunder, and maſſacre, which has prevailed, with more or leſs violence, among the people of Ireland, as far back as their authentic hiſtory can be traced; eſpecially ſince the period, which eſtabliſhed the diviſion of them into Proteſtants and Papiſts.

The ſuppoſition that theſe good effects are more likely to be produced by a reſident Parliament, is inſtantly controverted by experience, which reminds us, that in a courſe of ages, a reſident Parliament has not been able to effect theſe improvements.

Increaſe of Abſentees counterbalanced, Pitt.

If an Union were to have the effect of increaſing the number of Abſentees from Ireland, yet that inconvenience would be counterbalanced, by the increaſed predelection, that ſuch a change would probably occaſion, for Engliſh habits, and for the Engliſh conſtitution;† and by promoting that connexion between the higher and lower orders of ſociety, which is ſo much wanting in Ireland: it would be more than compenſated, by the addition to the aggregate ſtock of wealth and commerce, which the adoption of an Union would produce; and by the ſupply of an uſeful ſet of men, who would replace abſent proprietors of land, and, by their conſumption, would equally encourage trade and manufactures, which their ſkill and induſtry would at the ſame time direct.

Smith, & Douglas.

counteracted,

But, as the reduced number of repreſentatives would much increaſe the difficulty of obtaining a ſeat in Parliament, no man, who was a permanent abſentee, could expect to retain influence ſufficient to be returned; and this circumſtance would rather induce many, even of thoſe now reſident in England, to ſpend a large portion of time on their eſtates, in order to court the favour of electors.

The

* Foſter, Ceaſe your Funning, 57.

† Foſter, Spencer, Bousfield, Rudd, 58, &c.

and of no conſequence to Dublin. Pitt, & Smith.

The metropolis of Ireland has no grounds for the alarm, which it has felt for its proſperity; becauſe it would ſtill continue to be the reſidence of the Viceroy, the ſeat of the Courts of Law, civil and eccleſiaſtical,—of the Revenue,—of the Univerſity,—and the Head-quarters of the Army;* and becauſe it would ſtill be the centre of the commerce of this Kingdom, in an increaſed ſtate of vigour:—objects of much greater importance than the temporary reſidence of a certain number of Members of Parliament.

Dean Tucker.

But it is a vulgar notion, that *money is riches*; induſtry and frugality are the riches of a ſtate, and money is only the ſign of them; its circulation in a country is uſeful, only as it promotes the circulation of labour and induſtry: if not productive of this effect, the greateſt quantity of gold and ſilver, inſtead of being beneficial, is a detriment to the community. Spain has had ſad experience of this truth: Spain once abounded with induſtry and manufactures, but when gold and ſilver flowed in, from the mines of Mexico and of Peru, and were obtained without labour, all her apparatus of manufactures, her looms, and her induſtry were laid aſide; and Spain became one of the pooreſt, and worſt cultivated countries in Europe. Such is the caſe, in every town, which is the ſeat of diſſipation and luxury, where money is idly ſcattered, and induſtry is not requiſite to obtain it: idleneſs, and poverty were glaring amidſt the ſplendor, and profuſion of Verſailles; ſo, alſo, it is found at Vienna, at Berlin, at Munich, at Dreſden, at Naples, at every town, which is the reſidence of a Court; for the ſeat of proſperous manufacture is ever removed from the haunts of diſſipation. The ſame contraſt is found in our own towns; immenſe ſums of money are ſpent, every year, at Bath, by a concourſe, on an average, of 20,000 ſtrangers, in every ſort of luxury, pleaſure, and extravagance; yet the inhabitants of Bath are not rich, nor has any one manufacture ſprung up among them, though there is not any town more admirably ſituated, by nature, for the ſeat of manufacture.

When Edinburgh was the reſidence of a Court, and a Parliament, it was a very poor place, but it is now become a great and wealthy city, thriving in trade and manufactures. The contraſt is apparent even in London, between the Court and the City end,—between the idle fickly buſineſs of Bond-ſtreet, and the ſtirring activity of Cheapſide or Cornhill: And before diſſipation and prodigality had arrived at ſo great a pitch in Dublin, there were flouriſhing manufactures, eſtabliſhed in the *Liberty*; now a ſcene of miſery and deſolation: It is not, then, to the reſidence of a Parliament or a Court, that the ſucceſs of thoſe manufactures

* Jervis, Goold, Taaffe, Weld, Rudd, 62.

tures is to be attributed; ſince they have failed while that Parliament and Court were ſtill reſident; in conſequence, probably of the accompanying diſſipation and luxury.

Trade of Dublin in no danger.

But Dublin is apprehenſive, that the trade of its port, will be transferred to better harbours; that Cork, Derry, Galway, Belfaſt, will attract it, while Dublin will decline: though were there any real probability of this being the caſe, ſtill Dublin would be no loſer; for it muſt not only profit by the increaſing proſperity of any part of the Kingdom, but alſo, as it muſt ever continue to be the ſeat of the Treaſury and National Bank, it muſt ever continue to be the centre of exchange for univerſal commerce, and, conſequently, muſt become the ſcene of proportionate and increaſed trade: beſides, the circumſtance of the numerous canals cut through all the Weſtern parts of England, and communicating with London, and thoſe making from Dublin through Ireland, will contribute much to increaſe its commerce with England, and will make it the depôt, for the conſumption of the kingdom, in all articles of Britiſh manufacture.

Arguments for and againſt, &c. Anon.

The fears of Dublin, however, for the local loſs of trade are otherwiſe ill-founded, for trade does not always follow the beſt ports; and when once an eſtabliſhment has taken place, it is difficult to remove it to another ſituation; its relations and habitudes are its ſecurity. No ports are more inconveniently circumſtanced for trade than London, Briſtol and Liverpool; yet this defect has not removed their trade to the ſpacious and admirable harbours of Portſmouth, Plymouth, or Milford, becauſe the artificial baſis of their eſtabliſhment, has become too broad, for the diſadvantages, under which they labour, to overturn it.

Dean Tucker.

Dublin has, therefore, no reaſon for any ſuch apprehenſions: for on the contrary, increaſed commerce and increaſed induſtry will give increaſe of wealth and population, and conſequently of value, to the lands and houſes in the vicinity of Dublin.

But, if there were real grounds for the fears of any particular diſtrict, or of any particular claſs of men, yet their intereſts ſhould not be put in competition with the benefit of the whole, from which their particular advantage, alſo, muſt ultimately flow: it matters little to the nation at large, whether it receive its treaſures with the right hand, or with the left. The fate of Edinburgh ſince the Union preſents an example, ſufficient to remove the fears of Dublin; for though the ſame apprehenſions were, at the time, entertained for that city, and prophecies as loud and clamorous, were made, of its approaching ruin, it has, ſince the above

Pitt, & Anon.

Pitt.

period, increaſed in commerce and population, in the proportion of five or ſix to one; and has continued to be the reſort of the gentry and nobility of Scotland, whoſe circumſtances it did not ſuit, to viſit the more remote metropolis of the Empire.

Douglas. It is a well known fact that no nobility and gentry live more at home, than thoſe of Scotland.

But the beſt method of preventing the increaſe of Abſentees, will be, to reſtore tranquillity, police, and ſecurity of life and property: theſe, added to the natural advantages of Ireland, then free from impediment or reſtraint, will give new weight to the common partiality, that men feel for their native land, and will bring back to Ireland, her wandering ſons, from all parts of the world.*

Abſentees no ſerious evil. Peel. It may be well doubted, however, whether the abſence of noblemen, and gentlemen of rank and property, be ſo great an evil, as it is generally reckoned;† for induſtry is the riches of a country; and it is univerſally found that manufactures, and other conſiderable objects of labour, flouriſh moſt at a diſtance from the ſeat of luxury, and the gay purſuits of genteel life. The want of acceſs to the money circulating in England, has kept Ireland comparatively poor, and unin-duſtrious: when the Britiſh markets, therefore, are laid open, property drawn from Ireland, will be returned through the medium of induſtry; and thus the equilibrium will be reſtored; manufactures will be more likely, to eſtabliſh themſelves in a ſituation, remote from the influence of a domineering neighbour.

Benefit to Cork. Smith. If it were juſt, in arguing a meaſure that concerns the Empire at large, to conſider the intereſts of any particular part, or diſtrict, the opinion of the people of Cork might be addueed;‖ the inhabitants of that city ought beſt to underſtand their own intereſts, and they apprehend no injury, but on the contrary expect conſiderable benefit from a legiſlative Union; the abolition of all fears, jealouſies and diſtruſt; the intimate blending of the two countries, and the removal of all poſſibility of ſeparation, may furniſh motives, which did not before exiſt, and may remove all former objections to the eſtabliſhment of a Naval dock-yard; which is in itſelf a conſiderable object of deſire, and does not neceſſarily impede the progreſs of commercial proſperity; for though trade certainly does not reſort to thoſe ports where dock-yards are eſtabliſhed, that circumſtance muſt be aſcribed to ſome other cauſe, and cannot merely ariſe from the vicinity of a naval ſtation.

With

* See the Speech of the Rt. Hon. Sylveſter Douglas, p. 124.

† Foſter, 55, 58. ‖ Foſter, Anon. 61.

With regard to Taxation; the known integrity of the British Parliament, the example of the good faith kept with Scotland, and the leading principles of English finance, are, to Ireland, a ſufficient protection from the danger of being ſubjected to the burthens of Great Britain, or loaded with taxes beyond her ability. *No danger of exorbitant taxation to Ireland.* Pitt.

But, though Ireland were to have the whole of the annual burthen of England impoſed on her, (too heavy undoubtedly for her preſent means,) ſtill there would be no grounds for apprehenſion of the poorer part of the community being cruſhed by it, or driven to deſpair. The Taxes of England may be divided into ſix claſſes, viz. 1ſt. The Land tax. 2d. The Cuſtom-houſe duties, on the importation of foreign produce, manufactures, and luxuries. 3d. The Exciſe on articles of home conſumption. 4th. The Aſſeſſed taxes, as thoſe on Houſes, Windows, Horſes, Carriages, Servants, Dogs, &c. 5th. The Stamp duties, and 6th. The Poſtage tax. Dean Tucker.

From almoſt the whole of theſe the lower claſs of people are exempt: to the firſt they cannot be ſubject: the Cuſtoms are felt by thoſe only who chooſe to indulge in the luxuries of foreign produce, a thing no way neceſſary to the poor, who may enjoy all the comforts of good food, decent clothing, and warm dwellings, without the importation of any one foreign article; the duties on Horſes, Carriages, &c. cannot fall upon them, and to the Houſe and Window tax they are ſubjected in a very ſmall degree;* the Stamp duties do not concern any of their tranſactions, unleſs when they chooſe to ſpend their money in the purchaſe of newſpapers; nor can the Poſtage tax affect them; but if it did, there would be no room for complaint, becauſe it affords the cheapeſt mode, that they can make uſe of, for the conveyance of letters: the Exciſe is the only branch which muſt, to a certain degree, affect the poor, for they cannot, by the ſtricteſt frugality, ſave themſelves from the exciſe on Malt, Hops, and Cyder, on Soap, Candles, and Leather, and the duty on Salt: theſe are not, however, to any great amount, and, except in the two laſt articles, would ſcarcely at all concern the ſame claſs of people in Ireland; ſo that if ſimilar taxes were to be laid on that country, the poor would, according to their preſent mode of living, be ſubject to a very ſmall portion of them, for they make much leſs uſe of any of the exciſeable articles, than

* The greater part of the lower claſs are by law exempt, and the reſt are rarely aſſeſſed, by a ſort of connivance; to ſave them from the burthen. Dean Tucker.

than the poor of England, and are at leaſt as far beyond the reach of all the others.

But there is no reaſon to ſuppoſe, that, in the event of an Union, the taxes muſt be invariably the ſame in both countries: on the contrary, according to the ‖ reſolutions already agreed to, the rate of taxation is to be regulated upon certain rules, and fixed principles, previous to the Union; ſo that there ſhall be a conſtant difference proportioned to the comparative ability, of each country. The ſame reſolution preſerves Ireland from any wanton abuſe of her purſe; for, beſide that it is as ſafe in the hands of her repreſentatives ſitting in Weſtminſter, as aſſembled in Dublin, Britain *cannot* lay any tax upon Ireland, without at the ſame time ſubjecting herſelf to a burthen, *heavier in the full proportion of her greater ability*, and the very ſelfiſhneſs of Britain thus becomes, of itſelf, a ſafeguard to Ireland.

Douglas.

Many regulations might be ſuggeſted, eſpecially with regard to the Land-tax, which would enrich Ireland inſtead of impoveriſhing it. Any tax, which promotes induſtry and encourages a circulation of labour, enriches a country; and in the ſame proportion, a country is neceſſarily impoveriſhed by any tax which checks induſtry and ſtops labour: if a * land tax were laid upon Ireland under certain regulations, it would fill the towns with induſtrious inhabitants, and the country with laborious cottagers and working farmers. Thus a race of men would ariſe, who would create a demand for manufactures, and a home conſumption: and †without home conſumption foreign trade cannot flouriſh. But at preſent the great maſs of the Iriſh are ſo deſtitute of food, raiment, and lodging, (the foundation of all commerce,

Dean Tucker.

‖ See 7th Reſolution of the Britiſh Commons.

* A Land tax, ſo regulated as that the poorer claſs, and thoſe poſſeſſed of no more than half an acre, ſhould be exempt from it, and that larger farms ſhould be *proportionably* burthened, would be productive of the beſt effects. For inſtance, let a farm under 50 acres, with an houſe, be ſubject to three pence per acre; under 100 acres, with an houſe, to ſix pence; and all lands and farms of greater extent, and not ſo circumſtanced, to two ſhillings per acre.—From the time when the Land tax was laid upon England, the great improvement of landed eſtates may date its origin; and may be, in a great meaſure, attributed to the permanency of that tax, which remained always the ſame, without fluctuation, and operated as a quit-rent, to ſpur on the farmer to improvement: he knows that, however he may increaſe the value of his land, he cannot be called on for any greater proportion, and that however his negligence may ſuffer his land to lie uncultivated or run to waſte, he is ſubject to no leſs, but that his quota of Land tax *muſt* be paid. Dean Tucker.

† Mr. Pitt eſtimates the profits of the home trade, in Britain, at 28 millions, and thoſe of the foreign trade at only 12 millions.

merce, the moſt brilliant and extenſive), that they are no cuſtomers to the community, nor is their conſumption any encouragement to trade.

Ireland bound to ſupport the credit of Great Britain now.

But, even if that greateſt object of alarm, were to take place, and Ireland, by an Union, were to become ſubject to the national debt of Great Britain, and were called on, to ſupply her quota to its diſcharge, (which is indeed a mere fiction of the imagination, not capable of being realized) ſtill would not Ireland on this account be in a worſe ſituation, than at this moment; for though not legally, yet *effectively* Ireland is now pledged to ſupport, with her reſources, the credit of Great Britain. If the debt of Great Britain were to be effaced by a bankruptcy, that calamity would be followed by the failure, and conſequent penury of an immenſe number of perſons, who now conſume or traffic in articles of Iriſh fabric and export; from thence would neceſſarily follow a ſtagnation of Iriſh trade, a ceſſation of demand and encouragement, and a depreſſion of induſtry. As conſumption was diminiſhed, the value of lands and houſes would fall, and the elegant arts, which thrive by the overflow of opulence would decline. Beſides, it is the credit of Great Britain, which gives efficacy to her reſources: her credit is the lever by which ſhe moves mankind and influences the tranſactions of the world. If the artificial power of Britain were ſubverted, Ireland would be left without encouragement to improve, and without protection to preſerve what ſhe has,—a prey to the rapacity of France, ſhould the power of that nation laſt;—or elſe a ſubject of conteſt, among the factions of the European ſtates.

M'Kenna.

Union will effect reform.

An Union would ſerve alſo to gratify the *real* well-wiſhers of thoſe two great popular meaſures, which have ſo long agitated the country,* exciting the hopes of one party and the fears of the other, *Reform of Parliament*, and *Catholic emancipation*. It has already been ſhewn that the claims of the Roman Catholics would be favoured by ſuch a meaſure. A reform would alſo be effected in Parliament; for as the number of Iriſh repreſentatives would be confined perhaps to 100, among whom here would be 64 members for counties, and ſome for cities and large towns, the greater part of the boroughs, and with them the borough influence in the Commons Houſe, would be cut off, and thus, though by a ſmaller number, the people would be *as fully and freely* repreſented as they now are.

Peel.

AGAINST

* Spencer, Taaffe, 61.

AGAINST A LEGISLATIVE UNION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND;

ARGUMENTS *POLITICAL*, RESPECTING THE *INTERNAL* INTERESTS, PEACE, AND PROSPERITY OF IRELAND.

Union will not ſtrengthen Ireland.

Foſter. IT is an exaggeration and an inſult to the feelings of Iriſhmen, who know the falſehood of the aſſertion, to repreſent Ireland, as the vulnerable part of the Empire, torn by contending factions; and if ſuch a ſtatement were true, it would betray the moſt glaring want of prudence, and policy, thus to declare to the enemy, the weakneſs, and diſunion of the Empire.* In whatever degree the country

Bousfield. may be expoſed to the attacks of the enemy, that danger ariſes to it, not from its independence, but from the deſtructive meaſures of the Miniſter, which have ſo long embroiled theſe kingdoms in a deſolating war.

Foſter. But the enemy, knows that ſuch weakneſs is not the condition of Ireland; he knows that ſhe is firmly united to Great Britain, in intereſt and affection: and it is of no conſequence to him, in what manner her municipal laws may cement or qualify that Union. A roll of parchment will neither change the inclinations of ſecret enemies within the realm, or deprive them of the means of giving the expected aſſiſtance to their friends, nor will it ſtrengthen the affections, the intereſts, or the reſources of that part of the Empire. It was the energy of the legiſlature, that diſcomfited the late attempts to promote rebellion; and the depriving ſo large a kingdom of that legiſlature, will give to the ſecret partizans of the enemy a larger field for action, and more

Goold. power to act with vigor. And a powerful invitation is held out to France to renew her attempts on Ireland, by the view of a meaſure forced upon the people, ſo notoriouſly contrary to their inclinations; for ſhe may well conclude, that diſguſt and diſunion will much abate the zeal of thoſe who before reſiſted her arms and influence.

Foſter. But, granting the poſition of the weakneſs of Ireland and of the effects of an Union in working a remedy, ſtill it is not adequate to the danger. For the perils, to which Ireland is ſaid to be expoſed, are inſtant, and the remedy propoſed muſt be a work of time, and its effects remote; though the diſguſt it may occaſion, will be immediate. And the

* Smith, 40.

the chief dangers of Ireland, which ariſe from its geographical relation to France, and its phyſical poſition on the globe, cannot poſſibly be removed by an Union, for theſe cauſes admit of no change. Ceaſe your Funning. Anon.

If energy in the government of a country were the ſole object to be provided for, the adminiſtration ſhould be put into the hands of a ſingle Prince. But there are other conſiderations paramount to this, however deſirable; and for that reaſon the Britiſh conſtitution is a ſyſtem of checks, which, while they leſſen the energy of government, ſecure the freedom of the country. And there is no pretence for ſaying that any increaſe of energy is required by the government of theſe realms: the Iriſh Parliament never yet has heſitated to come forward, with its full ſhare of contribution and ſupport to the exigencies of the Empire. Tit for Tat. Anon.

Will not tranquillize Ireland. Foſter,

It is ſaid that an Union will tranquillize Ireland: but the great misfortune of the country, from whence flow its internal diſcord, and the weakneſs of the laws, which ought to preſerve tranquillity, is derived from the intervention of *middlemen*, between the proprietor and the occupier of the ſoil, and theſe are chiefly to be found on the eſtates of Abſentees. If a reſident Parliament, and reſident gentry cannot ſoften the manners, amend the habits, and promote ſocial intercourſe, it is not likely to be effected by removing the Parliament and leſſening the number of the gentry, at once depriving the country of their influence, and giving room for the increaſe of the pernicious claſs of middlemen. It is generally underſtood that the affections of the lower ranks are beſt conciliated, their manners moſt effectually improved, and good morals and habits of order moſt ſtrongly promoted, by the example of the upper ranks, by their attention to the education, health, and comforts of their ſurrounding neighbours and dependents; and that veneration for the laws, and attachment to the country which affords them the bleſſings they enjoy, are chiefly to be inculcated by that benevolent protection, which every eſtate and every village ought to derive from its reſident landlord, in the eaſy and impartial diſpenſation of juſtice, and the allaying thoſe little feuds, which headſtrong paſſions, untamed by education, are apt to carry to the laſt exceſſes. But the effects of the ſyſtem now propoſed, will be to deprive the kingdom of that beneficial claſs of men, to encourage land jobbers, and to degrade the hoſpitality of the ancient manſions into the penury of an agents dwelling.

It is impoſſible that it can be as much within the reach of a Parliament unacquainted with local circumſtances, and at too & Spencer.

too great a diſtance to receive information in time * for adminiſtering to the wants, and wiſhes of the people, or for guarding againſt their diſcontents and exceſſes,—to act beneficially for the country; as of a legiſlature which by being reſident on the ſpot, is acquainted with all the habits, prejudices and diſpoſitions of their fellow ſubjects, and knows how to apply relief.

Foſter, All the various conſequences that may reſult from a change of ſyſtem, even in a ſmall affair, are not eaſily foreſeen; but the difficulty is much increaſed when the change reſpects ſo ſtupendous a work as the conſtitution of a great Empire. If therefore the exiſting ſyſtem go on practically, though it may have ſome, and even great ſpeculative imperfections, it is raſh to attempt a change, on the ſuggeſtions even of the moſt clear and perſuaſive theory. The moſt plauſible theory is often defeated by practice; thus in the inſtance of *Juries from the vicinage*, the theory of Juſtice might object to them, as being liable to prejudices, friendſhips, and animoſities, which might bias their deciſion, and which would not affect men collected from a more remote ſituation: and yet long experience has proved that what might have been apprehended, as an imperfection in this mode of trial, is that in which conſiſts its great and peculiar excellence. Practice, in like manner refutes that theory, which ſuppoſes that the reſident Iriſh Parliament may be influenced by the local prejudices and partialities of the country, whoſe intereſts are the objects of its concern, and which would, therefore, place thoſe intereſts in the hands of a foreign Parliament, ignorant of all attending circumſtances. Experience, in this inſtance alſo, ſhews that local knowledge is the very eſſence of the capability of Parliament to adminiſter its functions. No

& Spencer, &L.d. Farnham. Parliament ſitting in Great Britain, could have developed the ſecret ſyſtem of conſpiracy, which has lately degraded Ireland;—or could have animated the loyal, and ſupported the executive power with the ſame effect, as did the Iriſh Parliament. The requiſite concurrence of the legiſlature to the wiſe and neceſſary meaſure, of proclaiming Martial Law, could not have arrived in time, from London: and the ſupport, derived from a Parliament, compoſed, five parts in ſix, of ſtrangers, and ſitting in another country,† would have been but very faint, in compariſon with the impreſſion made on the public mind, by the conſciouſneſs of its ſpringing from Iriſhmen, all liable to the dangers of its operation, and all yielding up themſelves and their property to its control. Perſonal character, reſpect for individuals, opinion of their attachment to their country where their ſtake lies, and in whoſe preſervation and glory their intereſts, as well as their hearts

* Douglas, 46. † Ibid. 47.

hearts are engaged, muſt have an irreſiſtible effect on the people. On the other hand, by the removal of the legiſlature, not only ſuch powerful means of ſtrengthening the hands of government are loſt, but at the ſame time, all means of control over the executive department of Ireland are taken away, and the country is left to the abſolute diſpoſal of the Miniſter or his deputy in Ireland. Sheehy.

Much reliance is placed upon the lamentable picture that is drawn with ſtudied exaggeration, of the diſſenſions and hoſtility which prevail between the different religious perſuaſions of Ireland. Such repreſentations are calculated only to create jealouſy and diſtruſt, and to foment any ill will that may already exiſt. But the experience of the laſt twenty years proves the falſehood of the aſſertion; for during that period the Proteſtants have been conſtantly removing the burthens which oppreſſed the Romaniſts. The latter have expreſſed the higheſt gratitude; the profeſſors of the two religions became as one family, and the moſt perfect cordiality appeared to ſubſiſt between them. Lord Farnham.

Thoſe diſputes and contentions, that ariſe from religious difference, are not the neceſſary conſequence of a variety of religions, but the effect of the crooked policy of Great Britain, which has ever labored to keep alive and foment the ſpirit of bigotry and mutual hatred; in order the more eaſily to maintain her deſpotic ſway over a divided country. An Union is not likely therefore to change her line of policy in that reſpect. It is not from any attachment or preference for that religion, that the Britiſh cabinet is induced to ſupport the Proteſtant faction; but becauſe the Proteſtants, being the minority, feel not as a nation for the honor and independence of the country, and are ready to ſacrifice to it the rights and intereſts of that country. Taaffe, & Sheehy.

Will not ſettle religious diſputes.

It is abſurd to ſuppoſe that in points of internal policy, or in the arrangements with regard to religion and the claims of the Roman Catholics, a foreign uninformed aſſembly, can be a more competent judge, or better qualified to decide, than an Iriſh Parliament well acquainted with the grounds and extent of the claims, and with the local circumſtances, upon which may depend the danger, or the expediency of compliance. An Union, therefore, cannot allay religious differences, nor remove the cauſes of diſcontent. Indeed the argument commonly drawn from this topic by the advocates of Union, amounts only to this: to the Proteſtant it ſays, Catholic emancipation cannot *be refuſed* unleſs there be an Union; and to the Roman Catholic it ſays, Catholic emancipation cannot *be granted* till there is an Union. Foſter.

Ceaſe your Funning.

Lord Farnham. But in fact the Roman Catholics will have much leſs room for hope, in caſe of an Union, than they have now. No diſtinction can then be made between the Roman Catholic of the United Kingdoms. Either thoſe of Britain muſt be raiſed to the level of the Iriſh Romaniſt, or the Iriſh muſt be lowered to that of the Britiſh. But Great Britain has not ſhewn any diſpoſition to afford relief to her own ſubjects of that perſuaſion, and an attempt to remove the teſt laws, failed not long ſince. It is not probable then, that in the United Parliament, where this adjuſtment muſt be determined, the great Britiſh majority will concede to the Iriſh minority. The ſtandard of adjuſtment then, it appears likely, would be lowered, and thus Lord Auckland has directly expreſſed his opinion, "that the meaſure of indulgences granted to the "Catholics of England ought to guide the diſcretion of Go-"vernment with regard to the Catholics of Ireland."

Taaffe. And with regard to the danger, with which the property of Proteſtants is threatened, from the aſcendancy, which the Romaniſts might by their numbers obtain, if admitted into Parliament, it is but falſe and illuſory. Suppoſing it even likely that the proportion of property in the hands of Proteſtants, which is, to that of the Roman Catholics, as one hundred to one, could ever allow ſuch an aſcendancy to take place.

For much the greater part of the Romaniſts poſſeſſed of property derive their title from Proteſtants, either by leaſe or purchaſe, and conſequently, in deſtroying the title of the latter, they would equally invalidate their own. As to the ſearching out the ancient heirs of eſtates, and re-eſtabliſhing the forfeited titles, it might as well be apprehended, that they ſhould recur to the predeceſſors of the Mileſians for the true proprietor. Beſides when the majority of Parliament were Papiſts, and great forfeitures had been recently made by Papiſts, no attempt was made for their recovery, or to wreſt them out of the hands of Proteſtants.

Taaffe. An Union is no way neceſſary to the arrangement of tythes; a modification of them may as well take place, and may be equally ſatisfactory with an Union.

Will not invite Engliſh ſettlers. Foſter. But the number of Engliſh ſettlers, it is ſaid, who will be invited over by an Union, will introduce Engliſh manners and cuſtoms into Ireland: admirable however, and deſirable as theſe are, they are not worth the ſacrifice of Iriſh character; if ſuch was to be the effect of an Union. The fact is, that no inducement will be offered by an Union. Adventurers will not be inticed to ſettle in Ireland—by the removal of the Legiſlature, of the men of fortune, and men of talents, thoſe, to whom, in their ſchemes of traffic they muſt look, for ſucceſs, as their principal cuſtomers. The reſidence of

Engliſhmen

Engliſhmen in Ireland is, on account of the unuſual number of Britiſh forces quartered there, now greater than any that can be expected from an Union, and of a more uſeful kind; becauſe the privates being of the ſame rank, mix with thoſe claſſes, that ſtand moſt in need of improvement, and require examples of manners and civilization. In time of war, numbers of Engliſh ſoldiers come to Ireland, without an Union; in time of peace, an Union could not have the effect of bringing thoſe over, as ſoldiers.

Scotland has been united to England for almoſt a century, and Wales above five centuries; yet Engliſh manners and habits have never been able to eſtabliſh themſelves, ſo far even as to bring the Engliſh language into full uſe, nor to obtain for them in England the character of natives; for a conſtant ſource of jealouſy is furniſhed to that country, by the multitudes of Scotchmen, who puſh their fortunes ſucceſsfully in England, in all profeſſions and departments, and no pains can prevail upon the Engliſh to acknowledge them as countrymen. Ceaſe your Funning.

An Union can hold out no inducement to Britiſh ſettlers that has not been of equal force, for theſe laſt eighteen years; it is the genius of a Briton, though he ſearch the world for gain, to concentrate at laſt his riches and his enjoyments in his own country. The great emigrations, which peopled North America, were the effects of peculiar circumſtances, of religious and political diſputes under the reign of the Stuarts; and though it might again happen that ſimilar cauſes might produce like effects, yet it never would be in poor enſlaved provincial Ireland, that the covetous Engliſhman, who had once taſted liberty, would ſeek for refuge. Bousfield.

Will not increaſe population.

Population is by no means likely to be increaſed by an Union; for that of Ireland is already in a much higher proportion to the extent of the territory, than the population of England; and, by this meaſure, the management of all thoſe concerns, on which depends the encouragement of population, will be removed from the kingdom;—the control of all meaſures neceſſary for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, manufactures, fiſheries, &c. but, above all, of the public purſe. The immenſe National debt of Great Britain, and the conſequent weight of taxes, have prevented any increaſe almoſt in the population of England, for theſe laſt fifty years. Goold.

Will injure Ireland.

Not only, the benefits held out to Ireland as the probable effects of an Union, are falſe and deluſive, but the conſequences of that meaſure would be poſitively injurious. By increaſing the number of Abſentees, it will reduce a ſtill larger Foſter,

Abſentees. & Spencer, & Bousfield, & Rudd, & Taaffe, & Weld, & Anon.

larger portion of the landed property of Ireland, to the miſerable condition in which the eſtates of abſent landlords are uſually found. Every member choſen to the United Parliament muſt become a new abſentee, for no man, now an abſentee, can expect to be choſen;* and as, he muſt be a man of conſiderable property, to be able to bear the expences of parliamentary attendance, a large part of the property of the kingdom would thus be continually drained from it; and the loſs of ſo great a portion of the men of fortune would deprive the manufacturers of their beſt cuſtomers.

Anon. The time, and expences required for attendance in Parliament would have the effect alſo, of excluding from that body the whole bar, the whole commercial intereſts, and every gentleman who attends to the cultivation of his eſtate or has any ſort of occupation, leaving the intereſts of the country in the hands of the idle and the ignorant.

Taaffe. By habituating the riſing generation, to hear Ireland ſpoken of with contempt, in a country where its inhabitants are deſpiſed, an Union will alienate the minds of Iriſhmen from their country, fill them with prejudices againſt it, induce them to treat it with the contempt and injuſtice that they ſee beſtowed on it, by thoſe with whom they aſſociate; and domeſticated in England from generation to generation, will change them into mere Engliſhmen, with Iriſh eſtates, who will be no more inclined to pay attention to the intereſts of Ireland, than the multitudes of that deſcription, already members of the Britiſh legiſlature.

Foſter. Beſides, an Union propoſes the poſſibility of a period, when all protecting duties are to ceaſe: the very notion of ſuch a proſpect may check the further expenditure of money, and induce individuals to draw in their capital, and look to the winding up of their buſineſs, againſt that period, when the ceſſation of all protection, muſt leave the infant manufactures to decay. Agriculture will decline, from the uncertainty of the Corn laws being continued; for the ſame principle, by which the bounty on the carriage of corn, was diſcontinued, from one part of the Kingdom to the other, may, by ſimilar reaſoning, be extended by the United Parliament, to the whole of the United Empire. Every law, and regulation now valued and relied on, may be ſubject to repeal by a foreign Parliament, difficult of acceſs, and ignorant of the local cauſes that gave riſe to them.

Spencer, & Taaffe. An Union will abſorb the queſtion † of parliamentary reform, and deſtroy the national dignity, honour, and importance of Ireland. It partakes ſtrongly of a revolutionary hue, and the

* Pitt, Smith, Douglas, 48. † M'Kenna, 53.

the degradation of the nobility, and extinction of the legiſlature, which would accompany the meaſure, might ſhake the crown upon the King's head, and would probably lead to revolution and ſeparation. Bousfield, & Anon.

New laws equal in appearance and alike in phraſe, may be very unequal in effect in different countries; for inſtance, the ſame mode of taxation, which is ſuitable to a country, already arrived at the maturity of wealth and commerce, may be deſtructive to a poor country, young in trade and manufactures. Foſter,

It is the intereſt of the one to borrow money, rather than raiſe an income by taxes, for the expences of a war; becauſe the proſpect of increaſing proſperity offers the certain means of paying the debt gradually, and a ſufficient increaſe of annual taxation to meet the exigency, might curb her ſpirit of enterpriſe. But, the other having the trade of the world in her hands, has no reaſon to expect any extenſion of her reſources upon the return of peace, and ought rather to apprehend a decreaſe; ſhe therefore ought to take advantage of her temporary affluence, and raiſe an annual income to ſupport her expences, rather than incur a debt, which no increaſe of riches is likely to enable her, with greater facility, to diſcharge.

Will injure Cork.

The inhabitants of Cork have been induced by ſome vague hopes of benefit to be derived to them from an Union, to expreſs themſelves in favour of that meaſure; but, in fact,* no part of Ireland is more expoſed to injury from it, than that city. The only manufactures eſtabliſhed there or in the neighbourhood are the woollen and cotton, neither of which can be promoted in Ireland by an Union: it cannot, in any way, increaſe her powers of export, or import; nor can it ever render her an emporium or depôt for foreign goods.† An Union then offers no hope to Cork, unleſs it be the eſtabliſhment of a naval dockyard; but even to this it could furniſh no one poſſible inducement, that does not now equally exiſt. There has hitherto been no impediment to the eſtabliſhment of a dockyard there, but the natural ſituation of the place, which has not appeared to be uſeful or deſirable for the purpoſe. In the courſe of almoſt a century, the effects of an Union has not produced a ſingle dockyard for the navy, in Scotland. But, if the eſtabliſhment of a naval ſtation at Cork, were to be the certain conſequence of an Union, the proſpect ought not to miſlead the wiſhes of that city, for it is not, in itſelf, a deſirable object; the effect of it would probably prove prejudicial. Plymouth and Portſmouth are the fineſt harbours, and the beſt ſituated for trade in & Anon. Foſter.

* Smith, 50. † See Commercial Arguments.

in England; and yet no trade exiſts, where thoſe great naval dockyards are eſtabliſhed. Milford Haven is a magnificent harbour, and, though abandoned as a naval ſtation, it has not however recovered any of the trade, that it formerly enjoyed.

The two grand articles of export from Cork,—corn and proviſions,—are liable to be much affected by the injuries, to which agriculture may be expoſed; eſpecially, as the demand for proviſions has latterly run to much greater extent in the article of pork, than in that of beef: for pork depends much upon agriculture, and with its decline the pork trade muſt fall. Their proviſion trade, in this as well as the other article, beef, may be again obſtructed and ruined, by thoſe embargoes, which have ſo frequently already ſacrificed the intereſt of Cork to the avarice of a Britiſh contractor; a grievance for which an Iriſh Parliament only, was able to obtain redreſs.

Anon. But, if the expectations of Cork were well founded, and the greateſt advantages were to flow into that city from an Union, ſtill juſtice muſt reſiſt any meaſure that would benefit Cork or any other diſtrict, at the expence of the reſt of the kingdom, and by the depreſſion of ſome other part. And at the ſame time, this partial exaltation, by affording a pretence for increaſing the public burthens, would prove injurious to the very part, which might reap the profit, and totally ruinous, perhaps, to the reſt, already impoveriſhed by the ſame circumſtance.

Will ruin Dublin.
Sir J. Jervis, & Goold, & Taaffe, & Anon. & Weld, & Rudd.

The proſperity of Dublin would be deſtroyed, her ſplendor would be effaced, and her ſtreets would become a deſert: her halls, her univerſity,* her courts of law would be ſilent, and her future ſtate would reſemble the ruined walls of Babylon. Deſerted by her Parliament, and her reſident gentry, the loſs of trade would ſoon follow, and carry with it, the ſpeedy reduction of rents, not only in Dublin, and its vicinity, but in every part of Ireland.

The time improper.
Spencer.

If an Union of the legiſlatures of Great Britain and Ireland were neceſſary to the welfare of Ireland, that meaſure ought long ſince to have been concluded, at an earlier period, before habits were confirmed.† For if it be a political maxim that innovation is dangerous, the force of it muſt increaſe with the magnitude and irrevocability of the meaſure. The preſent at leaſt is an ill-choſen time to bring it forward; it is imprudent when the country is in ſuch a ſtate of agitation, to furniſh a new cauſe of diſtraction and contention; or while France

* Pitt, Smith, Tucker, 50. † Douglas, 20.

France is endeavouring to propagate her democratical principles in Ireland, to remove from thence the preſence and protection of the Britiſh conſtitution in its outward and viſible ſigns.

It is neither generous nor juſt, to bring forward the propoſal for an Union, at a moment when the country is diſtracted with the horrors of a recent rebellion, is expoſed to all the calamities of an actual war, and apprehended invaſion, and ſtill languiſhes under the terror of new commotions; and while there are in the heart of the country 40,000 Britiſh ſoldiers. The choice of ſuch a moment to ſeduce the people, or the uſe of ſuch means to force them into any meaſure, is a ſtrong argument of the notorious averſion that the country bears to it, and of the diſadvantage, that is known to be the probable conſequence of it to the kingdom. Bousfield, & Weld, & Sheehy, & Anon. multitude.

But whatever might be the happy effects of a fair and equitable Union, it cannot be ſuppoſed that Ireland can be entitled to feel them: ſhe cannot treat fairly, or upon equal terms with Great Britain, as long as the Iriſh miniſters are named by thoſe of Britain, and are of courſe ſubject to their control. It is Britain negociating the terms with herſelf. *The mode unjuſt.* Anon.

Another argument in favour of an Union, is drawn from the ſuppoſed degeneracy of the Iriſh Parliament. So great, ſay they, is its venality and corruption, that it is not fit to be truſted with the concerns of the country. This is the common outcry of United Iriſhmen and their partiſans, againſt the government; and, if it be true, may be a ſtrong argument in favour of the *reform*, but cannot be one for the *abolition* of that body: neither does it appear to be a well judged method of purifying a corrupt body, to plunge it into the midſt of a larger one, equally vitiated; and placed, beſides, at ſo great a diſtance from thoſe conſtituents, who might have the power of control over theſe venal members, as is beyond the reach of their influence or their obſervation. Taaffe, & Anon.

Perhaps it may be true, that Ireland is governed by Britiſh counſels, and that Engliſh influence predominates in her Parliament, ſo as to render her independence but a name; but it does not ſeem to be a very adequate remedy for ſuch an evil, to tranſport the Parliament into that country, by which it is ſaid to be too much influenced, at ſo great a diſtance; and whoſe voice it will no longer have the power to reſiſt. Rudd, & Anon.

The example of the American ſtates, in preferring an incorporative to a federal Union, is not applicable to the caſe of Ireland; becauſe at the time of its adoption, the ſtates were all equally in a ſtate of infancy; they had nothing to gain from each other, nor any thing to give up, either commercial or conſtitutional. But Ireland has her own legiſlature, ſhe has Ceaſe your Funning.

has independence, ſhe has freedom of commerce, and growing wealth. Neither are the effects of the meaſure in America ſuch as to invite imitation; for the ſtates have ever ſince been haraſſed and agitated by the influence of French intrigue.

Ditto, & Rudd. If from the incorporation of Geneva, Savoy, Belgium, &c. with France, any other argument can be deduced, than of the rapacity and ambition of the French republic, it is, of the neceſſity in which Ireland is placed, of guarding with all poſſible precaution, againſt a ſimilar meaſure, which may reduce her to a ſimilar ſtate of ſubjection, under the dominion of *her* powerful incorporating neighbour.

IN

IN *FAVOUR* OF A LEGISLATIVE UNION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND,

ARGUMENTS *COMMERCIAL*.

AN Union would procure for Ireland the *ſecure and permanent* poſſeſſion of thoſe advantages, which in the preſent ſituation of things, ſhe neceſſarily enjoys but as contingent and precarious. *Union will ſecure preſent advantages.* Pitt,

In 1785 it was ſtated by thoſe gentlemen who were beſt acquainted with the ſubject, that theſe advantages on the balance of trade were very great in favour of Ireland.* At preſent the trade is ſtill more advantageous; Ireland imports of the manufactured produce of Great Britain to the amount of *one* million, on which ſhe raiſes a revenue, by way of duty: while Iriſh manufactures to the amount of between *four* and *five* millions are imported into England, *duty free*; and that too, in linen, and proviſions, the great articles of Iriſh manufacture.

All raw materials, all articles neceſſary to the trade or ſubſiſtence of Ireland are ſent thither from Britain, *duty free*. The linen exported from Ireland, conſtitutes four-fifths of the Iriſh export trade to the whole world; and for the proſperity of this manufacture ſhe is indebted to, and dependant on Britain: the Britiſh Parliament has furniſhed a market for Iriſh linens to the amount of three millions; and by the bounty on re-exportation affords her a double market, and enſures to her an advantage in competition with the linens of other countries, of 30 per cent.

But the effects of an Union will not be merely a confirmation of theſe advantages: † for a fairer and more perfect connexion of the two countries muſt lead to an equality of commercial advantages, and ultimately tend to the benefit of both countries. *Will procure others.*

Thoſe now enjoyed by Ireland, are not to be aſcribed to the Iriſh Parliament, but, if traced to their true ſource, will be found to have flowed from the voluntary and diſcretionary grants of the Britiſh Parliament, conferred from a regard for the intereſts of the Iriſh nation, as inſeparably connected with the welfare of the empire; and that, in ſpite of rivalſhip and jealouſy, at a time when the Parliaments were ſeparate, when it was not *certain* whether what was given to Ireland, was given to Britain alſo, and when the countries were but partially and imperfectly united: there can therefore be no well grounded appre- *Thoſe now enjoyed, the gift of Britain.* &Ld. Auckland.

* Imports 1,000,000 to 4,500,000 of exports.
† Bonsfield, 88. Taaffe, Rudd, 89.

henſions that Britain, if it were in her power, ſhould be inclined to reſume grants ſo made, from Ireland when parliamentarily united to herſelf, and identified in intereſts. But it would not be in her power ſo to do, becauſe Ireland, in caſe of an Union, would have the ſecurity of a firm and irrevocable compact for that, which *now* reſts on the independent diſcretion of the Britiſh Parliament.

Union will invite Britiſh capital. Smith, & Douglas.

An Union, by promoting tranquillity, and ſecuring the Britiſh connexion, will have the effect of increaſing the commerce of Ireland, and inviting over Britiſh capital; for when property ſhall be rendered perfectly ſecure by the removal of internal convulſion; when all *diſtinctneſs* of intereſt between the two kingdoms, and all *poſſibility* of ſeparation ſhall be done away, there will remain no impediment, to hinder the Britiſh capitaliſt from availing himſelf of the natural advantages of Ireland, and of the cheapneſs of labour and proviſions, &c. in that kingdom;* becauſe there will be no political difference between the iſlands, and the proſperity of Ireland will be equally the proſperity of Great Britain.

Many branches of induſtry open. Anon.

And, if the aſſertion were true that there are natural cauſes to prevent the *principal* manufacturers of England from profiting by theſe circumſtances and flouriſhing in Ireland;† ſtill, there are other branches in which capital may be veſted, with equal advantage,—as in agriculture, in the proviſion trade, in the linen manufacture, &c. Nor is it fair to argue, that becauſe the ſmall advantages held out, in ſome particular branches, have failed by their encouragement to draw over the Britiſh adventurer under the preſent ſyſtem, he may not find his account even without thoſe encouragements in ſettling there, under ſuch a change of circumſtances as would produce ſecurity of property, and tranquillity. There is no probability, however, that the encouragements alluded to would ceaſe upon an Union, or that the bounties, whether actual or conſtructive, or the regulations whether internal or relative, which now ſerve to promote the infant manufactures of Ireland, would be removed, as long as they may continue to be requiſite, by an imperial legiſlature, whoſe intereſt it will be equally to promote the welfare of Ireland, with that of Great Britain or any other part of the empire.

By giving to Ireland the common uſe of Britiſh capital, it is meant, that the identification of the rights, intereſts, and privileges of the two countries, will induce the people of Great Britain, to employ their capital equally in either kingdom: each man preferring that ſpot in the empire, where he can carry on to the greateſt advantage his own branch of trade or manufacture: and the ſecurity of money being the ſame

* Foſter, Tit for Tat, 82. † Foſter, 83.

ſame in both countries, the money-holders of England will be induced to lend their money with as much facility to merchants and manufacturers in Ireland, as to thoſe in the other iſland. Upon the alteration of the Iriſh conſtitution in 1782, immenſe ſums of money, which had been lent on Iriſh ſecurity, were called in; above 40,000l. were drawn out of Ireland at that period by the Earl of Mansfield alone.

It is in this manner that the trade of the Weſt Indies is carried on by Britiſh capital, though there are not any Britiſh manufactures eſtabliſhed there.

There is a variety of manufactures and branches of trade, in which Ireland might furniſh room for the advantageous employment of Britiſh capital. Some of the moſt profitable and moſt important to the nation, are the linen and leather manufactures; and the cultivation of waſte and unprofitable lands. The firſt is too well known, to require any exemplification of its value: as to the manufacture of leather, it may ſuffice to ſtate that Ireland exports yearly nearly 23,000 raw hides, and yet, for want of capital to carry on her works, ſhe imports manufactured articles of leather to an immenſe amount; and though, having the *free* importation of bark, ſhe can tan her own hides without any ſuch additional burthen as duties would impoſe, yet in her own market ſhe is underſold by Britiſh goods, which are there ſubject to an importation duty of 10 per cent. The cultivation of waſte lands, it has been ſtated by Mr. Arthur Young, would yield a profit of from 15 to 20 per cent. but it requires a conſiderable capital, as does alſo the adequate improvement of the cultivated parts of the iſland.

Lord Auckland.

Anon.

Another field for the employment of Britiſh capital may be found in the colonial trade; for, notwithſtanding the freedom of trade to the colonies, obtained in 1779, Ireland at this day imports colonial produce, to the value of more than a million, through Great Britain; while, for want of capital, ſhe does not import *directly* above the value of 140,000l. There is ſcarcely an inſtance of any conſiderable Britiſh houſe being engaged, in Ireland, in Iriſh partnerſhip.

Lord Auckland.

Such were the advantages ſtated in 1785 by a moſt able politician,* as likely to reſult to Ireland from a partnerſhip with Great Britain: it was his opinion "that the cheapneſs of labour and proviſions, would invite the Britiſh ſettler, to a country ſituated in the neighbourhood of the rich, extended, and ſteady market of Great Britain, and that Ireland, with thoſe advantages, with a climate as good, equa natural powers, and fewer taxes, would be able to manufacture cheaper than England."

Anon.

But

* Right Hon. John Foſter's Speech on the Propoſitions in Woodfall's Report, &c.

But ſince much weight has been laid, on the difficulty of introducing into Ireland what are called the principal and moſt profitable manufactures of Britain, (as if, for that reaſon, no others were admiſſible, or theſe alone were worth the purſuit) it may be proper to inveſtigate that matter with ſome attention.

Principal manufactures of Great Britain may ſucceed in Ireland.

There are ſtated four principal branches, which, it is ſaid, *cannot exiſt* in Ireland for want of fuel, the Woollen, the Cotton, the Pottery, and the Iron manufactures.* But this impediment,† which is ſtated as the principal one, is directly removed by a view of the fact; for it is well known that Collieries exiſt (and are prevented only by want of capital from being worked to any extent) in the counties of Tipperary, Leitrim, Tyrone and Antrim, beſide thoſe ſo notorious in Kilkenny and Queen's county, which alone, according to the evidence of Mr. Evans, an Engineer of merit, given before the Iriſh Commons in 1783, are capable, if properly worked, of ſupplying annually 300,000 tons, delivered, by water carriage, at the diſtance of 40 miles, at ſo low a rate as 4½d. per hundred;—a lower price, than coals can be bought for at Leeds, Mancheſter, or Sheffield: Coals can alſo be furniſhed from England to moſt parts of Ireland, cheaper than they can be conveyed to many parts of England, where they are obliged to be brought by water carriage, on account of the heavy coaſting duties, which amount to 5s. 9d. per chaldron, and in the port of London to 9s. 5d. per chaldron.

Coals exiſt.

But theſe manufactures do not depend on the cheapneſs of the one article of fuel alone, though it be a matter of importance; but on that of all the articles neceſſary for carrying them on, ſuch as the raw material, labour, proviſions, taxes, the command of water, &c. &c.; and theſe may more than counterbalance any difference that there might be in the expence of fuel.

& Dr. Clarke.

The Woollen manufacture did once flouriſh ſo extenſively in Ireland as to excite the jealouſy of England, in the reign of William III. and, after the ſupply of her own market, to export to the annual value of £110,000.‡ At this day, there is in Ireland, an increaſing manufacture of Woollens, ſufficient to work up almoſt all her own wool (the export of

Woollen.

* For a more particular detail on this ſubject the Reader may have recourſe to the Speech of Lord Auckland in the Britiſh Houſe of Lords, April 11th, 1799: to that of the Right Hon. Sylveſter Douglas in the Britiſh Houſe of Commons, April 22d, 1799: or to an anonymous pamphlet, entitled "Obſervations on that part of the Speaker's Speech, "which relates to Trade:" and Dr. Clarke's "Miſconceptions, Miſtatements, &c."

† Bousfield, 88. ‡ Foſter, 83.

of which decreaſes every year) and that, carried on in parts of the country remote from any colliery. * The great woollen manufactures of Glouceſterſhire, Wiltſhire, Devonſhire and Norfolk, are ſituated where coals are not cheap. It is a fact, that, though wool is dearer in Ireland than in England, yet ſo much greater are the other relative advantages of the former, that in woollen, and worſted yarn, ſhe can conſiderably underſell the Engliſh: notwithſtanding which Ireland is obliged annually to import Woollen Cloths to the amount of near £700,000. Ld. Auckland.

Cotton. The Cotton manufacture does not require, as an eſſential article, the neighbourhood of Fuel, for the machinery can be as well worked by water as by the ſteam engine, and at a cheaper rate.† There are now carrying on, ‡ in many places in Ireland, very conſiderable Cotton manufactures, which are daily increaſing, and which juſtify the opinions of the Engliſh manufacturers examined before Parliament in 1785, "that the ſuperior advantages enjoyed by Ireland would enable her, ſoon to beat them out of their own market; and, after paying 10½ per Cent. duty, to ſend her goods into the Engliſh market at a cheaper rate by 12 or 13 per Cent. than they could do." So confident were thoſe gentlemen in their opinion, that the greateſt manufacturers in Britain, Mr. Peel, Mr. Smith, &c. declared that they already endeavoured to obtain partnerſhips in Ireland, in caſe the reſolutions then depending ſhould paſs into a law. Still however, from the want of capital in Ireland, the importation of Britiſh cottons, amounts to £70,000 per Ann. Ld. Auckland.

Iron. With regard to the Iron manufacture, it is ſufficient to repeat, that there are abundant collieries in the Kingdom; § and that the want of capital alone prevents the working of theſe, and the diſcovery of others: and to add, that there have been found there many ſpecies of Iron ſtone and ores, which are alſo neglected from the ſame cauſe; and that the Engliſh Iron manufacturers declared to the Houſe of Commons, their opinion that Ireland could underſell them, and would beat them out of the American market; though her want of capital impoſed on her the diſadvantage of being obliged to purchaſe her bar iron in England, at a dearer rate than ſhe could purchaſe it in Sweden or Ruſſia, for the ſake of the long credit, that England is able to give. Beſides, London, where coals are far dearer than in Dublin, as well as labour, proviſions, and taxes beyond compariſon, carries on

* In Dublin, Cork, Bandon, Waterford, Liſmore, Tallow, Carrick on Shannon, &c.

† Foſter, 83.

‡ At Celbridge, Proſperous, Malahide, Balbriggen, Drogheda, Belfaſt, Clonmell, Cork, Michelſtown, Kilmacthomas, Mountrath, &c.

§ Foſter, 82.

on very conſiderable Iron manufactures, in the coarſer articles, which occaſion the greateſt conſumption of fuel, ſuch
Douglas. as anchors, &c. In the manufacture of the ſmaller articles, the price of fuel makes ſcarcely any perceptible difference; their ſucceſs depends wholly on the labour and ſkill of the artizan; and notwithſtanding that labour is dearer where the manufacture of theſe articles is carried on (Sheffield and Birmingham) than in moſt parts of the world, yet England can underſell at the rate of, from 15 to 20 per cent. thoſe of the city of Liege, which has been long celebrated for its manufacture of Hardware, where labour and proviſions are cheaper than on moſt parts of the continent, and firing is procured at the very gates of the city.

Pottery. The value of the manufacture of Pottery depends almoſt wholly on the cheapneſs of labour; in this circumſtance Ireland has an evident advantage, ‡ as well as the neighbourhood of the raw material, flintſtones and clay; for both theſe artieles are found in Ireland,* as well inland, as upon the coaſts, in abundance, and of the beſt quality; while the Engliſh potteries, ſituated in the centre of the Kingdom, bring their raw material from the coaſts of Cornwall, Wales, and Ireland. It was the opinion † both of Mr. Wedgewood, and of Mr. Brierly that England owed her ſuperiority in that branch of manufacture, to the ingenuity of the workmen alone, and that the natural advantages of Ireland would induce them to migrate to that country; as had already been the caſe in the glaſs manufacture, in which the Iriſh are arrived at ſo great a degree of perfection, as to be able to hold a competition with Britain; and that manufacture
Douglas. demands as great a ſupply of fuel as the Pottery. Thoſe gentlemen were alſo of opinion, that as the fine clay can be ſhipped on the coaſt for 6s. or 7s. per ton, but, on account of the inland carriage it ſtands them in Staffordſhire in £1 16 0—to £2 2 per ton, Ireland would have been able, if the propoſitions had paſſed, to have underſold them by 40 or 50 per cent.

Douglas. Becauſe Britiſh capital has not been veſted, nor Britiſh credit pledged in the eſtabliſhment of new manufactures in Ireland, or in the encouragement of thoſe already ſettled there, when there was no Union; it is thence *aſſumed*, that an Union will not furniſh any invitations, which might not have been expected, nor remove any obſtacles, which cannot be done away by other means. This is, however, a mere *petitio*

‡ Foſter, 83.

* See the evidence of Mr. Evans, engineer of the Grand Canal, before the Iriſh Houſe of Commons, in 1783.

† As delivered before the Britiſh Houſe of Commons, in 1785.

petitio principii: beſides, though Britiſh capital to any great amount has not actually ſettled in Ireland, yet it is not a correct inference from thence, that Britiſh money has had no influence in promoting the fabric of Iriſh linens, and other wares.

Britiſh capital now uſed by Ireland. Douglas.

The Iriſh manufacturers and merchants, in general, immediately on ſhipping their linens, draw for two-thirds of the value, on their agents or factors in England, though great part of theſe goods often remains in the hands of ſuch conſignee for ſix, or nine months, beſide the credit that he is obliged to give purchaſers, amounting commonly, to twelve or eighteen months more.

Balance of trade in favour of Ireland. Ld. Auckland, & Douglas, & Ann. Obſerv.

In the Commercial intercourſe between Great Britain and Ireland,* the balance of trade is ſo much in favour of the latter †, and the demand for her produce in the Britiſh market is ſo great an advantage; that Ireland could not in any way receive compenſation for the loſs that would accrue, from the ceſſation of that intercourſe.

Douglas.

Upon a general view of the exports and imports of each country to the other, as authentically reported in March, 1799, by Mr. Irving, Inſpector-General of the imports and exports of Great Britain; it appears, that in the interchange of the produce of the two iſlands, the balance in favour of Ireland is *three millions and a half*; and, including that of foreign merchandize, in which the balance is againſt Ireland, ſtill there remains in her favour a general balance of upwards of £2,000,000. and this depends on the commercial code, not of *Ireland*, but of *Great Britain*.

Thoſe arguments are unfair which attempt to do away this ſtatement,‡ by diſtinguiſhing the exports of Ireland into manufactured goods, and raw materials, which laſt, it is pretended, are of greater benefit, to the country importing, than the export is to that from whence they are ſent; and are therefore ſaid to incline the balance on that article, much in favour of England. But the articles there ſtated as raw materials, are in fact, the produce of agriculture, and articles of manufacture in the proviſion trade, as ſalt beef, pork, butter, &c. which employ a number of hands, and ought therefore to be claſſed under the head of manufacture, of which they are, to Ireland, a valuable and important branch. Beſides, ſimilar articles, as cheeſe, ſalted fiſh, &c. are claſſed among Britiſh exports as *manufactures*. Raw materials are thoſe only, which conſtitute the baſis of a ſubſequent manufacture. There

* See the Speech of the Right Hon. John Foſter in the Houſe of Commons, April 11, 1799. † Foſter, 77. ‡ Ibid. 77, &c.

There is another fallacy in the argument above alluded to; for that ſtatement not only deducts from the exported manufactures of Ireland, all the above articles, to the amount of near £3,000,000, but adds to the manufactures of Great Britain, on the other ſide of the account, what are called *Colonial manufactures*, amounting to £970,000. * But theſe are all raw materials, or articles of conſumption without manufacture, and above one-third not even the produce of the Britiſh colonies: † ſo that here a double fallacy is made uſe of, to prove that England reaps more profit, than Ireland, from their mutual intercourſe; firſt in cutting off the above, one of the manufactures of Ireland, and with a change of name, placing them againſt Great Britain; and ſecondly by ſwelling ſtill more the amount of Britiſh manufactures, with the addition of Indian merchandize, which is no part of them. Nor are any of thoſe articles, the importation of which into Britain is ſtated as being ſo much in favour of that country, of ſuch importance to her, as that ſhe cannot do without them, or ſupply herſelf elſewhere. In order to favour the Iriſh proviſions, Britain has prohibited the importation of that article, in time of peace, from all other countries, even the ſupply from America to the iſlands and fiſheries. It is evident, then, that ſhe does not *depend* on Ireland for a ſupply: and it was but very lately that Ireland was allowed to ſend her proviſions into England (in conſequence of which permiſſion the prices of the produce are trebled in Ireland), and at this day all the boaſted quantity of Beef, which that country ſupplies to England and her fleets, does not amount to one-third of the annual ſale at Douglas. Smithfield, in London, alone. It cannot be ſtated as a benefit conferred on Great Britain, that ſhe *is allowed* the carrying of foreign produce to Ireland, notwithſtanding the *power*, which Ireland has, were ſhe ſo inclined of importing direct; for in mercantile affairs the want of inclination is only another name for the want of means, of which Ireland is abſolutely deſtitute, and therefore incapable of taking that trade out of the hands of Britain.

To ſhew the comparative value of the Britiſh market to Ireland, it is enough to ſtate, from Mr. Irving's report, that of the whole exports of Ireland, 6-7ths are to Great Britain and her colonies; and that with each of theſe the balance of trade

* In the ſtatement alluded to, this ſum, £970,000 is, by miſtake, *twice* charged againſt Britain, firſt under the head of Britiſh manufactures; and again, as foreign produce, which occaſion a very conſiderable error in the balance.

† The article of Tea alone, the produce of China, amounts to £367,887.

trade is in favour of Ireland; while, in the other ſeventh, conſiſting of her trade with all the reſt of the world, the balance is againſt Ireland; that Britain does not raiſe on the goods imported from Ireland more than the *hundred and fortieth* part of her Cuſtoms, of which ſum *ſeven-ninths* are expended in favour of Ireland by bounties on the re-exportation of Iriſh linens: and that the trade of Britain with Ireland amounts not to *one-ninth* of her whole trade, and her exported manufactures to Ireland, to no more than a *twentieth* of her whole export, while on theſe Ireland raiſes nearly *one-half* of her duties.

It ſhould be added, that of the raw materials imported by Ireland from Great Britain, ſome of the moſt eſſential to the manufactures are of ſuch a kind, as ſhe can neither raiſe herſelf, nor procure elſewhere, unleſs at a greater charge than the article is capable of bearing.

Proſperity of the Linen manufacture due to Great Britain.

The increaſe and proſperity of the Linen manufacture is, in a great degree, owing to the Britiſh duties on foreign linens imported, and to bounties on the re-exportation of Iriſh; ‖ for, if foreign linens labouring under a duty of 36½ per cent. on an average * can yet find their way at all into the Britiſh market, it is evident that, without ſuch a protection, the Iriſh would have been driven out by them. England is certainly entitled to acknowledgment for her kindneſs, in this reſpect, becauſe it is notorious, that the foreign duties, impoſed in return on her woollens, have injured their ſale in the foreign market, and becauſe ſhe thus obliges herſelf to purchaſe her linens at a higher rate by 36½ per cent. (beſide the difference by which the foreign linens would be able if there were no duty, to underſell the Iriſh) than ſhe could do, if ſuch duties were not impoſed.† Douglas.

It is however of no conſequence to the preſent queſtion to enquire what were the motives, which induced England to take thoſe meaſures, which have ſerved for the encouragement of the Iriſh Linen manufacture; it is ſufficient to conſider that, *ſuch* has been the effect,‡ and that the continuance Smith.

‖ Foſter, 80.

* It is ſtated by Mr. Douglas, on an average of the whole, to amount to about 25 per cent.; by Dr. Clarke alſo.

† This difference of price, together, amounts, on 30 millions of yards of Iriſh linen, and 11 millions of foreign linen, conſumed in Great Britain, to £1,184,333, and this, with the bounties on the re-export of Iriſh linens, viz. £29,232, makes the ſum of £1,213,565, the abſolute expence to which England puts herſelf for the encouragement of the Linen manufacture of Ireland. Douglas, &c.

‡ The duty on foreign linens has ſerved between the years 1785 and 1798 to alter the proportions of Iriſh, and foreign linen conſumed in Great Britain as follows: in 1785, there were conſumed of Iriſh, 18,500,000 yards;—of foreign 19,000,000 yards. In 1798 of Iriſh, 28,871,334 yards;—of foreign 11,748,164 yards. And in conſequence

Douglas. ance of them *now* depends ſolely on the will of Great Britain. It is argued, indeed, that without the protecting duty Iriſh linens would maintain their ground in the Britiſh market, becauſe, notwithſtanding the late riſe of 35 per cent. upon their price, merchants ſtill purchaſe them with avidity. This extraordinary riſe is owing to the reduced quantity manufactured on the continent; to the greatly increaſed demand, during the war, occaſioned by the conſumption of the armies, and of South America, which was formerly ſupplied by Germany, but now takes a large portion circuitouſly from Ireland; and to the unwiſe ſpeculations, which both theſe circumſtances have induced, and which alone have prevented the riſe on the price of foreign linens from being *fully* equal to that on Iriſh: but as the price abroad has nearly kept pace with it, it is evident that from that increaſe of price in Ireland, no countervailing argument can be drawn, againſt the neceſſity to Ireland of the Britiſh duties on foreign linens.

The export bounty in Great Britain of 12 per cent. has operated it is ſaid very much in favour of Britiſh linens, viz.—as 12 per cent. on them, and only as 5½ per cent. on Iriſh, the remainder barely compenſating the expences of freight, carriage, &c. and by this unequal encouragement, which makes a difference of 6½ per cent. has ſo increaſed the quantity of Britiſh linen exported, that, from being *equal* in 1763, the bounty paid on Britiſh re-exported, was in 1798, to that on Iriſh, as 82 to 25: but if this be the caſe, it is plainly to be inferred from thence that if 5½ per cent. could operate ſo greatly in favour of Britiſh linens, the operation of the remaining 6½ per cent. in favour of Iriſh linens, as oppoſed to foreign, muſt at leaſt be of as great moment to them.

Theſe advantages derived to the great ſtaple manufacture of Ireland, from the conſumption of Britain, and from the meaſures, which the legiſlature of that country has taken for its encouragement, are very generally admitted; but, in order to obviate any claim that Britain might from thence lay to an acknowledgment of liberality on her part, it is aſſerted that England is bound by ſolemn compact to give every encouragement to the Linen manufacture of Ireland, and that for ſo doing ſhe did receive valuable conſideration, in the

of the Britiſh export bounty granted in 1743, the quantity re-exported, increaſed between that year and 1798, from 7,500,000 yards to 41,500,000 yards. The important operation of bounties is evinced in their effect on the Sail-cloth manufacture, of which, in 1750, Ireland exported more than ſhe imported: Britain then commenced a bounty on the export of her own Sail-cloths, and in 1784, Ireland *imported* 480,000 yards, and exported *none*. Foſter's Speech, 1785. See Woodfall.

the ſuppreſſion of the woollen manufacture, in Ireland. Of any ſuch compact, however, no trace or monument exiſts; and the only circumſtance that can be ſaid, in any way to bear ſuch an appearance, has, many years ago, been totally cancelled and done away. In the reign of Charles II. a duty of 8s. 6d. per yard was impoſed in England upon the importation of *all* woollen cloth, from Ireland, and elſewhere: this duty, which in itſelf amounted to a prohibition, has never ſince been leſſened, but, by the common operation of general ſubſidies, it has at different times, been increaſed to £1 17 5 per yard. No concurrence, then, on the part of Ireland, nor conſequently any compact was neceſſary to exclude Iriſh woollens from the Britiſh *home* market. But to prevent the competition of the Iriſh in foreign markets, a law was obtained in the 10th of William III. from the Iriſh Parliament, (who ſeem to have been content, by relinquiſhing that hoſtile competition, to obtain the favour of England for their Linen manufacture, which had even then been carried to a conſiderable height) impoſing an *ad valorem* duty of 4s. in the pound on broad cloths, and 2s. on ſerges, &c: exported from Ireland. This amounted to a prohibition, yet no act was paſſed to check the exportation of Engliſh linens, nor was any compact made for the encouragement of that manufacture in Ireland: the Lords and Commons of England had, indeed, each, in an addreſs to the King, previous to this Iriſh act, intreated his Majeſty "to countenance "as much as poſſible the Linen manufacture, in Ireland, in "caſe the Woollen ſhould be relinquiſhed." At that time, Iriſh linens, though made importable into England, duty free by an act of the 7 & 8 William III. was by a new ſubſidy of five per cent. on *all* goods imported, (8 & 9 Will. III.) made ſubject to that duty: no exemption for them, from this 5 per cent, was obtained, during the life of King William; but in the firſt of Anne, the free importation of Iriſh linen was reſtored, and has been continued ever ſince. The Iriſh woollen-exportation-act expired in 1702, and was not renewed: but a very harſh act, and not temporary, had been paſſed in the *Engliſh* Parliament, (10 & 11 Will. III.) which aſſumed the power of making ſuch a law,—*totally prohibiting* the exportation of Iriſh woollens. This injurious reſtriction, which is the only tranſaction that can be conſtrued into any thing bearing the appearance of *condition*, on the part of Ireland, was at the *expreſs deſire of Ireland*,* removed by the Britiſh act of 20 George III. and the free exportation of Iriſh woollens allowed, to all foreign places. If any *compact*, therefore, exiſted, reſpecting the Linen and Woollen manufactures, this law muſt have completely put an end to it: Great

* Foſter, 80.

Great Britain has, notwithſtanding, ſtill continued her encouragement to the Linens of Ireland,—her free entry, her bounty on exportation, her foreign duties; ſince that period at leaſt, voluntarily and without any compact, or obligation, other, than what the general principles of good policy may impoſe.

Ireland well ſituated to be a depôt of foreign trade to Great Britain.

Ireland is particularly well ſituated, in many caſes, to be a depôt of foreign trade to the Britiſh merchant; but at preſent, ſuch is the confined commercial intercourſe of Ireland, that ſhe cannot make that uſe of her convenient ſituation, becauſe in many inſtances, it would deprive him of the chance of the home market.† Owing to this circumſtance, the redundancy of Britiſh capital has found its way more readily to Hamburgh, Oſtend, and many other parts of the world, than to Ireland; becauſe it can more eaſily be turned there, and returned from thence. But when there ſhall be no diſtinction between the ports of Ireland, and thoſe of Great Britain; the former will feel the full benefit of her ſituation in that reſpect, and will enjoy the influence of the capital and commerce of Great Britain.

† Foſter, Spencer, 88.

AGAINST A LEGISLATIVE UNION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND;

ARGUMENTS *COMMERCIAL*.

THE Commercial intercourſe between Great Britain and Ireland, has been much dwelt upon, as an argument in favour of an Union; as well as the misfortunes, which are repreſented as likely to fall upon the commercial intereſts of Ireland, from the loſs of Britiſh protection and favour. But there is no danger of the loſs of that protection, both, becauſe its continuance on the part of Great Britain is enſured by the never-failing argument of ſelf-intereſt, and becauſe it is claimed by Ireland, not as a boon, but as a right, for the purchaſe of which, ample payment has been made, in the perpetual grant of an Iriſh marine, and in the conſtant ſupply of mariners, which the Britiſh navy draws from that Iſland.

No danger of Britain's withdrawing her protection. Foſter. Goold.

The balance of trade is repreſented, as being ſo greatly in favour of Ireland, that, from her intercourſe with Great Britain, ſhe derives the greater part of the profits of her whole trade. And the encouragements afforded by the Britiſh Parliament,* to the Iriſh Linen manufacture, are ſaid to be of ſuch value, that from them the proſperity of that manufacture is derived, and upon them it depends for its ſupport.

Balance of trade not in favour of Ireland. Foſter.

It is ſtated that, on an average of three years, to 1799, the whole imports into Britain, from Ireland amounted to - - - - £5,612,689
thoſe into Ireland from Britain to - 3,555,445
leaving an *apparent* yearly balance in favour of Ireland, of - - - 2,057,244

But an inveſtigation of the nature and amount of the ſeveral articles, and a compariſon of the benefits, accruing to either country, will place the matter in a very different light, and ſhew that the advantage is in favour of Great Britain. The mere balance of value in money of the articles, imported and exported, which is vulgarly called the Balance of Trade, affords a very inadequate and often a very falſe criterion of the real advantage or diſadvantage of a trade between two countries; for inſtance, in the trade between Great Britain and the Eaſt Indies, the value of imports greatly exceeds that of exports; ſo in the Weſt India trade; yet both trades are highly advantageous and increaſe her wealth and her reſources. Further, in her trade with Ruſſia, the balance is always againſt her, yet the trade is greatly beneficial, as the imports are raw materials or articles of prime neceſſity;—and in every country there is further advantage or diſadvantage in proportion as the navigation or carriage of articles is enjoyed by the one or the other. The trade therefore between Ireland and England may be conſidered in three points of view, as it regards manufactures, raw materials including proviſions, and articles of prime neceſſity, and navigation or the carrying trade.

1ſt,

* Douglas, &c. 71, &c.

1ſt. MANUFACTURES.

Britiſh manufactures exported to Ireland, including colonial produce, (which may be placed under this head, on account of the manual labour and ſhipping employed in them)	£2,614,000
Iriſh manufactures exported to Great Britain, conſiſting of linen alone - - -	2,600,000
Balance in favour of Britain - -	14,000

2d. RAW MATERIALS.

Raw material, ſupplied by Ireland to Great Britain, including articles of prime neceſſity, as, beef, pork, butter, bacon, corn, &c. -	£2,910,724*
Raw material ſupplied by Britain to Ireland, including coals, hops, bark, ſalt, &c. - -	447.477
Exceſs of ſupply by Ireland - -	2,463,247

3d. NAVIGATION or CARRYING TRADE.

Foreign articles taken from Britain, by Ireland - - - - -	£1,468,170
Ditto - - taken from Ireland, by Britain - - - -	101.864
Exceſs taken by Ireland - -	1,366,306

Thus in manufactures the account is nearly equal:† in the raw material and articles of neceſſity, the balance of ſupply is very great in favour of Britain: and, (in the carrying trade of foreign articles,) the exceſs of gain to Britain is prodigious; and in addition to this laſt head it ought to be conſidered, that as of that ſum, the produce of the Eaſt Indies amounts to no more than £407,000, the remainder conſiſting of trade to the value of £1,061,173, is open and free to Ireland, for direct importation, if ſhe were inclined to import in that manner, and to deprive Great Britain of the benefits, that ſhe derives from that branch of Commerce.

To the balance ought alſo to be added the value of the monopoly, which, in her direct importation of colonial produce, Ireland gives to that of the Britiſh colonies, amounting to £1,0,000; as well as the great importance that the Iriſh market is of to England for her Eaſt and Weſt-India articles, becauſe thoſe goods are to England, the means of remitting home the wealth of the diſtant ſettlements.

Ld. Farnham. But without conſidering ſeparately the different articles of import and export, it will appear, that in Mr. Irvine's report there

* This reaſoning and calculation is confirmed by Lord Auckland, who in his Speech of 5th May, 1800, as reported in the Sun, ſays, "he would preſs on the committee the circumſtance of the increaſed advantages which Britain for years paſt had derived from the importation of raw and unimproved produce from Ireland, of the average value of about *three millions*." † Douglas, 71.

there is a fallacy, which will lead to a very erroneous concluſion with regard to the actual balance of trade. He ſtates the value of both exports and imports according to their prices in the *Britiſh market*; the former therefore are truly ſtated at the prime coſt, but to the latter is added the expence of tranſportation, of inſurance, and of cuſtoms paid in England, and the Britiſh merchants profit, which are no addition to the profits of Ireland, nor no loſs to England.

From the balance therefore of £2,056,844, which appears on the face of his reports, in favour of Ireland, theſe charges ought to be deducted. The cuſtoms are ſtated by Lord Auckland at £47,500; the freight, &c. amounts, at leaſt to 1 per cent. and the inſurance to 4 per cent. and, as eſtimated, in computing the Income tax by Mr. Pitt, the merchants profit to 15 per cent. This 20 per cent. upon the prime coſt will amount to £927,561, and, together with the Cuſtoms, ought to be deducted from the eſtimated value of Iriſh exports: the remainder will be the ſum *actually* received by Ireland, as the price of her exported commodities. The real balance in favour of Ireland, upon this view of the matter, will appear to be only £1,081,728. If the Inſpector General in Dublin, were to make his reports in a ſimilar manner with Mr. Irvine, he would with equal truth, make the balance appear to be in favour of England; but his ſtatement for the ſame reaſons would be erroneous alſo.

Linen manufacture not dependent on Britain.

With regard to the Linen manufacture, the Britiſh market is undoubtedly of very great value to Ireland. But if Great Britain were to engage in a war of duties and to impoſe ſuch as would exclude the Iriſh linens from her market, it would fall heavier on the Britiſh conſumer, than on the manufacturer: for not being able to ſupply herſelf at home, England muſt then have recourſe to Germany and Ruſſia for the neceſſary ſupply, paying a heavy tax to the ſtate, and her money to a ſtranger; while Ireland would probably be able very ſoon to find another market for her produce.

And it is evident that if Iriſh linens were made ſubject to *equal* duties with foreign linens, on importation into Great Britain, ſtill, even under this diſadvantage, they would obtain admiſſion into her market, becauſe it is the intereſt of Britain to purchaſe them: for, though, at this moment the prices of linen in Ireland, are 35 per cent. higher than their uſual rate, yet the Britiſh merchants are anxious to ſecure them even the greens, before they go to market.

This riſe, indeed, is temporary, but it ſerves to ſhew, that the Iriſh linens do not depend, for the poſſeſſion of the Britiſh market, on the protection of thoſe duties alone, but, without them, can find their way there.

Lord

Lord Grenville, in 1785, ſtated it as his opinion that a prohibition of Iriſh linens from the Britiſh market, would operate more to the detriment of England, than of Ireland, by the injury it would occaſion, in the article of ſhipping and the carrying trade, and by the intercourſe which it would promote, between Ireland and foreign ſtates.

Anon. Nor would the loſs of the Britiſh market for her linens be any ſuch mighty evil to Ireland, as it is apprehended. Any reſtriction that had been impoſed on the Linen manufacture, in its infancy, when it was the ſole reſource of the country, and no other manufacture was allowed, might have been extremely injurious; but, ſuppoſing that it were now in the power of Britain, by any regulations or reſtrictions, to prevent its further growth, the bad conſequences would not be the ſame; for it is idle to ſuppoſe that money and induſtry would not re-produce as well to the riſk, in ſome other article of manufacture, or trade, as in the Linen buſineſs; or that the loſs of *one* market for one branch of manufacture, could materially depreſs a country which is increaſing in ſkill, induſtry, and capital, when the whole world is her mark, and every branch of trade is open to her endeavours.

But Ireland does not, in the article of linen, poſſeſs excluſively the Britiſh market: the linens of Germany, Ruſſia, Pruſſia, Scotland, and Ireland all gain admiſſion there, and find ample room, without any grounds for jealouſy. The *coarſe* linens of foreign manufacture are eſteemed ſuperior, but the peculiar qualities of the Iriſh linens muſt ever ſecure them a market, and the unrivalled excellence of the fine linens of Ireland, enſures them a demand, as long as luxury and delicacy ſhall exiſt: the coarſer ſorts are equally ſought, and certain of conſtant ſale, on account of their ſuperior fitneſs for the ſtamping buſineſs, which ariſes from their ſtrong texture; and of their thinneſs, which adapts them for women's uſe and for hot climates. For theſe reaſons they are preferred by America to the fabric of any other part of the world and the ſame qualities ſecure to them the Britiſh market.

Foſter, The danger is merely imaginary, to which the proſperity of the Linen manufacture is ſaid to be expoſed, from the power poſſeſſed by the Britiſh Parliament of recalling thoſe meaſures, which have ſerved as an encouragement. Theſe are two: the Britiſh duties on foreign linens, and the Britiſh bounties on the export of Iriſh linens. But it was not for the ſake of Ireland, that thoſe duties were impoſed, as appears, by the report of the board of trade in 1698, that the deſign of them was to protect the *Britiſh* linen manufacturer, and the *Britiſh* trader in Iriſh linens; and therefore their permanency

permanency depends not on the good will that Britain bears to Ireland, but on the intereſt of Britain.

Beſides, Britain is bound alſo by ſolemn compact to protect and encourage in every inſtance the Iriſh linen manufacture,* and for ſo covenanting, ſhe received valuable conſideration from Ireland, in the ſuppreſſion of the woollen trade of Ireland, at a time when the exports in that branch amounted to £110,000 (1-5th of her whole exports.)

Neither was the export bounty granted for the ſake of Ireland, but in compliance with the petition of the London trader and the Scottiſh manufacturer, who aſked for that in preference to the plan then ſuggeſted, of refuſing the drawback on foreign linen,—in which no benefit to Ireland could have been intended: and till the year 1780, thoſe bounties were confined to perſons reſiding in Great Britain, becauſe they were intended for the benefits of the Britiſh merchant, and for the prevention of direct export from Ireland: And, as they are reſtricted to Iriſh linens of eighteen-pence per yard, and are forfeited on ſtamped linens, they are fully countervailed by the drawback of the duties, allowed on the re-exportation of German and Ruſſian linens, and are thus almoſt reduced to nothing. The effect alſo which they have produced, has been much greater in favour of the Britiſh than the Iriſh manufacture, operating on the former as 12 per cent. but on the latter only as 6½ per cent.;—for the remaining 5½ per cent. ſerves only to compenſate the charges of freight, commiſſion, &c. Theſe bounties commenced in 1743, and by the unequal encouragement thus afforded, the export of Britiſh linens was ſo raiſed as to equal that of the Iriſh in 1763; and ſince that period they have ſo much exceeded the Iriſh, that in 1797, the bounties paid on Britiſh linens (excluſive of £56,935, paid on *printed* linens and cottons, all Britiſh alſo) amounted to £82,935, and thoſe on Iriſh, but to £24,459; and that was only on 3,000,000 yards. Anon. Foſter.

All thoſe threats, therefore, of diſpleaſure and reſentment on the part of Great Britain, which are held out, in order to urge Ireland into acquieſcence in an Union, are idle and inſignificant; and it is neither a neceſſary nor a probable conſequence of the rejection of the propoſal, that a ſyſtem of oppreſſive and reſentful regulations ſhould commence; and if ſuch a meaſure were adopted, its conſequences would not be ſuch as are apprehended. Anon.

It is a miſtatement to value the amount of Iriſh manufactures conſumed in the Britiſh market, at ſo great a ſum as *four or five millions*, for it conſiſts of linens alone, Foſter,

* Douglas, 76.

which do not exceed 2,600,000l. and for this article, if excluded from Britain, other markets may be found. All the raw materials with which Ireland is now ſupplied from the ſiſter iſland, ſuch as coals, ſalt, hops, bark,—may with a little care and diligence be procured at home, or perhaps obtained elſewhere: but, thoſe which Ireland furniſhes to Great Britain, are of equal importance to that country and of much greater amount; and if ſhe turns away the ſource whence ſhe now ſupplies herſelf, it will be *much more difficult for her* to ſubſtitute any other method of procuring a ſupply. Ireland, beſides, is no contemptible cuſtomer to her neighbour; for the Britiſh manufactures exported to that iſland are equal to one-third of thoſe exported to all the reſt of Europe, including Jerſey, Guernſey, Greenland, and the Iſle of Man.

& Bousfield.

Foſter.

An Union will not invite Britiſh ſettlers.

But an Union, they ſay, will invite Britiſh ſettlers and Britiſh capital to Ireland, and will induce ſpeculation in ſo fair a field for adventure in the manufacturing line. The principal inducement, relied upon in this ſuppoſition, is the comparative cheapneſs of labour and proviſions: but, as it was very juſtly argued by Mr. Pitt, in 1785, the price of labour conſiſts not merely in the wages paid, for the coarſe works of huſbandry; the comparative ſkill, induſtry, and ingenuity of the labourer muſt be conſidered, together with the quantity of work produced; and taken in this point of view, labour will appear to bear a *higher* price in Ireland, than it does in Britain. Mr. Pitt quoted the authority of the firſt cotton manufacturer in Ireland, Major Brooke, who, he ſaid, was ſeveral times in danger of loſing his life, becauſe he would not allow his workmen *higher wages* than were given at Mancheſter. The other inducement, the cheapneſs of proviſions, would vaniſh, as ſoon as manufactures were eſtabliſhed; for it ariſes now merely from the circumſtance, that the raiſing of proviſions is the ſole occupation of the people.

Tit for Tat. Anon.

Engliſh manufacturs will not ſucceed in Ireland.

But a more detailed view of the ſubject will make it appear, that not one of the chief manufactures of England, can ſucceed in Ireland. The principal and the moſt profitable are the woollen, the cotton, the iron and the pottery. Of theſe the two laſt depend ſo entirely on the plenty and cheapneſs of fuel, that they have never been known to form a ſettlement, in England, at any diſtance from a plentiful colliery; and fire forms ſo great a portion of their expences, that that part of the country, which affords it beſt and cheapeſt, muſt always have a decided preference.

Foſter.

Iron.

In the iron manufacture, the encouragements to eſtabliſh it in Ireland are ſuperior to thoſe offered by Great Britain, for

for the former imports under a duty of 12s. 6d. per ton, while the Britiſh duty is 3l. nearly ;* this difference operates as a bounty of above 40s. per ton in favour of the Iriſh manufacturer ; and yet, this great advantage has brought no capital into Ireland. It is not likely then, that ſuch an effect will be produced by the removal of that, in the propoſed equalization of duties.

Pottery. In the pottery, flint and clay, though ſo abundant in England, have not been found in any quantity in Ireland :† and there is not a ſingle pottery eſtabliſhed in the kingdom.

The ſame facility of fuel muſt give England an unequivocal advantage in all manufactures, which make uſe of the ſteam engine.

Woollen. Fuel is a matter of great conſideration in the woollen manufacture ; ſo that, though that manufacture has been for centuries eſtabliſhed in Yorkſhire, it has never yet extended itſelf above ten miles from that circle of country, where coals abound.‡ There are other conſiderations too not to be overlooked, by him who forms ſpeculations for extending himſelf in this buſineſs. England finds a full call for all ſhe makes, and every year affords an increaſing demand : And if a man ſpeculate to veſt more capital in his buſineſs, he will ſurely prefer his own ſpot, for extending himſelf, where his returns are known and his market certain, to a new and diſtant country, whoſe works he can already ſo much underſell, as to oblige its people to come and offer him their market, at his own door : he will conclude that, where he is, he can manufacture at a cheaper rate, than he could in Ireland, by the amount of the whole expence of carriage, freight, &c. and of the Iriſh duties charged on importation.

An Union offers not one inducement to counterbalance theſe diſadvantages : it will afford no additional ſupply of fuel ; it will not provide a better market, or a greater freedom of export, than Ireland has enjoyed for theſe twenty years ; it cannot procure for manufacturers a larger ſupply of wool than is now to be had, and already Ireland exports no unwrought wool, but works up all that ſhe produces : even that quantity is likely to leſſen, as the increaſe of agriculture and the linen manufacture give a better profit in land than ſheep afford. An Union will obtain no additional protecting duties, for it is to be ſtipulated by the 6th Propoſition, that theſe are never to be raiſed, but in time to ceaſe.

Cotton. In the cotton manufacture, the probability is as little favourable to Ireland. For many years the machinery made uſe of, in the cotton buſineſs was ſubject in England, to the heavy charge of 2s. 6d. annually, on every ſpindle for Arkwright's

* Lord Auckland, Douglas, 69.
† Douglas, 70. ‡ Lord Auckland, 69.

Arkwright's patent: this operated as a bounty in favour of Ireland which was free from ſuch a charge; yet it never induced any adventurer to carry his capital into Ireland.

The patent is now expired, and that charge has ceaſed; and there is little likelihood of that happening without its aſſiſtance, which ſo great an encouragement never could effect. Even on the coaſt neareſt to Britain and immediately oppoſite the collieries, cotton twiſt cannot be made within 20 per cent. as cheap as England can ſupply it.

In 1785, when the Commercial Propoſitions were under diſcuſſion, the cotton manufacturers of England were much alarmed, leſt their regulation ſhould have the effect of removing the trade to Ireland. In order to quiet their fears, Mr. Pitt then ſtated it as his opinion,* "that there was no danger of ſo poor a country as Ireland, ever being able to draw from England either her workmen, her trade or her capital. It appears, then, that there is no proſpect of an eſtabliſhment being effected in Ireland, by Britiſh capital, of thoſe manufactures in which Great Britain chiefly excels.

Linen manufacture will not invite Britiſh capital.

In the linen manufacture, Ireland can underſell England, and poſſeſſes advantages by nature, which England has not; but that Britiſh capital ſhould eſtabliſh itſelf in Ireland, in that branch, is equally improbable: if, in the courſe of ninety years, during which the linen manufacture has been free and open, cheriſhed and ſupported by laws and beneficial large grants from the Iriſh Parliament,† ſcarcely any Britiſh capital has been veſted in it; there is little proſpect of that taking place, when its protecting guardian is no more, and no additional encouragement is held out to replace it; and when the great progreſs of that manufacture in Britain ſhall have taught men, that equal profits may be derived from it in that country, and ſhall induce them to purſue it at home.

Thus it appears, that there is no room to expect from an Union any new motive, that can induce Britain to employ her capital in Ireland, in any manufactures for home conſumption. Indeed if ſuch an employment of Engliſh capital were to be the conſequence of an Union; its miſchievous effects would ſerve only, to divert to purpoſes of frippery, faſhion, and luxury, thoſe exertions which are now employed in the ſubſtantial purſuits of agriculture.

Weld.

Foſter, If it be not worth the while of Britiſh capital to ſpeculate for the home market, ſpeculation for the ſupply of the foreign becomes conſequently abſurd; for if Britain can underſell Ireland at home, ſhe will, upon the ſame grounds, be able to do ſo abroad alſo, and that in a larger proportion, on account of her eſtabliſhed credit.

If

* Lord Auckland, 69. † Douglas, 70.

But if Britiſh capital ſhould come to Ireland, to deal in foreign articles of import, its object muſt either be to provide thoſe articles for home uſe, or to import them with a view to re-exportation. If for home uſe, ſuch a dealer, inſtead of being beneficial becomes an injury to the country, by increaſing the quantity of imports, to the prejudice of the home manufacture. If for re-exportation, little benefit can be derived to Ireland from ſuch a traffic: * and it has been the declared opinion of an able ſtateſman, that Ireland never can become the depôt, or emporium of foreign goods, for the ſupply either of the Britiſh, or the foreign market. But even ſuppoſing it a beneficial branch of commerce, no new inducement to purſue it, would be furniſhed by an Union, for Ireland is at this moment as free to trade with all the world, as Great Britain is herſelf.† & Spencer.

In point of commerce then Ireland has nothing to hope from an Union: nor is the influx of Britiſh capital, however uſeful it might be, by any means indiſpenſable to the proſperity of Ireland. Iriſh induſtry has already created a capital, which the daily growth of that induſtry will continue daily to augment in an increaſed ratio—a capital infinitely more uſeful, than any that can be produced by the forced influx of wealth; becauſe it is the *gradual* produce of induſtry, and improving experience, which can alone be ſecure or permanent. Foſter, & Spencer, & Bousfield. Spencer. Goold.

But the Britiſh cabinet well knows, that there is no probability of Britiſh capital being tranſported to Ireland: and, were it not certain of this point, it would not be raſh enough to propoſe a meaſure that might endanger the wealth, power, and aſcendency of Britain. That country has not natural reſources to ſupport the rank which it now holds among nations, but depends upon the returns of an extenſive commerce: if then capital be removed elſewhere, and decreaſe at home, conſequently ſo will commerce, and Great Britain muſt deſcend from the exalted ſtation, which ſhe has attained. Goold. & Anon.

The great improvement in the condition of Scotland, which has taken place ſince the period when that country was united to England, has been held out as a lure to Ireland, to follow the example. But the reaſoning is falſe, becauſe it falſely attributes to the effects of the Union, the increaſe of wealth population and trade, that has taken place in Scotland; as if nothing was due to the progreſſive improvement of the world, during almoſt a century But taking all her proſperity as the conſequences of her Union,‖ ſtill her progreſs has been inferior to that of *ununited* Ireland, the *Analogy of the improvement of Scotland, falſe.* Foſter, & Spencer,

* See Doctor Adam Smith's Enquiry into the Cauſes, &c.
† Douglas, 76. ‖ Ibid. 16.

Anon. and of all ſurrounding nations in the ſame period. The improvement would probably have been conſiderably greater, but for the conſtant drain of her wealth to England, by her quota of ſupply, and by her abſentees.

Foſter. The Linen manufacture of Scotland, which is ſtated by Mr. Dundas, as the teſt of his country's proſperity, has increaſed between 1706 and 1796, in the proportion of 23 to 1, while that of Ireland made a progreſs, in the ſame time, of 88 to 1.* During that term, the population of Scotland has been enlarged from one million to one and a half; that of Ireland from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{1}{2}$.

The exports of Ireland have been multiplied more than tenfold; thoſe of united Britain, not fourfold.†

Anon. Beſides Scotland and England, at the time of the Union, were upon an equal footing; they were both poor, and have grown up together to opulence, and proſperity: but, while Ireland is ſtill young and poor, Great Britain is arrived at full maturity.

Goold. But ſince the period of the Union the population of Scotland has advanced but little, the manufactures have ſcarcely improved, commerce and agriculture have been ſtationary, and civil liberty merely a name; for in all Scotland there are but 2000 voters, and many of theſe are nominal ſuperiorities, without any property whatever: and the want of a reſident Legiſlature has been the cauſe of Scotland's remaining in ſuch a condition, in all theſe reſpects.

Britiſh Parliament ignorant of local intereſts.
Anon. In every country, but more eſpecially in one which is poor and only beginning to riſe, there are different intereſts, according to the relative ſituation of different parts.‡ Theſe, it muſt be confeſſed, are frequently overlooked and miſunderſtood, even by a reſident legiſlature; the great defect of which ariſes from its not admitting ſufficiently the influence of the mercantile claſs of ſociety. And there is little probability that ſuch peculiar and various intereſts will be better underſtood, or better attended to by an alien Parliament, ſitting in another kingdom, and compoſed of men never reſident in the country, and unacquainted with all its local circumſtances.

Union would leſſen capital.
Anon. It is a maxim in political oeconomy, that the proportion between capital and revenue, ever regulates that between induſtry and idleneſs; that where capital predominates, induſtry prevails, and that idleneſs is apparent, where revenue bears the larger proportion. But by the increaſe of Abſentees,

* Douglas, 16.

† Exports of Ireland.

In 1706, - - -	548,318
In 1796, - -	5,064,834

Exports of Great Britain.

In 1706, - -	6,512,086
In 1796, - -	27,621,843

‡ Douglas, 46.

tees, and by additional taxation, an Union would cauſe a double diminution of capital in Ireland. Its direct tendency therefore would be to promote idleneſs, thus affording another, *accelerating* cauſe for the decreaſe of capital.

Would ruin manufacture. Anon.

By giving to Britain the power of reſtricting, regulating, and controling the trade with Ireland, an Union will enable her to take ſuch meaſures, as always to underſel Ireland, even in the Iriſh market, and conſequently to annihilate the riſing manufactures of that country; the rents and prices of land would fall of *courſe*, becauſe its produce would loſe the market now ſupplied by the conſumption of thoſe numerous manufacturers, who would then be either reduced to beggary, or obliged to leave the kingdom in ſearch of employment: and Ireland would be under the neceſſity of again having recourſe to the corn and proviſion trade, from which ſhe is juſt beginning to eſcape.

Agriculture has no excluſive claim to preference, over every other means of employing induſtry: it deſerves favour, only in that proportion, in which it may be found productive. The improvement of agriculture, and the cultivation of waſte lands are beſt promoted by the extenſion of manufactures, which create a more certain and more profitable conſumption for the produce of land, than can be any otherwiſe procured.

By an Union, Ireland would be compelled to direct a great part of her induſtry to agriculture: but many impediments exiſt, to prevent Ireland from receiving the full benefits of her agricultural induſtry, and not one of theſe would be removed by an Union. It would not aboliſh the ſyſtem of primogeniture, which, in ſome caſes prevents the poſſibility of letting lands on ſuch leaſes, as are neceſſary to animate induſtry: nor that of tithes, which diſguſts men, with agricultural exertion: it would neither induce the return of abſent landlords, nor convince them of the pernicious conſequences, that reſult from the uſual mode of letting their eſtates, to middlemen. Beſide this, after the reſtoration of peace in Europe, the agricultural produce of Ireland, will have no market left for its diſpoſal, becauſe the great political improvements, which are rapidly extending their influence to all nations, will enable them to take advantage of their natural reſources, and ſupply their own conſumption. Britain will be her only market, but even Great Britain will be rendered, by her improved cultivation of the country, adequate to her own ſupply.

Free intercourſe with Britain, not beneficial. Anon. & Bousfield.

A free and unreſtricted intercourſe of traffic with Great Britain would not tend to the advantage of Ireland, by augmenting the exportation either of thoſe articles, which ſhe is in the habit of ſending to the Britiſh market or of others.

others. All the principal articles of export from Ireland to Great Britain,—provisions, corn, hides, cordage, cables, sail-cloth, wool, yarn and linens, are *now* either free, or subject to very trifling duties: and in those articles of Irish produce, which by the heavy duties on importation, are now excluded from the British market, Ireland would be unable to undersell England, even though these duties were to be removed, so that in them also competition would be equally beyond her reach. Such was the opinion of the principal manufacturers of England, as declared before the Lords of Trade, with regard to woollens, printed cottons, silks, iron, pottery and the produce of the brewery. And the great improvements in agriculture, that have recently taken place in England, make it absurd to expect that Ireland shall be able, in that branch, to enter into competition with her, in the British market.

The apprehension of a war of duties is very futile, for England is as much benefited by the import, as Ireland by the export of those articles, with which Britain is from thence supplied: And, while Britain would suffer material injury from the loss of the raw material, which she procures from Ireland, it would be a considerable advantage to Ireland to have that exportation prevented.

But Ireland is threatened with the loss of British protection. To this it may be answered, that the best protection of a country, consists in forwarding her interests, not in reducing her to servitude; that Britain owes more to Ireland, than she can claim as due to her, by that country, which has ever been her best and most constant friend; that the interests of Britain will always oblige her to exert herself for the protection of Ireland; and that Ireland has a *right* to a protection, for which she has largely paid.

British partnership not desirable. Taaffe.

But, an Union, we are told will procure for Ireland, admission to all the benefits of British commerce; as a younger sister, setting out in the world, she is to be taken into partnership in a great, wealthy, and extensive house. If however that great house be overloaded with immense debts, and stand on the verge of bankruptcy, and the younger partner be admitted merely to a state of subjection and dependence on her associate,—to share the risk, and not the profits of the firm; then this splendid partnership can have no other effect, than to prevent the younger partner from rising in the world by her own means, and to chain her to an over-grown, sinking firm; to which she has been obliged to resign her whole capital, without a possibility of ever being able to withdraw it, however uneasy the new situation may be found. Rudd.

THE END.

CAMBRIDGE